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 i 
Abstract 
This dissertation examines the policy making of the United Kingdom towards the Single 
European Act (SEA) from June 1984 to December 1985. The SEA codified the practice of 
foreign policy coordination and began a process of liberalising the Single Market of the 
European Community (EC). The literature has identified the SEA as an important milestone 
in the process of European integration. Controversy surrounds the question as to how 
Margaret Thatcher could sign the SEA but afterwards say she did not like it. This research 
makes a contribution with a multi-archival and multilingual analysis of the UK government’s 
decision making and diplomacy in the negotiations that lead to the SEA. This dissertation 
argues that the UK government’s approach to the SEA went through two phases. In the first 
phase, Thatcher unsuccessfully attempted to lead the EC, in cooperation with Germany and 
France, into formalising foreign policy coordination. In the second phase, Thatcher withheld 
her commitment to the ongoing talks until the shape of the SEA had become clear, while the 
Foreign Secretary and diplomats were negotiating the clauses of the SEA. Using the SEA as a 
lens makes it possible to comment on the broader theme of Margaret Thatcher’s views on 
European integration and adds a puzzle piece to the history of the relationship between the 
UK and the EC. 
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 1 
Introduction 
“If Britain were to withdraw, we might imagine that we could regain 
complete national sovereignty. But it would, in fact, be an illusion. Our lives 
would be increasingly influenced by the EEC, yet we would have no say in 
decisions, which would vitally affect us”.1  
Margaret Thatcher (1975) 
“Yes, we got our fingers burnt [with the Single European Act]. Do not now 
go back to that same fire with a much bigger treaty with many more powers 
and get both your arms and perhaps your head burnt as well”.2  
Margaret Thatcher (1993) 
 
Margaret Thatcher’s views on European integration have always been of interest, 
never more so than now, as Brexit is keeping the issue of Britain and its relationship with the 
European Union in the news. Thatcher campaigned alongside Edward Heath to keep Britain 
in the European Economic Community (EEC) during the 1975 referendum but warned John 
Major that he would get his “head burnt” if he signed the Maastricht Treaty.3 The quotes 
above illustrate how Thatcher’s views on European integration changed over the course of her 
political career. The Single European Act (SEA) sits at an important crossroad for Margaret 
Thatcher and for the UK in the European Community (EC). Before 1985, Thatcher’s views on 
the issue of “Europe” followed the line that Harold Macmillan and Edward Heath had 
charted, which emphasised the benefits of EC membership to Britain’s standing in the world 
and to the economy. After the SEA was ratified, Thatcher began to express doubts, not of 
membership in the EC, but of the current direction of European integration. The most famous 
of such expressions was her landmark speech on 20 September 1988 in Bruges, when she said 
that “we have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them 
 
1 Margaret Thatcher quoted in Saunders, Yes to Europe! The 1975 Referendum and Seventies Britain 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 247. 
2 Speech by Margaret Thatcher in House of Lords, European Communities (Amendment) Bill debate, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108317.  
3 Uwe W. Kitzinger and David H. E. Butler, The 1975 referendum (London: Macmillan, 1976); Saunders, Yes to 
Europe! The 1975 Referendum and Seventies Britain; Stephen Wall, The Official History of Britain and the 
European Community: From Rejection to Referendum, 1963-1975 (Routledge, 2012); Speech by Margaret 
Thatcher in House of Lords, European Communities (Amendment) Bill debate, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108317. 
 2 
re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from 
Brussels”.4 By studying the SEA, my research adds a vital piece to the puzzle about Britain’s 
policy making towards the EC in the mid-1980s and on Thatcher’s own thinking about 
European integration. 
Thatcher wrote in her memoirs that “the Single Market was very much a British 
initiative”.5 Thatcher argued that she was prepared to accept majority voting and 
standardisations as “the price” for achieving a better functioning of the Single Market, but 
hastened to add she could not have known that such powers would later be used to legislate 
on social policies after the Single Market had been achieved.6 Looking back at the SEA from 
retirement, Margaret Thatcher argued that the SEA had been a “disappointment”.7 After 
retiring, Thatcher believed that majority voting, which the SEA significantly extended, was 
being used to “push corporatist and collectivist social legislation upon Britain by the back 
door”.8 Thatcher’s changing views on the SEA pose a very interesting question: if the SEA 
was such a disadvantageous treaty for the UK, why had she decided to agree to the treaty and 
how did her government negotiate the provisions in the SEA? It is this discrepancy between 
the rhetorical element of Thatcher’s European policies and her commitment to the practical 
aspects of European integration in the SEA that puzzled me and motivated me to conduct a 
detailed archival study of Thatcher’s policies towards the SEA. My research was driven by 
wanting to understand the tension between Thatcher’s commitment to European integration 
and her rejection of many aspects that came with being a member of the EC. How Margaret 
Thatcher and her government negotiated the SEA, the diplomatic bargaining, the 
disagreements over conflicting views on European integrations and how the British 
 
4 Speech by Margaret Thatcher to the College of Europe in Bruges, 20 September 1988, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332. 
5 Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World (Harper Collins, 2003), 372. 
6 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1995), 553, 556-57; Thatcher, 
Statecraft, 374-6. 
7 Ibid., 376. 
8 Ibid., 374–5. 
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government engaged in the negotiations towards the SEA will be the focus of this Ph.D. 
dissertation.  
Using the SEA as a lens this Ph.D. dissertation studies the evolution of European 
policy making of Margaret Thatcher and her government from June 1984 to December 1985 
and examines what this says about her views towards European integration. The focus of this 
dissertation is to assess the evolution of Britain’s policy towards the SEA and to analyse how 
the British government negotiated in the diplomatic setting of the EC, by examining multiple 
archival records. The multi-archival methodology that underpins this research will be 
explained in the section on methods and sources below. The outcome is a fine-grained and 
narrowly focused account that explains in detail how the UK contributed to and engaged in 
the negotiations towards the SEA. This research can thus shed new light on the role of the UK 
in the negotiations that led to the SEA. Moreover, by drawing on British, French and German 
sources this research analyses how the British government interacted in the high-level 
diplomatic forums where the SEA was discussed. This dissertation asks a three-pronged 
research question: firstly, what was the policy of the UK government towards the SEA? 
Secondly, how did the diplomacy of the UK leading up to the act evolve? Thirdly, what can 
the SEA tell us about Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative government’s attitudes 
towards European integration? These overarching research questions opened up other 
questions, such as how the UK engaged with the EC diplomatically, and how Britain 
negotiated with the EC’s main powers, France and Germany. These issues will be explored at 
apt chronological moments during the course of the thesis.  
The SEA needs to be situated in the historical context of European integration. In 
1951 the Treaty of Paris founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and in 
1957 the Treaties of Rome founded the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom. 
These treaties founded the European Community and established the Common Market as a 
tariff-free zone of trade. The “Merger Treaty” of 1965 established a single Council of 
 4 
Ministers and one European Commission. In 1992 the Treaty of European Union, which 
became known as the “Maastricht Treaty”, established a treaty structure of three pillars that 
created the European Union as a new organisation.9 The SEA sits between the Merger Treaty 
and the Maastricht Treaty. The SEA was the first substantial amendment of the Treaty of 
Rome that founded the EEC in 1957 and which shall henceforth be referred to as the “EEC 
treaty”. With the negotiation for the SEA, for the first time since the creation of the EEC the 
political will was summoned by all member states to negotiate detailed changes to the articles 
of the EEC treaty. In doing so the EC collectively began to formulate answers to the 
challenges that the EC faced in the 1980s. The 1980s were marked by increased economic 
competition from the USA and Japan, developments of new technologies (such as microchips 
and industrial lasers) and, with the end of détente, a renewed heightening of Cold War 
tensions. The SEA also reflected the reforms that were undertaken during the 1970s, such as 
first successes in European Political Cooperation (EPC), the commitment to stable exchange 
rates and the setting up of the European Monetary System (EMS), the successful participation 
of Roy Jenkins, European Commission president, at international high-level summits and 
gave a legal basis to the meeting of heads of government in the European Council.10  
The SEA was an ambitious political programme of liberalising the Internal Market 
and a further step towards turning a commitment made with the EEC treaty to the free 
movement of goods, services and people, into reality. The SEA committed the EC to 
establishing the Single Market by 1992, which was implemented by following the 
 
9 The three pillars were the European Communities, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and 
Home Affairs. 
10 See Daniel Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream 
of Political Unity (London: IB Tauris, 2009); Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol and Federico Romero, eds., 
International Summitry and Global Governance: The Rise of the G7 and the European Council, 1974-1991 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2014); Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the 
European Monetary System (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2012); Peter Ludlow, The Making of the 
European Monetary System: A Case Study of the Politics of the European Community, Butterworths European 
Studies (London: Butterworth scientific, 1982); N. Piers Ludlow, ‘The Unnoticed Apogee of Atlanticism?: US-
Western European Relations during the Early Reagan Era’, in European Integration and the Atlantic Community 
in the 1980s, ed. Kiran Klaus Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 17-
38; N. Piers Ludlow, Roy Jenkins and the European Commission Presidency, 1976-1980: At the Heart of Europe 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
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recommendations of a White Paper written by the European Commission.11 The White Paper 
suggested the successive abolition, or harmonisation, of a list of approximately 300 non-tariff 
barriers (NTB) to trade. Therefore, the SEA prepared the legal basis for turning the Internal 
Market, which since the establishment of the Common Market had no internal tariffs, into the 
Single Market, by lowering technical, financial and fiscal NTBs. To implement the Single 
Market, the SEA introduced more majority voting provisions, and revived existing unused 
ones. The SEA also provided a legal basis for involving the European Parliament (EP) more 
in the process of EC-law making through a consultation process, giving the European 
Commission more executive power and establishing a court of first instance at the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). Moreover, the preamble of the SEA contained a commitment to 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and endorsed measures of social, environmental and 
technical cooperation. Finally, the signatories of the SEA committed themselves to codifying 
the coordination of their foreign policies in an EPC framework, which involved regular 
meetings to align their positions in an attempt to create a “European foreign policy”.12  
It is also important to put the SEA in perspective by recognising that it was just one 
of several issues that the second Thatcher government and the EC were dealing with. In 
domestic politics the SEA was a low-salience issue, exemplified by nearly a third of MPs not 
showing up to vote on its ratification.13 In 1985 the Westland Affair began, which was a 
dispute over whether a European or American company should take over an ailing military 
helicopter manufacturing company. The conflict laid bare the divisions in Cabinet and 
publicly exposed Thatcher’s sometimes abrasive leadership style when Michael Heseltine, 
Secretary of State for Defence, resigned in January 1986. Also in 1985, the miners’ strike was 
 
11 Arthur S. Cockfield, ‘Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council (Milan, 28-29 June 1985)’, 14 June 1985, 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf. 
12 The UK National Archives (henceforth TNA) FO 949/553, “Single European Act and Final Act with 
declarations by Italy and Federal Republic of Germany made on signature Place of Signing: Luxembourg, The 
Hague,” 17 and 28 February 1986. 
13 The SEA passed by 270 to 153 votes. See Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill 
to Blair (London: MacMillan, 1998), 334; Anthony Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics, 
Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2002), 67, 
80. 
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coming to an end, which for Thatcher meant that she had won against those who she called 
“the enemy within”. Moreover, the Brighton bomb of 12 October 1984 had accentuated the 
importance of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference which concluded in November 
1985 with an agreement that aimed to put an end to “the troubles” in Northern Ireland. In 
European integration, the EC was busy with finding a resolution to the dispute on the British 
Budget Question (BBQ) and engaged in the accession negotiations for Greece, Spain and 
Portugal.14 Greece gained full membership in 1981 and Iberian enlargement was to take effect 
from 1986. The combined effects of stalled new developments, such as the Genscher-
Colombo proposals in 1981 (proposing the extension of EC powers into foreign policy, 
defence, justice and a revival of majority voting), with enlargement (from 9 to 12 member 
states) were important factors in the debates on how to take the project of European 
integration into the future.15 With the end of détente, Cold War tensions were increasing 
again. Moreover, on 16 December 1984, Thatcher met Mikhail Gorbachev. Konstantin 
Chernenko passed away on 10 March 1985 and Gorbachev came to power the day afterwards. 
These domestic and international developments lie outside the scope of my research but were 
important because they shaped the world around the topic of this dissertation.  
It is important to clarify some of the terminologies used in this dissertation. One of 
the challenges in writing about European integration is that different actors used different 
terminologies at different times and did so inconsistently, vaguely or even wrongly. A further 
challenge was that sometimes terms were used to describe aspirations. Helmut Kohl for 
instance used the term European Union in an aspirational sense, whereas Margaret Thatcher 
avoided using the term because she believed it had no clear meaning. Equally, Margaret 
Thatcher referred to the EP by its old name of “assembly” to make a clear distinction between 
the EP and national parliaments. Therefore, these terms have to be seen in the context of who 
 
14 Eirini Karamouzi, Greece, the EEC and the Cold War 1974-1979: The Second Enlargement: (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Jurgen Elvert and Wolfram Kaiser, eds., European Union Enlargement: A 
Comparative History (London: Routledge, 2006). 
15 Deborah Cuccia, ‘The Genscher-Colombo Plan: A Forgotten Page in the European Integration History’, 
Journal of European Integration History 24, no. 1 (2018): 59–78, https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2018-1-59.  
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used them, when and for what purpose. In general, this dissertation tries to bridge staying true 
to sources with writing consistently and clearly. A few specific cases should be highlighted. 
Firstly, the terms “European Communities” and “European Community” are used 
interchangeably, as was common at the time, to refer to the European Communities as they 
stood in 1984-5. The term EEC treaty is used here to refer to the 1957 Treaty of Rome that 
founded the European Economic Community, which the SEA amended. For reasons of 
readability, the term United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) is used 
synonymously with Great Britain or simply Britain.  
Secondly, this is a story about Britain and the European Community. I have therefore 
zoomed in on such detailed policy aspects, and their appropriate terminologies, when the 
analysis merited it but focused on explaining the overarching narrative of policy formation in 
the British government in line with my overall research question. In the UK the by 1984-5 
outdated term “Common Market” was still used a lot, not least by Thatcher herself, for what 
correctly should have been called the Internal Market. The term Single Market is used in 
many of the sources in aspirational terms to refer to the goal of a truly unified or liberalised 
market. Because this dissertation is in part about the treaty that created the Single Market, it 
was decided to refer to the Single Market as such from the beginning to avoid confusion, 
except when quoting directly or in my search for primary sources. The practice of foreign 
policy cooperation in the EC in the 1980s was referred to in France, Germany and Brussels as 
European Political Cooperation and abbreviated as “EPC”, whereas in the UK it was called 
Political Cooperation and abbreviated as “PoCo”. This dissertation stays true to the respective 
usage in the primary sources but because of a focus on the UK uses the term PoCo more.  
Thirdly, terms that describe institutional policies of the EC, such as voting 
mechanisms, have been used in the sources either to refer to specific rules or in an 
aspirational sense. For instance, the terms majority voting and qualified majority voting 
(QMV) have sometimes been used in the sources interchangeably and sometimes specifically. 
 8 
It is also important to know that the distinction between majority voting and QMV was 
simpler in 1985 than today, with QMV having a simple weighting by size of the country and 
not yet by population. I have for reasons of clarity referred to majority voting in a general 
sense and only indicated the kind of majority voting when this was relevant. The term “co-
decision” was also used in aspirational terms in the sources to advocate measures that would 
give the EP more say vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers. The result of the SEA was a 
consultation process that gave the EP more say in how European laws were created but kept 
the last word with the Council of Ministers. I have tried to stay true to the sources in using 
these terms because they were mostly used in proposing specific policies.  
Lastly, the Luxembourg Compromise featured frequently in the negotiations leading 
up to the SEA and needs to be explained briefly. It was a legacy that originated with the 
“empty chair crisis” (1965-6), during which French ministers boycotted meetings of the 
Council of Ministers to protest against the introduction of qualified majority voting and the 
concept of “own resources”, a proposal under which money paid in by member states was 
transferred entirely to the EC. The French president General Charles de Gaulle worried that 
these proposals would weaken member states’ ability to block individual decisions that were 
not in their interest. The stalemate was resolved with a compromise that informally permitted 
a member state to delay a vote if a “vital national interest” was at stake.16 The Luxembourg 
Compromise was not a “veto” but rather a fragile truce, centred on the resolve to keep 
discussions going when no agreement could be found, which sometimes was characterised in 
 
16 N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 65–68, 118–24; Anthony L. Teasdale, ‘The Life and Death of the Luxembourg 
Compromise’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 4 (1 December 1993): 567–79, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00481.x; Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of 
European Integration since 1945, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1995), 111–15; Mark Gilbert, Surpassing 
Realism: The Politics of European Integration Since 1945 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 104–11; 
Andrew M. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 
(London: UCL Press, 1999), 227–36; Dorothee Heisenberg, ‘The Institution of “Consensus” in the European 
Union: Formal versus Informal Decision-Making in the Council’, European Journal of Political Research 44, 
no. 1 (1 January 2005): 65–90, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00219.x; Jean Marie Palayret, Helen 
Wallace, and Pascaline Winand, eds., Visions, Votes, and Vetoes: The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg 
Compromise Forty Years On (Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang, 2006). 
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the literature as “agreement to disagree”.17 Not all governments formally recognised the 
existence of the Luxembourg Compromise. When Germany invoked the Luxembourg 
Compromise over grain prices in 1985,18 Maurice Couve de Murville, who was French 
foreign minister when the Luxembourg Compromise was created, argued that the 
Luxembourg Compromise was not a veto but instead was a “political” compromise, which 
rested on the willingness of other countries to honour it.19 The UK government was well 
aware of the fact that this was a political compromise that depended on the recognition of 
other EC member states, which is shown in the full Cabinet minutes explaining in detail 
which country supported Kiechle when he invoked the Luxembourg Compromise.20  
Literature review 
This Ph.D. dissertation can be situated at the intersection of three broad strands of 
literature: firstly, the literature that focuses on Britain and the EC; secondly, the biographical 
literature on Margaret Thatcher and her time as Prime Minister; thirdly, the literature that 
explains the process of European integration, how it came about and what it is. This research 
contributes to the literature with a detailed multi-archival study of the SEA. Firstly, my 
research contributes to the literature on the UK and European integration. By analysing the 
SEA, my Ph.D. dissertation studies a detailed aspect of Britain’s policy making towards the 
EC. Secondly, my research speaks to the biographical literature in adding a puzzle piece to 
the broader interpretations of Thatcher’s views on European integration. Thirdly, because this 
dissertation is about the UK and the EC, it has been informed by the literature on the 
dynamics of European integration.  
 
17 Ibid. 
18 On 12 June 1985, Ignaz Kiechle, the German minister for agriculture, invoked the Luxembourg Compromise 
over an 1.8% decrease in grain prices. 
19 TNA FCO30/6198, “Un blocage du Marché commun?,” Le Figaro, 14 June 1985. 
20 TNA CAB128/81/20, “Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 13 
June 1985 at 10.30 am,” 13 June 1985, 3-4.  
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Literature on Britain and the European Community 
Since the creation of the EEC, the literature on the history of the UK and European 
integration has become an important historical field in its own right.21 The orthodox argument 
held that the UK did not form part of the EEC because of an overly cautious stance at the 
Messina conference in 1955 and a refusal on the part of the British government of the time to 
interact with the Spaak Committee that led to the creation of the EEC.22 Aspects that held up 
joining the ECSC and the EEC were rooted in domestic politics, international connections 
(notably with the Commonwealth) and notions of national standing as a winner of WWII. The 
analogy that was frequently used, in newspaper cartoons and academic articles, was one of 
missing busses, trains or ships bound for Europe.23 One of the early comprehensive 
monographs advancing this argument was written by Miriam Camps.24 In addition, several 
journalists have embraced this view, most prominently Nora Beloff and Hugo Young.25 A 
significant segment of the literature looks at Britain in the process of European integration 
over a longer time frame.26 A section of this broader literature analyses Britain and the EC in 
the context of Britain’s influence in the wider world.27 
The orthodox thesis has been criticised by a revisionist school of thought for 
advancing a one-dimensional argument. James Ellison suggested that the orthodox view 
 
21 For historiographical overviews see Oliver J. Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographical 
Perspectives on Integration (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); James Ellison, ‘Britain and 
Europe’, in A Companion to Contemporary Britain, 1939-2000, ed. Paul Addison and Harriet Jones (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2005), 517–38. 
22 Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945, 58 ff.; Ellison, ‘Britain and Europe’, 518–20. 
23 Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945, 62–66; The British Cartoon Archive at the University of Kent 
contains a record of such depictions. See https://archive.cartoons.ac.uk/. 
24 Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community, 1955-1963 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
25 Nora Beloff, The General Says No, Britain’s Exclusion from Europe (London: Penguin Books, 1963); Young, 
This Blessed Plot. 
26 Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990); Sean Greenwood, Britain and European Cooperation Since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); David A. 
Gowland, Arthur S. Turner, and Alex Wright, Britain and European Integration since 1945, On the Sidelines 
(London: Routledge, 2010); John W. Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: 
MacMillan, 2000); Young, This Blessed Plot. 
27 Nicholas J. Crowson, Britain and Europe: A Political History Since 1918 (Routledge, 2010); David Reynolds, 
Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (Routledge, 2013); Benjamin 
Grob-Fitzgibbon, Continental Drift: Britain and Europe from the End of Empire to the Rise of Euroscepticism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
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meant “writing history backwards”.28 Oliver Daddow argued that the orthodox school 
“generate[d] an internal logic of its own” and was “ideologically weighted”.29 Mark Gilbert 
and N. Piers Ludlow both criticised the orthodox school for advancing teleological 
explanations, which implied an assumed sense of progress towards a desired outcome.30 
Moreover, the revisionists have added colour, context and new dimensions to the picture and 
have successfully refuted the narrative of Britain simply missing the bus, train or ship.31 The 
UK’s turn towards European integration under the leadership of Harold Macmillan, the 
decision to apply for EEC membership and the first British application to join the EEC 
generated a rich and qualitatively high-standing academic debate,32 which according to 
Ellison “represents the field at its best”.33 Ellison, Kaiser, Deighton, Ludlow, Milward and 
Young all pointed out the unique challenges that the post-WWII world, the Cold War, 
changing domestic politics and the diplomatic accession negotiations created for successive 
UK governments.34 For instance, Ellison examined the free trade area proposals that the UK 
 
28 Ellison, ‘Britain and Europe’, 520. 
29 Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945, 112. 
30 N. Piers Ludlow, ‘History Aplenty: But Still Too Isolated’, in Research Agendas in EU Studies: Stalking the 
Elephant. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, ed. Michelle Egan, Neil Nugent, and William E. 
Paterson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/26370/; Mark Gilbert, ‘A Polity 
Constructed: New Explorations in European Integration History’, Contemporary European History 19, no. 2 
(May 2010): 169–79, https://doi.org/10.1017/S096077731000007X. 
31 Ellison, ‘Britain and Europe’, 520–23, 530–32; Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945, 114 ff. 
32 Richard Griffiths, ‘A Slow One Hundred and Eighty Degree Turn: British Policy Towards the Common 
Market, 1955-60’, in Britain’s Failure to Enter the European Community, 1961-63, The Enlargement 
Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations, ed. George Wilkes (London: 
Frank Cass, 1997), 35–50; Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward, ‘“The End of a Thousand Years of History”: 
The Origins of Britain’s Decision to Join the European Community, 1955-61’, in Courting the Common Market: 
The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community, 1961-63, ed. Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward 
(London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1996), 7–37; Wolfram Kaiser, Großbritannien und die Europäische 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1955-61: Von Messina nach Canossa (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996); Wilfried Loth, 
Der Weg nach Europa: Geschichte der Europäischen Integration 1939-1957, 2. Aufl. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1991); John W. Young, ‘“The Parting of the Ways”?: Britain, the Messina Conference and the 
Spaak Committee, June-December 1955’, in British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, ed. Michael L. Dockrill and John 
W. Young (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 197–224; Roger Broad and Virginia Preston, eds., Moored to the 
Continent?: Britain and European Integration (London: Institute of Historical Research, University of London, 
2001); Anne Deighton and Alan S. Milward, eds., Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European 
Economic Community, 1957-63 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999); Anne Deighton, ‘The United Kingdom 
Application for EEC Membership 1961-63’, in Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the 
European Community, 1961-63, ed. Richard Griffiths and Stuart Ward (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 
1996), 39–58; Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian Staerck, eds., British Foreign Policy, 1955-64, Contracting Options 
(Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2000); George Wilkes, ed., Britain’s Failure to Enter the European Community, 
1961-63, The Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations 
(London: Frank Cass, 1997). 
33 Ellison, ‘Britain and Europe’, 530. 
34 Ibid. 
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put forward as an alternative to the EEC, which in their failure added to the momentum 
towards the decision to join the EEC.35  
N. Piers Ludlow examined the first British application to join the EEC, from 1961 to 
1963, in a ground-breaking multi-archival study of Britain’s first diplomatic negotiations to 
join the EEC.36 Ludlow argued that from the outset of the application, France couched 
opposition to British membership in pro-European language, which prevented its isolation 
and delayed the progress of the talks.37 Ludlow further argued that had there been a clear 
choice on the principle of membership, de Gaulle would have had no alternative but to accept 
Britain as EEC member.38 The technical, drawn-out process of the talks, and the fact that all 
six existing members had to agree to one common position in the diplomatic negotiations 
resulted in delay, which gave de Gaulle the opportunity to impose his veto on the process of 
British accession to the EEC, once his standing in domestic politics had improved.39 Helen 
Parr persuasively argued that in the 1960s Britain was not on a self-evident trajectory towards 
application but that Harold Wilson made a conscious decision to reapply for membership in 
1966, determined by considerations of Britain’s standing in the world and the wish to lead the 
EEC, together with France, which kept Britain on the path towards EC membership.40  
Alan Milward was commissioned by the British government to write the “Official 
History of Britain and the European Community”, from the end of WWII to the first 
accession negotiations on UK entry into the EEC. The result was a seminal monograph in 
which Milward explained how Harold Macmillan set the UK on a course in which the British 
government would no longer try to exert influence from the outside but would apply to join 
 
35 James Ellison, ‘Accepting the Inevitable: Britain and European Integration’, in British Foreign Policy, 1955-
64, Contracting Options, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian Staerck (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 171–89. 
36 N. Piers Ludlow, Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
37 Ibid., 238–40. 
38 Ibid., 244–47. 
39 Ibid., 111 ff., 247–52. 
40 Helen Parr, Britain’s Policy towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 
1964-1967 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 163 ff. 
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the EEC and as a leading member of the EC also gain influence in the Commonwealth and 
vis-à-vis the USA.41 Stephen Wall, a former diplomat, continued the “Official History of 
Britain and the European Community” series with a second volume, covering the time when 
the UK joined the EEC and the first referendum in 1975.42 Ludlow observed that unlike 
Milward, Wall has not put forward a “bold interpretative thesis” in his “official history” 
volume and interacted less with the existing secondary literature than other academic 
historians would.43 Moreover, Sir Con O’Neill, the negotiator who secured Britain’s entry 
into the EEC, published his official account on how the UK joined the EEC.44 The 
divisiveness of the issue of European integration was not confined to the realm of foreign 
policy but was also felt in domestic politics, as Robert Saunders has shown in his masterful 
account of the different campaigns during the first EEC membership referendum of 1975.45  
The scholarship of the UK and the EC in the 1980s is very different in focus and 
approach from the more settled debate of the question why and how the UK joined the EEC. 
In terms of their use of sources, much of the literature on the UK and the EC in the 1980s 
relied on information that was at the time already in the public domain, especially first-hand 
accounts and memoirs. Butler, Renwick and Wall, three former diplomats who throughout 
their careers were intimately involved in European diplomacy, published monographs on the 
subject.46 The archival sources for this time have only recently been declassified. Wall, as 
official Whitehall historian, received early access to archival records. He continued the 
“Official History of Britain and the European Community” series with a third volume, which 
 
41 Alan S. Milward, The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy, 1945-1963 (London: Whitehall History 
Publication in association with Frank Cass, 2002). 
42 Wall, The Official History of Britain and the European Community: From Rejection to Referendum. 
43 N. Piers Ludlow, ‘The Discomforts of Life on the Edge: Britain and Europe, 1963–1975’, International Affairs 
88, no. 6 (2012): 1331–1340, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01135.x.  
44 Sir Con O’Neill, Britain’s Entry Into the European Community: Report by Sir Con O’Neill on the 
Negotiations 1970-1972, ed. David Hannay (London: Frank Cass, 2000). 
45 Saunders, Yes to Europe! The 1975 Referendum and Seventies Britain. 
46 Michael Butler, Europe: More Than a Continent (London: Heinemann, 1986); Robin Renwick, A Journey 
with Margaret Thatcher: Foreign Policy Under the Iron Lady (London: Biteback Publishing, 2013); Stephen 
Wall, A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008); Wall, The Official History of Britain and the European Community: From Rejection to Referendum; 
Stephen Wall, The Official History of Britain and the European Community, Volume III: The Tiger Unleashed, 
1975-1985 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019). 
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brought the narrative up to the mid-1980s.47 Wall argued that by championing the Single 
Market as well as enlargement of the EC after the end of the Cold War, which he sees as the 
two “principal successes” of European integration, Thatcher was “in the vanguard of the 
European Communities/Union”.48 However, Wall qualified this statement by adding that the 
safeguards in the SEA on social policy and border controls were “ineffective”.49 According to 
Wall, during the “implementation of the SEA, [the EC] broke through the safeguard that the 
UK had sought to put in place”, on issues such as monetary integration, social legislation and 
passport-free travel.50 Wall argued further that once the SEA was agreed, the reference to 
EMU in the SEA gave Jacques Delors “a foothold” to pursue European integration further.51 
In terms of Thatcher’s negotiating approach, Wall remembered how she “hacked her way, 
armed with a machete, through the European jungle”, whereas Geoffrey Howe was “sugaring 
wine with honey” to avoid a ruptures in the diplomatic relations.52 Wall brings together an 
impressive amount of detail and some great anecdotes from the primary sources. However, 
perhaps because of his longer timeframe, his explanation on why and how the UK came to 
agree to the SEA lacks an overarching argument. 
Stephen George argued that many of the unique challenges that Britain faced as the 
first new member of the EC could be reduced to the epithet of being the “awkward partner” in 
the EC.53 George believed that the Thatcher government nudged the EC in a direction of 
policies the UK could live with.54 According to George, the more constructive approach of the 
British government in the Intergovernmental Conference of 1985 produced tangible results 
that the UK had desired from the outset, for instance limiting majority voting to issues 
connected with the Single Market.55 In addition, VAT as well as border control remained in 
 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 332. 
49 Ibid., 331. 
50 Ibid., 330–32. 
51 Ibid., 330. 
52 Ibid., 312–13. 
53 George, An Awkward Partner. 
54 Ibid., 183–85, 206–7. 
55 Ibid. 
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national hands after the SEA was agreed, just as the UK had preferred. George suggested that 
with these achievements, the UK outmanoeuvred France and Germany by interacting 
constructively in the negotiations on the SEA. Therefore, neither France nor Germany could 
lay the responsibility for any lack of progress at the door of the UK.56 John Young argued that 
with the SEA, Thatcher and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) had “reached an 
uneasy truce” around a policy that was intended to maintain full membership of the EC and 
still prevent the divisions of a “‘two-tier’ Europe”.57 In essence, George and Young argued 
that with the SEA, the UK countered the threat of being sidelined in what was at the time 
debated as a “two-tier Community”, where some countries would integrate faster than others. 
A significant strand of the literature saw the SEA in the context of domestic politics. 
Richard Vinen depicted Thatcher as taking over a pro-European party with no apparent 
intention of changing this policy, but then slowly changing her attitude to harbour more and 
more misgivings about Britain’s policies towards the EC.58 In this process, Thatcher’s views 
began to clash with those of Lawson and Howe (Chancellor of the Exchequer and Foreign 
Secretary), which contributed to her losing the leadership of her party.59 Vinen argued that 
from this perspective, the SEA was not part of Thatcher’s trajectory towards Euroscepticism, 
because it effectively delegated some powers to the EC to further the Single Market. Vinen 
suggested this “genuinely perplexed” her advisors.60 Robert Blake’s history of the 
Conservative Party argued that Thatcher signed the SEA because of its trade implications and 
dismissed the language of European integration as “windy waffle”.61 Blake presented the 
issue of the SEA in the larger context of a split in the Cabinet which gradually became 
apparent, between the more pro-European Geoffrey Howe and Michael Heseltine on one side, 
 
56 Ibid. 
57 Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999, 140–41. 
58 Richard Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the 1980s (London: Simon & 
Schuster UK, 2010), 230 ff. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 240. 
61 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party, from Peele to Major (London: William Heinemann, 1997), 368. 
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and Thatcher herself on the other.62 This split was characterised both by “ideology and 
personalities”. It emerged over the Westland Affair, lingered throughout the SEA negotiations 
and came to a head with Thatcher’s Bruges speech on 20 September 1988.63  
Jim Buller, analysing the broad sweep of Conservative European policy in the 
context of the political science concept of statecraft, argued that the SEA “represented the 
zenith of Conservative influence in the 1980s and also the origins of its decline”.64 Buller 
argues the SEA was the European component of Thatcher’s economic policies and at the 
same time a way of a strengthening the hold of the Conservative Party on domestic economic 
policy making, which went hand in hand with the realisation in the party that European 
policies were the necessary counterpart to domestic economic policy in an increasingly 
interconnected world.65 However, nine years later Buller argued that the SEA represented an 
“erosion of political sovereignty in the name of free market economics”, which entailed 
accepting majority voting for the Single Market, health and safety and an agreement to work 
on EMU in the future.66 Buller believed that these concessions were “side payments” for the 
European component of Thatcher’s economic policies.67 
Nicholas Crowson argued that to a section of the Conservative Party the SEA was 
“Thatcherism on a European scale”.68 To an extent Andrew Moravcsik, Benjamin Grob-
Fitzgibbon and Robert Skidelsky also accept this argument.69 Crowson argued that the SEA 
was largely endorsed by the Conservative Party because it was seen as instance when Britain 
 
62 Ibid., 359–60, 367–69, 376–79, 381–83. 
63 Ibid., 367–9, 376–9, 381–3. 
64 Jim Buller, National Statecraft and European Integration, The Conservative Government and the European 
Union, 1979-1997 (London: Pinter, 2000), 88. 
65 Ibid., 20, 48 ff., 79–82, 84–87, 165 ff. 
66 Jim Buller, ‘The European Union’, in The Oxford Handbook of British Politics, ed. Matthew Flinders et al. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 556–57. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Nicholas J. Crowson, The Conservative Party and European Integration Since 1945: At the Heart of Europe? 
(Routledge, 2006), 51. 
69 Andrew M. Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft 
in the European Community’, International Organization 45, no. 1 (1991): 31, 50–53; Moravcsik, The Choice 
for Europe, 324–25; Grob-Fitzgibbon, Continental Drift; Robert Skidelsky, ‘Britain: Mrs. Thatcher’s 
Revolution’, in Recasting Europe’s Economies: National Strategies in the 1980s, ed. David P. Calleo and 
Claudia Morgenstern (Lanham: Washington Foundation for European Studies, 1990), 128.  
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was spearheading a European policy and it served to bridge the divide between “wet” and 
“dry” members of the Cabinet; the “wets” wanted the UK to be involved in European 
integration and the “dries” saw the SEA as the European counterpart to their economic 
views.70 After 1986, these cracks could no longer be papered over and the rift about 
membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) opened up a split within the 
Conservative frontbenchers.71 The Bruges speech in 1988 was in Crowson’s view “a rejection 
of her government’s previous approach to Europe”, and with it the SEA and was ultimately 
“an admission of failure…to find a position for Britain within Europe”.72  
The challenge of assessing Thatcher’s views on European integration is summed up 
by Hugo Young in his monograph on Britain and the EC. Young argued that Thatcher “took 
Britain further into Europe than anyone except Heath … yet simultaneously all her political 
energy was directed against what she herself was doing. Even as she took Britain further in, 
she stoked the fire of those who opposed this every step of the way”. 73 Concerning 
Thatcher’s own views on the SEA, this controversy is often explained by asking the question 
whether or not Thatcher could have been “tricked”. On this question there is an overlap 
between the literature on the UK and the EC and the biographical literature. In the literature 
on Britain and European integration, there is one school of thought which argues that the SEA 
had been what Beloff called a “major British diplomatic defeat” and a “mistake” on the part 
of Thatcher.74 This strand of the literature tentatively advanced the explanation by wondering 
if Thatcher could have been “duped”, “misled”, “betrayed” or “tricked”.75 Gowland, Turner 
and Wright found it “puzzling” why Thatcher agreed to the SEA and argued that Thatcher 
 
70 Crowson, The Conservative Party and European Integration Since 1945, 51–53. For a discussion on the “wet” 
and “dry” divide see Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 50–51, 123 ff.; Young, This Blessed Plot, 317; Hugo 
Young, One of Us: A Biography of Margaret Thatcher (London: Macmillan, 1989), 198–204; Vinen, Thatcher’s 
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71 Crowson, The Conservative Party and European Integration Since 1945, 52. 
72 Ibid., 53. 
73 Young, This Blessed Plot, 306. 
74 Lord Max Beloff, Britain and European Union: Dialogue of the Deaf (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 95. 
75 Buller, ‘The European Union’, 557; Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945, 142; Gowland, Turner, and 
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failed to foresee how important the ambiguous declarations on “European unity” were.76 They 
believed she was “misled and betrayed by duplicitous EC partners”.77 
Treachery could have also come from within. Buller, Gowland Turner and Wright all 
believe that the FCO had “tricked” or “badly misinformed” Thatcher.78 The working 
relationship between Thatcher and her FCO advisors on the subject of European integration 
was by many accounts an uneasy one.79 Nicholas Henderson, a senior diplomat, told Hugo 
Young: “you see, she doesn’t really believe that there’s any such thing as useful 
negotiations”.80 Wall argued that “If, as she did, Mrs Thatcher subsequently felt that she had 
been double-crossed by Kohl, she was not double-crossed on the basis of official FCO 
advice”.81  
Wall remembered: “it was said that her view of the Foreign Office was the 
mirror image of her view of the Church of England: she liked the Church of 
England as an institution but had little time for a number of the people in it, 
whereas she had little time for the Foreign Office as an organisation but 
respected a number of the individual officials in it”.82 
 
Wall believed that even though Thatcher may have had an uneasy relationship with 
the FCO, she trusted the individual civil servants working there. Geoffrey Howe, Michael 
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Butler, David Williamson and Stephen Wall all have publicly denied having misled Thatcher 
and argued that she herself had said that she read every single word of the SEA.83 
Robin Renwick, Assistant Under-Secretary (European Integration), argued that 
“institutionally, the FCO had a near pathological fear of being left out of European 
construction”.84 Charles Moore, Thatcher’s official biographer, also argued that for the FCO 
and Whitehall at large “the biggest fear … was still that of being ‘left behind’”.85 Renwick 
and Moore’s remarks about the FCO hark back to the thesis that Britain “missed the bus” by 
not having been a signatory of the EEC treaty, which argued that many of the subsequent 
challenges in joining the EEC stemmed from this early omission. In the same context, John 
Young argued that the decision to hold an IGC at the European Council in Milan, on 28-9 
June 1985, brought Britain back to the same choice the country faced in 1955 of either 
embracing entanglement or facing being shut out of further work in the EC.86 However, 
Young believed that “by 1985 Britain was committed to a European future”.87 This is a 
significant assessment because it relativizes the comparison with 1955 and shows that by the 
1980s, the question was no longer whether or not the UK would join the EC but how the UK 
should make policies as a fully-fledged member of the EC.  
Biographies and memoirs 
Three major biographies have been written about Margaret Thatcher in which the 
Single European Act features prominently.88 Charles Moore, the former editor of the 
Spectator, Daily Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph, was asked in 1997 by Lady Thatcher if he 
wanted to write her authorised biography. The result was a seminal three-volume history of 
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Thatcher’s political life. Hugo Young was a political editor at the Sunday Times and in 1984 
became a columnist for The Guardian. He was self-confessedly critical of Thatcher’s politics, 
which is reflected in his 1998 biography of her.89 John Campbell, a biographer of David 
Lloyd George, Aneurin Bevan and Roy Jenkins, published a balanced two-volume biography 
of Thatcher in 2008 and 2009 respectively. Thatcher’s three biographers all wrestle with the 
question of what the SEA says about Margaret Thatcher’s attitudes on European integration 
and explain the conundrum by suggesting that she could have been deceived when she agreed 
to the SEA.90 Hugo Young asked, “was there an element of betrayal here, and if so, who by 
whom”?91 Was this a “misunderstanding” or “are we seriously to suppose that Mrs Thatcher 
had not examined the words she put her name to”?92  
Fundamentally, all three biographers of Thatcher argued that she did not support 
European integration and disliked the term “European Union”.93 Moore even believed that 
Thatcher “did not understand the implications of the [Single European] Act”.94 Campbell 
argued that Thatcher “‘gave away’ more sovereignty in 1985 than Heath in 1973 or Major in 
1992” but was “deceived by other leaders who broke assurances”.95 However, if she disliked 
European integration, why did she sign the SEA? Campbell, Moore and Young argued that 
Thatcher signed the SEA because she wanted to implement the Single Market.96 Campbell 
believed that apart from the Single Market she wanted to “send back the rest of the menu”.97 
Hugo Young put forward the explanation that Thatcher had read and understood the SEA but 
“wanted the Act to mean what she said it meant, and was simply not prepared to recognize 
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that it might mean something else as well”.98 The alternative meaning was that European 
integration was “an aspiration”, which according to Young was derided by Thatcher as “Euro-
guff, or Euro-twaddle – a bizarre, cultish worshipping at the altar of Jean Monnet, which 
would mercifully never get anywhere near full transubstantiation into the body of revealed 
and meaningful law”.99  
Charles Moore also resorted to religious analogies when attempting to explain 
Thatcher’s attitude to European integration.100 Moore argued that Thatcher never subscribed 
to “the religion of Europeanism”.101 Moore believed that Thatcher was in favour of Political 
Cooperation but disliked terms such as “political union” and “United States of Europe”.102 
She did not like what Moore called the “‘theology’ of European declarations” but her advisors 
said the language did not mean much and recommended accepting it as the condition of being 
a member of the EC.103 According to Moore, Thatcher tried to work within the system that 
was provided but tried to infuse it with some sense of pragmatism, such as by selecting Lord 
Cockfield to become European Commissioner or by improving the workings of the Single 
Market.104 Charles Powell told Moore that “in relation to the EEC, she had different periods – 
like Picasso in his painting. The first period was the budget row; the second was that of the 
SEA; the third – the violent stage – came on with the rising power of Delors and the issue of 
EMU”.105 Fundamentally, Moore believed that between 1979 and 1986 she never took the 
time to coherently develop “her own vision for Europe” and stuck to the policies that Heath 
had bequeathed to her.106 By that he meant the fundamentally pro-European course that since 
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1961 saw the UK as a leading member of the EC and the Conservative Party as responsible 
for the UK becoming a member of the EEC.  
Moore’s third volume of Thatcher’s biography portrayed her as a “Eurosceptic” who 
had transferred “British sovereignty” away from the nation state with the SEA but found 
herself battling with her two most senior Cabinet ministers, Geoffrey Howe and Nigel 
Lawson, on the question of whether or not to join the ERM.107 Moore argued that with the 
Bruges speech, on 20 September 1988, she outlined a “vision” of an outward-looking, open 
“European civilization”, which was not centred on the EEC treaty.108 However, Moore 
believed that even though it was critical, the speech was “careful to accept everything the EC 
had done to date”.109 Even though Thatcher was critical of Delors, on monetary integration 
and the Maastricht Treaty, she "was not attacking the EC and all its works; nor was she 
undermining the policy of her own government”.110 Moore confirmed this more Eurosceptic 
line of argument in an interview with Nick Robinson, arguing that “after [Thatcher] had 
signed and supported the Single European Act, she came to regret it, in the mid-1980s, 
because she could see that it was part of a centralising project – if you like a united states of 
Europe – particularly with Jacques Delors pushing the single currency”.111  
In the same interview, Moore said that “you can see the trajectory, she is moving 
from mild pro-Europeanism to a strong anti-Europeanism, in a process that took about fifteen 
years and in which the idea of a referendum became very much a strong part”.112 Moore 
mentions in his book that John Major was entertaining the idea for such a referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty but then Thatcher’s support in the House of Commons made it politically 
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impossible to get it through Cabinet.113 There is a danger here of seeing the SEA, EMU and 
the Maastricht Treaty as being on a linear trajectory that directly lead to the referendum on 
EU membership in 2016. This dissertation emphatically does not see the SEA in this way, but 
rather aims to tell the story of the SEA as one element of the unpredictable twists and turns of 
history. 
Much of the literature mentioned above relied heavily on memoirs. This dissertation 
consulted them to understand the views of decision makers with the benefit of hindsight and 
occasionally to add some colour to the narrative. In my research I drew on memoirs to 
complement and bring out the findings of the archival research by comparing them to how the 
leading British politicians defended their role in the making of the SEA, in the context of 
presenting their own legacies. The memoirs by Margaret Thatcher, Geoffrey Howe and Nigel 
Lawson have been particularly useful. Thatcher said in her memoirs that in order to achieve 
the Single Market she was prepared to accept more majority voting.114 Indeed, she maintained 
that “Britain was the originator of and continued to be the driving force behind the Single 
Market”.115 Thatcher argued that when she was negotiating the SEA, the Single Market was 
her “overriding goal”.116 With hindsight, Thatcher said that despite having done her best to 
limit how the European Commission could use the majority voting rules, she believed that 
“the provisions of the Single European Act were abused in order to push corporatist and 
collectivist social legislation upon Britain by the back door”.117 Thatcher argued in her 
retirement that the SEA was meant to extend the Single Market but said she had failed to 
recognise that once the European Commission was given a competence, it would not be 
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returned when the Single Market had been completed.118 Therefore, Thatcher concluded that 
“I cannot rate the European Single Act as other than a disappointment”.119  
Geoffrey Howe played a key role in the UK’s European policy making during the 
1980s. He was one of Thatcher’s longest-serving Cabinet ministers. From 1983 to 1989 he 
was Foreign Secretary, until he fell out with Thatcher over the question of European 
integration. Howe defended the SEA as a major achievement of the Thatcher government and 
his time as Foreign Secretary. He argued the SEA and the ERM were the two most important 
decisions related to the EC during his entire ministerial career.120 Howe argued that in order to 
achieve the Single Market it was essential to overcome a perception of “British 
negativism”.121 The final shape of the deal realised many of the goals on which Howe and the 
Thatcher government had set their sights.122 The market was further liberalised and it was 
agreed that non-tariff barriers would be abolished on the basis of the European Commission’s 
White Paper. Howe remembered “we were enthusiastic protagonists [of] the Single Market – 
indeed [it was] our chief campaigning cry – ‘Thatcherism on a European scale’ was one of the 
catchphrases”.123 The way in which majority voting would later also be used for social 
legislation illustrated to Howe that being a member of the EC was “as much part of a process 
as it is an event”.124 
After the re-election of Thatcher and the Conservative Party in 1983, Nigel Lawson 
succeeded Geoffrey Howe as Chancellor of the Exchequer and Howe replaced Francis Pym as 
Foreign Secretary. On 13 November 1985, Howe and Lawson attempted to persuade Thatcher 
to join the ERM, which she refused both then and again in June 1988.125 Lawson said in his 
memoirs he was unhappy that only foreign ministers but not finance ministers were allowed 
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to attend the European Council.126 Lawson argued that because he was not there, Thatcher 
heeded Howe’s advice and ignored his (Lawson’s) earlier warnings that EMU should not be 
included at all in the SEA.127 Therefore, Lawson believed that EMU had become part of the 
“constitution” of the EC and was for Thatcher “the genie she had allowed out of the bottle by 
agreeing to sign the SEA with its commitment to EMU”.128 Lawson argued that the inclusion 
of EMU in the preamble of the SEA and the fact that Thatcher agreed at the Hanover summit 
in 1988 to a study the implementation of EMU showed that “she simply failed to understand 
what she was about”.129 The issue of Britain’s role in European integration lead to the 
resignation of Lawson in 1989 and Howe in 1990 and contributed to the end of Thatcher’s 
time as Prime Minister. The SEA is an important element in this story because it codified the 
goal of EMU in the EC treaty structure. 
Literature on the history of European integration: the “relaunch” 
This research is based in the literature on Thatcher and Britain’s policy towards 
European integration. However, because this research is about the UK in the EC it also 
intersects with the literature on the history of European integration, from the point of view of 
European institutions and the entire EC. To draw a strict dividing line between the literature 
on Britain and that on the history of European integration risks automatically assuming a 
narrative of exceptionalism, which would perpetuate an “awkward partner” narrative. N. Piers 
Ludlow’s work shows that analysing the British position and the history of European 
integration conjointly yields fruitful results. According to Ludlow, both Thatcher as well as 
her European partners were committed to economic liberalisation in the mid-1980s.130 
Thatcher, however, wanted to liberalise the Single Market as an end in itself, whereas her 
counterparts in the EC embedded the Single Market in a much more political vision for the 
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EC.131 European leaders were especially concerned with maintaining European integration as 
a force for peace in the context of the Cold War, given the challenges of conflicts in the 
Middle East and German reunification, which gave European Political Cooperation both a 
historical and a political significance.132 In the field of political science, Moravcsik, Wallace 
and Wallace have also shown how one can usefully analyse the workings of the British 
government alongside the history and dynamics of European integration.133 
The history of European integration literature has hitherto seen two waves of interest 
in the SEA. The first wave empirically looked at what the SEA was, its articles and 
consequences. This was largely based on media coverage of the European Council, Lord 
Cockfield’s White Paper and the Cecchini report.134 This part of the literature serves as an 
important empirical resource for further research on the SEA because it grappled with 
fundamental questions about what the SEA was, how the Single Market was established and 
how the SEA compares to the Maastricht Treaty. This literature can also serve as a useful 
guide to the thinking in academia and politics of the time. The Dooge Committee was tasked 
in 1984 with studying how the institutions of the EC could be reformed. De Ruyt’s emphasis 
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on the Dooge Committee being called “Spaak II” goes some way in showing the political 
importance that the contemporary literature attached to this committee.135 This is significant 
because as chapter one of this dissertation will show, the more recent literature has 
underestimated the role of the Dooge Committee. Moreover, Lord Cockfield wrote a strong 
defence of the role of the European Commission in the creation of the Single Market.136 The 
second wave of the literature began to move away from the question of what the SEA was to 
answering questions such as how it came into being and who played which role. This section 
of the literature argued that the SEA was part of a “relaunch” of the EC after the years of 
political and economic stagnation in the 1970s.137 The notion that the 1970s were a lost 
decade in European integration is beginning to be revised with research on European 
monetary integration, the birth of the European Council and the institutionalisation of high-
level summits, such as the Group of Seven (G7).138 
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The accounts of the SEA in the history of European integration literature can be 
divided between those, like Green Cowles, Middlemas or Sandholz and Zysmann, who argue 
that “supranational entrepreneurs” were in the driving seat and others, like Milward and 
Moravcsik, who argue that the SEA was the outcome of interstate bargaining.139 A variant of 
the first strand of the literature emphasised the role of industry, particularly the European 
Roundtable of Industrialists, in politically supporting the drive towards a Single Market.140 
Andrew Moravcsik revived the search for a theory that could explain the history of European 
integration by developing the concept of “liberal intergovernmentalism”,141 which emphasised 
the role of national governments as rational decision makers, based largely on economic 
considerations.142 Moravcsik argued that the SEA ushered in the “most important period of 
trade liberalization” as well as an era of institutional change for the EC.143 The UK 
government wanted to liberalise the Single Market but had no aspirations of leadership in 
European integration.144 The Thatcher government wished to avoid treaty change, weakening 
the Luxembourg Compromise or giving EC institutions more say but realised the need for 
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majority voting to implement the Single Market.145 Furthermore, Moravcsik believed that the 
British proposals for foreign policy coordination were a response to initiatives by the French 
and German governments to “relaunch” European integration with the Dooge Committee as 
well as the German idea to limit the Luxembourg Compromise.146 More recent scholarship, 
for instance by Ludlow, Varsori or Warlouzet, argue that a combination of EC and national 
actors were responsible for achieving the “relaunch” of the 1980s.147 
There is a vast amount of literature on the Cold War.148 Although often considered 
separate fields of study, the connections between the scholarship on the Cold War and 
European integration have begun to be studied.149 Driven by the recent release of archival 
material many newer studies focus on the end of the Cold War, the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) and German reunification.150 Margaret Thatcher’s role in the end of the Cold 
War as well as her views on German unification have also been examined.151 Poggiolini and 
Pravda argued that the SEA was a “brief parenthesis of active engagement” but in the light of 
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Thatcher’s Bruges speech it exposed the “basic failure of the British Europeanists to promote 
a fresh start”.152 Maria Eleonora Guasconi has linked the SEA with the end of the Cold 
War.153 She argued that once the SEA was agreed, Gorbachev began to worry about being 
excluded by a “fortress Europe” and expressed an interest in establishing closer economic 
links between the USSR and the EC. Thatcher is only mentioned in passing because she met 
Gorbachev in 1984 and was in favour of the Single Market. Guasconi focused her account on 
the EPC aspect of the SEA and looked at how this changed Gorbachev’s thinking. However, 
in her account of how the SEA came about she emphasised the Single Market and argued that 
the SEA “was not originally designed to deal with foreign policy issues”.154 My research on 
the British policy making towards the SEA shows that for Margaret Thatcher in particular, 
foreign policy issues played a role from the start in the shaping of the SEA. 
In summary, the scholars and commentators working on the UK in the EC looked at 
the role of the UK in becoming and staying a member of the EC, whereas those focusing on 
the history of European integration analysed the emergence of the ECSC/EEC/EC/EU as a 
political construct. The SEA has been portrayed by the literature on the UK in the EC as an 
act to liberalise the Single Market. For instance, Ludlow argued that whichever view one 
takes on Thatcher’s position in the negotiations towards the SEA, it was “beyond dispute” 
that Thatcher was in favour of creating the Single Market.155 To Ludlow, an answer to the 
question of what legacy Thatcher left in regards to the European integration project should 
thus focus on the SEA.156 Implicitly or explicitly, the Single Market has therefore become the 
dominant feature in most explanations of the SEA. Most of the literature argued that Margaret 
Thatcher started her political career with mildly pro-European views and once in power 
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became progressively more critical of the direction in which European integration was 
heading. A question that has often been asked is how she could agree to the SEA in 1985, 
sign it in 1986, but then turn to criticising both the SEA and European integration in its 
entirety from 1988.  
The existing literature explained the mismatch between Thatcher’s rhetoric and her 
actions in two ways. One explanation argues that it had been a mistake to agree to the SEA 
and wonders whether or not Thatcher was “tricked”. The second school of thought 
highlighted the advantages of the SEA and argued that it had been a diplomatic success for 
Thatcher. One thing all accounts of the SEA have in common is that, while they situate the act 
as an important milestone, they do not examine in detail how the UK government engaged in 
the negotiations that brought this act about. By analysing the diplomacy and decision making 
of the UK government towards the SEA, my research will contribute to a fuller understanding 
of Britain’s role in the EC in the 1980s and Thatcher’s views on the subject of European 
integration. Analysing Thatcher’s thinking and her policies during the mid-1980s will help to 
understand how she transitioned from being a supporter of the EC during the 1975 
referendum to criticising it after 1988. It is on the question of Thatcher’s views on the EC, her 
role in European policy making, and the diplomacy of the UK towards the EC that this 
dissertation can add a puzzle piece that has hitherto been missing. 
Contribution to the literature, methods and sources 
This Ph.D. dissertation offers a thorough assessment of the evolution of British 
policy towards the negotiation of the Single European Act. Delving deeply into British 
archival sources has made it possible to assess the interactions between Whitehall 
departments, particularly the FCO and central government in devising policies towards the 
SEA. An examination of French and German diplomatic sources has enabled an assessment 
of the progress of British diplomacy that analyses how British leaders dealt with their 
European counterparts and to an extent learns how this was received. Therefore, my 
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dissertation is an addition to literature that seeks to explain Britain’s historical relationship 
with the EC. This research helps to fill a gap in this literature by looking at the detailed policy 
formation process of the British government towards the SEA. Moreover, my research offers 
a new element in the story of how Margaret Thatcher’s attitudes towards European integration 
evolved. By analysing newly declassified archival sources, my research offers a detailed study 
on the contribution and role of the UK government towards the SEA. Consulting French and 
German sources has enriched my reading of the UK sources, given me some appreciation of 
their own policy and diplomacy, and given me a wider canvas upon which to assess Britain’s 
policy making and diplomacy towards the SEA.  
This research is a multi-archival and multilingual historical research of high-level 
diplomatic meetings between heads of governments, ministers and diplomats which aims to 
find out how the UK government engaged in the negotiations towards the SEA. 
Methodologically, the approach is based on a tried and tested method of conducting a 
historical analysis based on archival sources, with the aim of reconstructing events as a 
historical narrative.157 In Peter Hennessy’s words, this research attempts to “distil the 
frenzy”.158 By doing so, this research reconstructs events without the benefit of hindsight by 
looking at how these events appeared to people experiencing them at the time. My research 
has relied on memos and correspondence to trace debates, decisions and analyse the making 
of policy. My narrow focus on the British policy towards the SEA in 1984-5 gave me an 
opportunity to comb through the archival sources and produce a detailed account of events. 
This research has benefitted from the thorough documenting and archiving system of the 
British civil service and the accurate cataloguing at the UK National Archives. Moreover, 
Thatcher’s style of communicating suited my methodology. By all accounts, Thatcher was a 
voracious reader of memos in the red boxes, which were annotated, underlined and sent back 
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History?, 3rd ed. (London: Palgrave, 2001); G. R. Elton, The Practice of History (London: Fontana, 1967). 
158 Peter Hennessy, Distilling the Frenzy: Writing the History of One’s Own Times (London: Biteback, 2012). 
 33 
to her private secretaries to communicate her decisions or views to Whitehall. According to 
Charles Moore, Thatcher “enjoyed political gossip, but it was the paper, rather than plotting 
on the sofa or discussion in Cabinet, which she saw as her primary means of governing”.159  
The multi-archival but very detailed focus meant that I chose to restrict the focus of 
my research on a narrow time frame: the timeline begins with the Dooge Committee in 1984, 
where many of the ideas for the SEA were gathered, and ends with the European Council in 
December 1985, where the political agreement for the SEA was reached. Many of the ideas 
that fed into the SEA could have been traced back further and many of the consequences of 
the SEA lasted well beyond the timeframe of this study. However, the focus here lies entirely 
on the negotiations that led to the SEA and how the UK government interacted therein. The 
question of ratification, how the text was put into legal language, the different side-statements 
that were added later and the implementation of the SEA lie outside the scope of my research. 
Equally, this research is not an enquiry into what the parliamentary party, grassroots 
movements, transnational actors or pressure groups made of the SEA. Neither is this 
dissertation a study about how the EC institutions worked, how EC laws, mechanisms and 
policies came into existence, or how votes were or were not been taken. By the end of 1985, 
the third enlargement negotiations of the EC were concluded and would result in the 
accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986. The workings and history of European Political 
Cooperation are also outside the scope of this study, which was formalised by the SEA but 
was in 1984-5 already a fully functioning informal framework.  
N. Piers Ludlow has pioneered a multi-archival approach in the writing of the history 
of Britain and European integration. A particularly important trailblazer in the field is his 
monograph Dealing with Britain in which he drew on archives from five countries and the EU 
to retrace the first application of Britain to the EEC, from 1961 to 1963.160 In his account 
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Ludlow went beyond the established focus in the literature on why the UK decided to join in 
the first place to analysing how the UK government fared in the application negotiations.161 
Ludlow’s work contributed to a body of literature that looked at the first two application 
negotiations for Britain to join the EEC/EC.162 For this research I have borrowed aspects of 
this methodology but I have also adapted them for the purpose of my own research. My 
research is not a comparison of how different delegations saw each other and negotiated with 
each other. However, studying how the UK government engaged in a series of negotiations 
allows my research to set UK policy within an international framework. By looking at 
archives in the UK, Germany and France, I have triangulated the recently declassified UK 
sources with the documents I have found in other archives. In bilateral and multilateral 
meetings not everyone keeps records all the time. By drawing on government archives in 
three different countries, more sources, accounts and thoughts could be included in the 
historical narrative. Therefore, the first benefit of the multi-archival approach is to put this 
research onto a more solid footing of primary sources. The second benefit of looking at 
sources from different government archives is that it gives a perception of how Thatcher’s 
position towards the SEA was seen by her French and German counterparts. The different 
perspectives have hopefully added a new dimension and a degree of colour to my account. 
The multi-archival approach complemented and enriched my reading of British 
sources. Moreover, it gives the reader a feeling for how the French and German negotiating 
positions towards the SEA and towards Britain evolved, which enabled this dissertation to put 
Britain’s policy into a fuller European context. However, the records of France and Germany 
which I have consulted are more fragmentary than the British sources. The German archives 
were more accessible, whereas the French National Archives gave me only very narrowly 
focused extraits of a small number of files from the Mitterrand papers. To see these 
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documents, I had to apply for a dérogation, which is an approval from the French Ministry of 
Culture. Therefore, it was not possible to reconstruct the French and German thread of policy 
making in the same way as I have done for Britain using the National Archives. This 
dissertation has taken French and German prises de positions to glean core elements of 
French and German negotiation stances, which helped to assess the central question of how 
effective UK diplomacy was. The point of consulting these sources was to cross-check the 
British sources and to gain some understanding of the French and German positions in these 
negotiations. The views of French and German governments in certain crucial meetings, 
especially the German point of view in the meeting between Kohl and Thatcher in May 1985, 
were very important to develop a more rounded account of events.  
Richard Evans suggested that conducting historical research was like trying to do a 
jigsaw puzzle where the different pieces were strewn all around the house.163 The pieces for 
my jigsaw puzzle were scattered all around Western Europe. In terms of access to the sources, 
the mid 1980s are interesting because of the novelty of the newly declassified primary 
sources.164 My main focus was to analyse the records at the UK National Archives in Kew. 
My second most important repository of sources were the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz and the 
Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts in Berlin. I was also permitted to consult selected 
extracts of the Mitterrand papers at the Archives Nationales in Paris and the Centre des 
Archives Diplomatiques du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères in Nantes. Furthermore, I 
consulted the Thatcher Papers at the Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge, which provided 
valuable background knowledge on Thatcher’s private correspondence. The Margaret 
Thatcher Foundation hosts a website with a treasure trove of digitised records, which have 
been particularly useful to find specific documents from either the Prime Ministerial files or 
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the Thatcher papers. The Delors papers at the Historical Archive of the European Union in 
Florence gave me a window into the correspondence and views of Jacques Delors. The 
Conservative Party Archive in Oxford provided me with an impression of the perspectives of 
the various legislative actors involved. The Confederation of British Industry Archive in 
Warwick holds records on its correspondence with other trade associations in the EC as well 
as with the European Round Table of Industrialists. The last four repositories of sources as 
well as the records from Oral History projects served this research in providing background 
information, which provided context rather than material with which to directly trace the 
evolution of government policy.  
My evidence gathering at the archives always began with a conversation with the 
archivist and a thorough look at the catalogue. To learn “how archives worked” I attended a 
seminar on the structure of the different repositories at the UK National Archives. I found it 
especially useful to learn about the shift from the paper-based chronological catalogue to the 
digital database. The paper-based catalogue goes up to the late 1970s. With the records of the 
1980s, the catalogue became exclusively an online catalogue.165 In the background of this 
online database is a catalogue structure that is similar to the paper catalogue in the sense that 
it is structured numerically, chronologically, has a description and a former reference. It can 
be searched by key word (from title and description), departmental reference or by record 
creator. In order to better understand how the online catalogue is almost a mirror image of the 
paper-based version, it was important to browse through the paper records first. Moreover, I 
not only learned how the catalogue was structured but also how documents were classified, 
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the seven levels of records and the principles that guided the classification of archival 
records.166 
To begin with, I looked through the catalogue and the archival sources in a linear and 
systematic way. In this process I examined every Prime Ministerial file (PREM) that was 
classified in the archives as being on “European policy”, dating from 1983 to 1986. This 
approach was intended to give me an overview of the issues that went across the Prime 
Minister’s desk in and around the time of my research. This overview would later serve as a 
fil rouge on the importance of topics and departments to my analysis. Inherent in this 
approach is an assumption of top-down decision making in government. From this analysis I 
learned that if I wanted to understand how the SEA came about, I had to focus on 1985, 
especially on the time from when the Dooge report was finished in spring 1985 to when the 
IGC was concluded in December 1985. I then followed the same approach with an analysis of 
the FCO records in which I analysed in depth every box in the FCO records on the “European 
Community” which mentions the “Intergovernmental Conference”. This process was recorded 
in copious manual notes, photographs and indexed with keywords.  
In the second stage of gathering data at the UK National Archives I wanted to make 
use of the new functions that the Discovery database offers. As opposed to the linearity of the 
first approach, the key-word search of the catalogue looked at the same files but 
systematically searched for key words in the title or the description of a file. The process was 
informed by the approach of systematic literature reviews used in business and medical 
studies but also the search functions of databases in general. Since these search functions have 
been incorporated into the catalogue of the UK National Archives, I felt that I had to harness 
the power of electronic databases. The problem with search functions in databases is that one 
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only gets useful results if one asks the right question. The beauty of searching systematically 
with key words is that it can be repeated and is verifiable.167 My approach attempted to 
whittle down broad areas of interest, which would have produced thousands of largely 
meaningless results, into specific key words that produced specific results. Based on the 
previous linear search approach I made a list of the key words that were most relevant in my 
reading through PREM and FCO files.168 Subsequently, I had to formulate this list of key 
words in a way that the database search function could use to perform a search with 
meaningful results. To do so I had to add key words and punctuations in order to build a 
formula for each search of the catalogue. The process is laid out in detail in Appendix Two. 
The result was a set of targeted lists of sources that corresponded to the key words I was 
looking for.  
The results of this systematic search through the Discovery catalogue were useful 
sets of references that were relevant for each particular topic of my research and served to 
cross-check the findings of my linear search through the primary sources. In the evaluation 
stage of my research, I systematically worked through the documents identified in the search 
process and read through the files in order to learn about the course of policy, decision 
makers’ opinions and identify important documents. This process was recorded in 
handwritten notes, which I classified by folder and indexed with key words. This structure 
was mirrored digitally on my computer and on the cloud platform Microsoft OneDrive.169 
Therefore, when I started writing I could draw on a set of indexed and searchable key words 
as well as handwritten notes. Before I began writing a chapter, I always looked through all my 
indexes and drew up a list of notes as well as digital files that addressed the issue I was going 
to write about. Then I read through my notes of the relevant files and selected the files that 
were most relevant to this particular topic. Using this process, I began to systematically look 
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through my pictures of sources in order to re-read the original documents. This process was 
again accompanied by taking notes, which in effect was a hybrid process of synthesising 
sources further and beginning the process of creating a narrative of events that was 
reconstructed from the sources I have analysed.  
On a theoretical note, my research fundamentally but rather loosely followed, like so 
many other historians before me, the urging of Leopold von Ranke to write history in an 
objective manner and to avoid doing so with hindsight.170 Ranke’s views have been famously 
criticised by E. H. Carr, who argued that “the facts speak only when the historian calls on 
them”.171 Carr argued that there was an inherent bias in the writing of history and the 
selection of facts, which together with concerns of present times and the identity of the author 
influenced the way history was written.172 G. R. Elton countered Carr’s views by arguing that 
even though the historian “cannot invent his experiment” a “historical truth” still existed 
independently of the researcher.173 Therefore, history was not an experiment that could be 
designed and repeated.174 Elton saw history as “an unending search for truth”.175 Elton 
acknowledged, however, that even the most rigorous survey of sources cannot hide the fact 
that it is a selection of sources and that such sources have to exist to denote facts in the first 
place.176 Richard Evans argued that what Elton missed was the aspect that sources can be 
approached from different perspectives.177 I have approached the archival sources as windows 
into the past and tried to understand how decision makers saw events at the time, without the 
benefit of hindsight.   
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In summary, my contribution to the literature lies in surveying recently declassified 
primary sources from the National Archives, in triangulating the results with a selection of 
German and French primary sources, and in writing a historical narrative of how the UK 
government interacted with the other EC countries in the negotiations towards the SEA. In its 
approach this study lies in the tradition of the literature that looks at the British position and 
policy making towards the EC. My Ph.D. dissertation contributes to this literature with a 
study of British policy making towards the SEA and fills a gap in the literature on the UK and 
the EC by analysing newly released archival sources, from multiple archives and in multiple 
languages. My work also interacts with the biographical literature on Thatcher and has been 
informed by the literature on this history of European integration. The primary sources for 
this dissertation were drawn from the Prime Ministerial and FCO records at the UK National 
Archives. The records of other departments were consulted when the evidence showed that 
they were involved or had anything to say about the SEA negotiations, such as for instance in 
Whitehall consultations. The Oral History archives added colour and context. I have drawn on 
multiple archival sources to interpret British policy and diplomacy in the context of French 
and German policies as well as to broaden my source base with accounts from different 
perspectives.  
Structure 
The structure of this Ph.D. dissertation is chronological. Chapter one begins by 
tracing the legacy of the British Budget Question (BBQ) in 1984, and with an explanation of 
the institutions that shape European policy and diplomacy in the UK government. This 
chapter then analyses how a policy document entitled “Europe – the Future” was written, and 
argues that it was a way of taking part in a larger debate between EC governments about how 
to develop the EC. This paper outlined the UK government’s aim to formalise the hitherto 
informal process of PoCo and advocated extending the Single Market. The paper served as an 
opening position for the British government in the Dooge Committee that discussed how to 
reform the institutions of the EC. This chapter also argues that the importance of the Dooge 
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Committee in the making of the SEA has been underappreciated by the literature. The Dooge 
Committee served as an important forum where ideas could be shared, and preliminary 
compromises could be worked out. This was important because the compromises reached in 
the Dooge Committee prepared the ground for future discussions in the IGC.  
The second chapter focuses on an Anglo-German summit, on 18 May 1985, because 
this bilateral relationship played a crucial role and showed how differently Margaret Thatcher 
and Helmut Kohl perceived European integration in 1985. Thatcher’s encounter with Kohl 
was the only bilateral meeting with another head of government which she attended to prepare 
for the Milan European Council on 28-9 June 1985. This chapter argues that the formalisation 
of PoCo became Thatcher’s accepted policy aim to develop the EC in a more 
intergovernmental direction. Subsequently, this chapter analyses on the basis of three 
different first-hand accounts how Thatcher and Kohl met and how their conceptions of 
European integration differed. The chapter argues that winning Kohl’s backing for Thatcher’s 
PoCo paper was an important step in her strategy to lead the EC into the formalisation of 
PoCo within an intergovernmental agreement that would be outside the treaty structure of the 
EC. Thatcher planned to win Kohl’s support for the PoCo paper and to present it personally as 
a high-level initiative to the European Council. Except for seeking Kohl’s backing, and 
informing Mitterrand, no other consultations were held. The involvement of officials was kept 
to a minimum. This chapter argues that Thatcher was unsuccessful in convincing Kohl to 
support her paper in the European Council because of the differences in outlook and views on 
European integration between the two leaders.  
The third chapter explains why the Milan European Council, on 28-9 June 1985, was 
an important turning point for Thatcher’s European policy making and for the entire EC. This 
chapter traces the progress of Thatcher’s initiative to lead the EC into the codification of 
PoCo in the preparations for the European Council in Milan. Firstly, in a short meeting with 
François Mitterrand, both Thatcher and Mitterrand declared themselves against holding an 
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IGC to change the EEC treaty. Mitterrand and Kohl’s reluctance to hold an IGC seemed to 
strengthen Thatcher’s position in suggesting an intergovernmental agreement outside the EEC 
structure. Secondly, Geoffrey Howe presented the PoCo paper to his fellow foreign ministers 
but said that it was a personal initiative that Thatcher wanted to present herself to the 
European Council, which meant that officials were not allowed to discuss it until then. 
Thatcher’s PoCo proposal failed to receive the backing from her fellow heads of government 
because Kohl and Mitterrand jointly introduced a paper as a counter-proposal, which adopted 
Thatcher’s PoCo proposals but was designed to amend the EEC treaty and was to be given the 
title “Treaty of European Union”. This chapter argues that the meeting of foreign ministers 
was a missed opportunity to gain multilateral support for the PoCo initiative. Moreover, the 
Milan European Council was a watershed in the way in which Thatcher approached European 
integration. The moment when Thatcher was outvoted in the Milan European Council on 
whether or not to hold an IGC represented the end of her ambition to lead the EC into the 
codification of PoCo and the beginning of the UK government’s cautious and more reactive 
engagement in the IGC.  
Chapter four analyses how the British position in the IGC evolved. The detailed 
bargaining for the SEA happened in the IGC and was finalised in the European Council. After 
Thatcher’s attempt to lead the EC into the codification of PoCo failed, the question was how 
her government would engage in a conference that she had explicitly not wanted. This chapter 
traces how Thatcher allowed Geoffrey Howe and the FCO officials to negotiate in the IGC 
but how she withheld her commitment in principle until the outcome of the IGC had become 
clear. Howe devised a negotiation strategy that aimed to take part in the ongoing discussions 
without presenting any new proposals, which he called a “questioning approach”. This 
chapter analyses how Howe’s approach contributed to bringing the IGC to a successful 
conclusion, how Thatcher had to abandon her plans for an intergovernmental agreement 
outside the EC treaty structure and consented to changing the EEC treaty. Thatcher agreed at 
the Luxembourg European Council, on 2-3 December 1985, to embed the SEA into the EC 
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treaty structure, which meant that the SEA would amend the EEC treaty. Thatcher assented to 
changing the EEC treaty because the content of her PoCo proposals were included and the 
Single Market would be created. On the question of monetary integration, Nigel Lawson 
departed in ECOFIN from Howe’s “questioning approach” and advocated that all mention of 
EMU should stay outside the SEA. This chapter argues that Howe and Lawson differed on the 
presentation of policy rather than its content. Lawson’s more confrontational style, coupled 
with backing from Delors and the French government, contributed to galvanising support for 
EMU in the IGC, which resulted in a commitment to the issue in the preamble of the SEA. 
Once the SEA was agreed, the focus of the British government in presentational terms shifted 
from emphasising foreign policy to highlighting the benefit of an enlarged Single Market.  
The Conclusion argues that the SEA was a watershed for Thatcher and for the UK’s 
relationship with the EC. Margaret Thatcher proposed to lead the EC into an 
intergovernmental agreement that codified the hitherto informal practices of PoCo. By doing 
so, Thatcher took part in the discussions of how to shape the future of the EC. After the BBQ 
was resolved, Thatcher presented an intergovernmental agreement as alternative to other plans 
that were being discussed at the time, such as the “Draft Treaty on European Union” of the 
European Parliament. Thatcher did not present a vision but presented a proposal that aligned 
with her views of a more intergovernmental way of European cooperation, while at the same 
time respecting the status quo of the existing EC in a genuine attempt to shape the future of 
the entire EC. In this process Thatcher showed her willingness to lead the EC, in cooperation 
with France and Germany, into the codification of PoCo, which the conclusion describes as 
her European moment. Thatcher’s paper did not become the intergovernmental agreement she 
had envisaged. When instead an IGC was convened, Thatcher permitted the FCO to engage in 
exploratory negotiations. Her original PoCo proposals and a commitment to extend the Single 
Market were included in the SEA, which were all in Thatcher’s interest. However, the act also 
significantly broadened the remit of the EC, which Thatcher had tried to either limit or avoid. 
Based on the archival sources analysed for this dissertation, the conclusion argues that it 
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would be too simplistic to portray Thatcher’s legacy in European integration as one of a 
sceptic, a disbeliever, or an anti-European, as parts of the literature have done. After the 
ratification of the SEA, Thatcher reformulated her views of a more intergovernmental EC in 
her landmark speech at the College of Bruges. This speech and the SEA are part of Thatcher’s 
contradictory legacy that the UK government has been grappling with ever since.  
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Chapter 1. Dooge Committee: “madcap schemes” of “European 
Union”? 
The literature on the history of European integration characterises the 1980s as a 
time when the European Community (EC) experienced a “relaunch” of the process of 
European integration. An important milestone was the Genscher-Colombo report of 1981, in 
which the foreign ministers from Germany and Italy advocated closer political and security 
ties in the EC.178 In 1983 the European Council approved a “Solemn Declaration of European 
Unity”.179 In February 1984 the European Parliament endorsed a “Draft Treaty on European 
Union”, sometimes also called the “Spinelli Treaty”, after the MEP and veteran federalist 
Altiero Spinelli.180 At the European Council in Fontainebleau, on 25-6 June 1984, two 
Committees were set up to study the social aspects of the EC (Adonnino Committee) and the 
institutional aspects of the community (Dooge Committee).181 Firstly, this chapter intends to 
explain the legacy of the British Budget Question (BBQ). Secondly, it will examine a policy 
paper of the UK government, entitled “Europe – the Future”, which was an important moment 
when the British government set out proposals on how to resolve the problem of reform of the 
EC following the BBQ. Thirdly, this chapter considers the institutional structures through 
which the UK government and Whitehall managed their policy making towards the EC. 
Fourthly, this chapter analyses the policy making of the UK government in relation to the 
Dooge Committee. The Dooge Committee was so important because many of the issues that 
were discussed in this committee came to form part of the IGC in autumn of 1985. The Dooge 
Committee consisted of eleven “personal representatives”, each with a mandate from a head 
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of government, and also included a representative of the European Commission. The remit 
was broad in the sense that it was focused on “institutional” questions and was only limited 
by the knowledge that the Adonnino Committee was meeting at the same time to discuss how 
the EC could be made more relevant to ordinary citizens. However, the latter was more 
technical, largely comprised of civil servants, and had practically no direct effect on the IGC. 
The broad themes of the debate in the Dooge Committee revolved mainly around the Single 
Market, foreign policy cooperation and the question how to make decision making more 
effective, through more majority voting and by limiting the Luxembourg Compromise.  
This chapter argues that the Dooge Committee was much more important than the 
existing literature assumes. The Dooge Committee was significant because it charted the 
possibilities for a compromise on how to reform the EC and prepared a list of measures as to 
how this could be done, many of which would be discussed during the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) in the second half of 1985. The final report of the Dooge Committee 
suggested that an IGC should be called, which was the process set out by the EEC treaty of 
1957 to negotiate changing the provisions in that treaty. The issue of changing the EEC treaty 
encapsulated two different ways of developing the EC; either through formal treaty change, 
by holding an IGC, or increase cooperation outside the existing EC treaty framework. Two 
stages can be defined in the work of the Dooge Committee. In the first stage, visionary but 
vague proposals clashed with suggestions that were more specific and limited in their scope. 
During the second stage, delegates wrote a compromise report, which would serve as a useful 
base for the discussions in the IGC, during the second half of 1985. The Dooge Committee 
was therefore an important discussion forum that prepared the ground for the IGC, defined 
topics for possible treaty change and negotiated areas of potential compromise. In the Dooge 
Committee the UK advocated specific areas of cooperation, namely extending the Single 
Market on the basis of the existing EEC treaty and formalising foreign policy coordination 
(PoCo) outside the EEC treaty. More broadly, the position of the UK government was also 
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affected by the legacy of the BBQ, a conflict in which Thatcher had fought for five years to 
secure a rebate on the UK contributions to the budget of the EC.  
The literature has not yet sufficiently recognised the importance of the Dooge 
Committee in the process of making the SEA. There is a clear dividing line between the 
literature from the 1980s, which devoted more attention to the Dooge Committee and the 
more recent literature, where the Dooge Committee was only mentioned in passing. I 
therefore agree with Philip Budden that the literature has undervalued the role of the Dooge 
Committee.182 Much of the literature began the story of the SEA with a White Paper, in which 
the European commission outlined a series of measures to abolish non-tariff barriers to trade, 
and presented the Dooge Committee briefly as a deliberative body that happened earlier on 
the timeline.183 In the earlier literature, Budden and Jean de Ruyt argued, the Dooge 
Committee was meant to follow in the footsteps of the Spaak Committee but was more vague, 
both in its original remit and in its recommendations.184 Andrew Moravcsik and Anthony 
Teasdale argued that the Dooge Committee was a deliberative body where representatives of 
governments met and in Moravcsik’s words, merely “agreed to disagree”.185 The British 
position in the Dooge Committee has largely been portrayed as cautious interaction, with a 
healthy dose of scepticism towards essentially continental ideas.186 John Young argued that 
the Dooge Committee “appeared like an attempt to frighten Thatcher”, Stephen George 
believed that the British and French representatives “frequently clashed”, whereas Hugo 
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Young suggested that the policies discussed in the Dooge Committee were “congenial to the 
European Thatcher”.187 De Ruyt argued that the footnotes of the report of the Dooge 
Committee revealed how Denmark, Greece and to a lesser extent the UK, were “manifestly 
‘marginalised’”.188  
The limitation of these accounts is that they have underestimated the constructive 
role that the UK government played by proactively engaging in the Dooge Committee, by 
proposing policies and searching for a solution that would work for the whole of the EC. My 
analysis of primary sources of the British policy making towards the SEA shows that the 
Dooge Committee played an important role in laying the groundwork for the IGC, where the 
SEA was negotiated. The topics that were discussed in the Dooge Committee reappeared 
again at the IGC in the second half of 1985, which will be discussed in chapter four. The list 
of topics that were discussed in the IGC and the opening position of each country in the IGC 
negotiations was very similar to the discussions in the Dooge Committee. However, despite 
recognising the importance of the Dooge Committee, Rifkind did not succeed in convincing 
the other delegates of the British view, which argued that the EC could be reformed without 
the need for any changes to the EEC treaty. Because Thatcher had pronounced herself against 
changing the EEC treaty, the question of whether or not the founding treaty of the EEC 
should be changed was going to become an important point of contention for the entire year 
of 1985.  
1. 1. From the “Bloody British Question” to “Europe – the Future” 
Between 1979 and 1984 all proposals to reform the EC were overshadowed by the 
BBQ, which was a dispute between the UK and the rest of the EC about whether or not the 
UK was contributing its fair share to the EC budget.189 The dispute was rooted in the way 
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contributions to the EC were calculated, and how the Common Agricultural Policy was 
financed, which disadvantaged the UK on the basis of its imports – especially of agricultural 
produce – from countries outside the EEC.190 The dispute pitted Thatcher’s insistence on 
receiving “my money” against the EC’s concept of “own resources”, by which money once 
given to the EC was no longer a contribution of an individual country but belonged to the 
EC.191 Roy Jenkins, president of the European Commission from 1977 to 1981, was so 
frustrated by the dispute that he referred to this debate as the “bloody British question”.192 
Jenkins remembers how “not only I but the whole Community was rarely allowed to think 
about anything else during this period”.193 N. Piers Ludlow argues that the BBQ in effect “had 
come to block any real prospect of wider Community advance” and resolving the issue was “a 
vital pre-condition for the surge forward in the European integration process that would ensue 
over the 1985-1992 period”.194 In the history of the UK policy towards the SEA, this dispute 
is important because to Britain’s partners in the EC the conflict represented five years in 
which too much time was wasted talking about Margaret Thatcher’s money and left a series 
of pent-up desires to tackle reforms of the EC. Whilst the BBQ itself lies outside the scope of 
this dissertation, it forms an important backdrop to the history of the British policy making 
towards the SEA. 
On a diplomatic level, the BBQ left a legacy that concerned the tenacity that 
Thatcher had displayed in this debate. When she arrived as newly-elected Prime Minister she 
was condescendingly called “la fille de l’épicier” – the grocer’s daughter – by Henri Simonet, 
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the Belgian foreign minister, but with steely determination negotiated a 66% rebate on the 
UK’s contribution to the EC budget.195 Very importantly, this refund would be in place until 
the overall financing mechanism of the EC was changed and was not the one-off refund 
which had been repeatedly offered over five years. Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, argued that “Margaret’s bloody-mindedness was the essential ingredient” to 
settling the BBQ.196 According to Roy Jenkins, the flipside was that Thatcher lost a great deal 
of goodwill in the European Council.197 How much this affected the negotiations for the SEA 
is difficult to ascertain. Hugo Young likens the question to a finite amount of “chips”, which 
Thatcher chose to spend on the BBQ, but could not spend on anything else.198  
Emile Noël, Secretary General of the European Commission, told Hugo Young that 
Thatcher “obtained much more than was reasonable”.199 Young believed that Thatcher’s “bad 
manners were certain to worsen the manners of everyone else she would need to help her at 
some time. They raised the temperature and burned in the memory” of other leaders.200 Young 
argues that these leaders agreed to settling the BBQ as the “prize” for “the relaunch 
Mitterrand had set himself to getting started”, which “Thatcher, in her hour of victory 
appeared to go along with”.201 Ludlow argued that in the long term the resolution of the BBQ 
turned out to be a “double-edged victory” for Thatcher because “banging the table was 
elevated to the default approach to European negotiation”.202 My research suggests that 
during the negotiations for the SEA this more confrontational approach did not yet come to 
the fore as strongly as it would with Thatcher’s Bruges speech in 1988, except on the question 
of monetary integration, which will be considered in chapter four. 
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For Margaret Thatcher the dominating sentiment at the end of the Fontainebleau 
summit, on 26 June 1984, was one of relief and satisfaction. Thatcher remembered that the 
discussions after the settlement of the BBQ became “very good humoured”.203 Thatcher said 
that she was ready to discuss reforming the EC and that she had fought an election on a 
manifesto that was committed to the EEC treaty and the Luxembourg Compromise.204 She 
further presented a paper at the Fontainebleau European Council, entitled “Europe – the 
Future”, which argued for reforming the Single Market and the EC institutions and for 
creating a common foreign policy, but did not advocate changing the EEC treaty.205 Piers 
Ludlow argued that “Europe – the Future was not in other words just a tactical ploy. Instead 
it should be seen as a genuine plea for Europe to press ahead, primarily in the direction of 
greater commercial liberalisation but also towards more effective foreign policy 
cooperation”.206  
Stephen Wall said that this paper “is probably the most complete and coherent 
statement of European policy made by any British government”.207 Wall argued that with the 
“Europe – the Future” paper Thatcher showed “a real vision for the future, especially [for] the 
Single Market, one of the primary, and then unfulfilled, objectives of the original Treaty of 
Rome”.208 According to Wall, Thatcher’s success was that her views on further liberalising 
the Internal Market was accepted by the Dooge Committee.209 Therefore, Wall believed that 
Thatcher could “lay a better claim than any other EC head of government to be the author of 
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the Single Market project that culminated in the Single European Act”.210 Budden argued that 
the SEA was part of a process of codification of policies, which were in fact already 
happening informally.211. Budden believed that in this process the UK government declared 
“a genuine Common Market” as its overriding policy objective.212 He saw the “Europe – the 
Future” paper as the “clearest, most pro-European policy statement a Thatcher government 
had made”.213 Therefore, the literature shows that the “Europe – the Future” paper was an 
important policy document for the UK government. Before examining how this paper came 
about, the structures of government and diplomacy need to be introduced with which UK 
policy towards the EC was made.  
1. 1. 1. Diplomacy “triumvirate”: Cabinet, Foreign Office and UK mission to the EC 
The question as to how this paper came into being offers a useful point of reflection 
on the institutions through which the British government assessed and devised policies 
towards the EC. Michael Butler, the head of the UK representation to the EC (UKRep), spoke 
once of a “triumvirate” of European policy making.214 According to Butler, the three parts of 
the “triumvirate” were Butler himself, as the head of UKRep, David Williamson as head of 
the European Secretariat and deputy secretary of the Cabinet Office (who chaired both the 
ministerial and civil service committees on European policy), and a senior official from the 
FCO, each of which shall be considered in turn.215 Michael Butler argued that since the UK 
joined the EC this “triumvirate” of European policymakers had been very important in 
shaping the policy recommendations that ministers would receive. Every Thursday Michael 
Butler attended the Committee of Representatives to the EC (COREPER) in Brussels and then 
on Fridays flew to London to brief the FCO and the Cabinet Office. It was at these 
“triumvirate” meetings where the suggestions on European policies were debated and 
 
210 Ibid., 48. 
211 Budden, ‘The Making of the Single European Act’, 7, 86–89, 412 ff. 
212 Ibid., 88. 
213 Ibid., 87. Budden also reproduced the entire document as an annex to his Ph.D. dissertation. 
214 British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (henceforth BDOHP) interview with Sir Michael Butler, 
conducted by Malcolm McBain, 1 October 1997, p. 29, https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/bdohp. 
215 Ibid. 
 53 
recommendations for ministers were prepared. Ministers then debated and agreed these 
recommendations in Cabinet committees or sometimes the full Cabinet.  
UKRep, the first element of Butler’s “triumvirate”, was the focal point in charge of 
representing the UK in the EC and reporting important events back to the British 
government.216 Michael Butler, and after his retirement David Hannay, represented the 
diplomatic connection between the UK government and the EC institutions. Butler argued in 
his valedictory despatch that UKRep, and how it worked with the Cabinet Office, was 
admired as one of the “major British assets” by other delegations in Brussels.217 Rodric 
Braithwaite, head of Chancery at UKRep from 1975-1978, said that at UKRep “policy [was] 
represented by one man” who was the head of the mission.218 In Brussels, the head of UKRep 
worked closely with the European Commission and also with the missions of other countries. 
UKRep was therefore the central conduit of information between the UK government and the 
EC institutions, including the permanent missions of other European countries to the EC.219 
Evidence for such a flow of information can be found in the daily instructions from the FCO 
in the form of telegrams that were sent back and forth between Brussels and London.220  
The second element of the “triumvirate” was the FCO. On a ministerial level, 
Rifkind reflected in his memoirs that “to be the Minister for Europe was important but not as 
grand as it might sound. Our relations with the European Community were so fundamental to 
our national interests that Geoffrey Howe, as Foreign Secretary, quite rightly devoted much of 
his own time to European matters” and he would give way to the Prime Minister “on the most 
important European occasions”.221 Therefore, Rifkind argued that “the real power on 
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European policy was with Margaret Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe”.222 On an official level, 
since the UK had joined the EEC, a group of senior civil servants had been very interested 
and were favourably disposed towards European integration, such as Michael Butler, David 
Hannay, Nicholas Henderson and Robin Renwick.223 Butler remembered how a desk officer 
in Paris, who was frustrated because of the lack of interest that ministers and officials showed 
in the ECSC, explained Jean Monnet’s ideas to him. He reflected that “I became strongly 
imbued with this vision myself in 1950 and have held to it very firmly ever since”.224 This 
meant that a group of senior FCO officials brought to their jobs a commitment to the cause of 
a united Europe.  
At the time when the UK joined the EEC in 1973, these officials were influential in 
shaping the departmental structure in the FCO. Butler became head of the European 
Integration Department in 1972 and split the department in two: European Integration 
(Internal) and European Integration (External).225 Rodric Braithwaite became the first head of 
the “external” department and Butler was in charge of the “internal” one. A political director 
was in charge of Political Cooperation (PoCo) and reported directly to the Permanent Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Secretary. The economic side of the 
community reported through the Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs (European Community). Therefore, the departmental structure in the FCO was 
characterised by two clearly separate categories of issues, with separate lines of reporting. 
However, Butler remembered that even though this division made sense in the 1970s, it 
increasingly did not work very well because political and economic issues were so 
interrelated.226 
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The third element of the “triumvirate” was the Cabinet Office and by extension the 
Cabinet. The Cabinet is responsible for the collective formation of government policy.227 
Approximately 20 Cabinet ministers attend the full Cabinet meetings. The Prime Minister sets 
the agenda. This is the forum where interdepartmental differences are reconciled on a 
ministerial level. Ministers are responsible for their own department but share a collective 
responsibility for the decisions of Cabinet. Peter Hennessy argued that Margaret Thatcher 
held fewer Cabinet meetings and created fewer Cabinet committees than all her post-WWII 
predecessors.228 In addition to Cabinet meetings, ministers often met on an ad-hoc basis and 
corresponded with them in writing.229 In Cabinet committees, discussions are normally 
prepared in detail for the more summative discussions in the full Cabinet.230 The decisions 
taken in the Cabinet Committees are usually, in effect, ratified by the full Cabinet. According 
to Peter Hennessy, in 1985 the existence and composition of Cabinet committees and sub-
committees were secret to the public, in order to maintain collective responsibility.231 
However, Thatcher’s style of governing was cast into the media spotlight when Michael 
Heseltine resigned during the Westland Affair, which is an episode that lies outside the scope 
of this research.232 
Most Cabinet discussions on UK policy making took place in the Cabinet sub-
committee on European questions of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (OD(E)).233 
This was a very important forum to discuss European policy making, which in turn prepared 
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the discussions in the assembled Cabinet.234 OD(E) was chaired by Geoffrey Howe, had 
regular members but the attendance of ministers varied depending on what was discussed, 
with invitations being extended to ministers on an ad-hoc basis. The recommendations that 
flowed from OD(E) meetings, and were ratified by the full Cabinet, determined the 
negotiating position of the UK government in the EC. The only ad-hoc committees in 1984-5 
that dealt with European policy making were on “bilateral relations with certain countries”.235 
It is in itself interesting that European policy making was predominantly discussed in a 
subcommittee of Overseas and Defence, which could indicate that Thatcher and her ministers 
judged the PoCo element of these discussions to be very important.  
On an official level, the Cabinet Office fulfilled an important function in reconciling 
disagreements between different Whitehall departments. The European Secretariat at the 
Cabinet Office was created in 1973 and was responsible for coordinating government policy 
across Whitehall, i.e. with other ministries, and for preparing either the full Cabinet or 
Cabinet Committees.236 Its precursor was the European Unit, which was set up when the 
Duchy of Lancaster’s office was moved to the Cabinet Office in 1971.237 The head of the 
European Secretariat was David Williamson, who had been seconded from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. The preparations for Cabinet meetings by the different 
Whitehall departments were coordinated through an Official Steering Committee on European 
Questions (EQS), chaired by David Williamson, which prepared the OD(E) meetings and 
coordinated the work of civil servants across Whitehall.238 Finally, there was a related group 
of civil servants, similar to EQS but more focused on routine business, called the Official 
Committee on European Questions (EQO), through which departments also shared papers and 
discussed the views of different Whitehall departments.239 A sub-committee of this official 
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committee looked at legal aspects of the EC membership and another one discussed the 
enlargement of the EC to include Spain and Portugal,240 which lies outside the scope of this 
dissertation. The ministerial and official structure explained in this section underpins the 
decision making and policy formation covered in this dissertation. The next section shall look 
at an important paper on European policy, which Thatcher presented to the European Council 
on 26 June 1984.  
1. 1. 2. Debate participation: “Europe – the Future” 
The “Europe – the Future” paper was one of three papers which Margaret Thatcher 
shared with her European counterparts during 1984 and the first half of 1985. Firstly, on 9 
March 1984, Thatcher had shared a paper on the “Future Financing of the Community” with 
François Mitterrand, which proposed a way to measure the contributions of a member state to 
the EC budget.241 With this paper Thatcher wanted to propose a solution to the British Budget 
Question. Secondly, the “Europe – the Future” paper, which Margaret Thatcher presented at 
the European Council in Fontainebleau on 25-6 June 1984, advocated extending the 
“Common Market” and developing a “common approach to external affairs”.242 The paper 
was meant as a contribution to the discussions on “the future of the European Community”.243 
The third paper, which Thatcher presented to Helmut Kohl on 18 May 1985, proposed to 
codify PoCo. For Margaret Thatcher such papers were an important tool to set out ideas, take 
part in debates and to convince her European counterparts at the highest political level. With 
the last two papers, Thatcher wanted to steer the debate in the European Council away from 
treaty change and towards an intergovernmental agreement on foreign policy coordination.  
Helmut Kohl played an important role in the UK government’s policy making 
towards the EC. The “Europe – the Future” paper was not only an answer to an ongoing 
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debate but was also in part written with the aim of securing Kohl’s support and to strengthen 
Anglo-German relations in the EC. He was the only head of government who received an 
advance copy of both the “Europe – the Future” paper in 1984 as well as the PoCo proposals 
in 1985. On 28 February 1984, Thatcher mentioned to Kohl in a bilateral meeting that she 
“would produce a paper on how to take Europe forward and use its influence to greater 
advantage in the wider world” and promised to share it at their bilateral meeting after the 
summer holidays.244 Thatcher told her Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, John Coles, that 
she wanted the paper to be a “longer term exercise”.245 David Williamson, the head of the 
European Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, said that the “paper for Chancellor Kohl” was 
designed “not to join in competitive rhetoric about European Union” but to present “our own 
ideas for making the Community work better both externally as a greater force in the world 
and internally by making the Common Market more real and effective”.246  
The “Europe – the Future” paper was written to take part in a discussion on how to 
“relaunch” the EC. Much of the broader political impetus for such a “relaunch” came from 
François Mitterrand. In 1984 Mitterrand played an important role as chair of the European 
Council in Fontainebleau, on 25-6 June 1984, where the BBQ was resolved. However, his 
ambition for the EC had a more federalist component. On 24 May 1984, Mitterrand made a 
speech at the European Parliament in which he said that once the BBQ was settled, he would 
support calls for a “European Union”, such as the EP’s “Draft Treaty on European Union”, 
championed by the MEP Altiero Spinelli, and said he was in favour of extending the 
competences of the EC into social, environmental and technological fields.247 Moreover, 
Mitterrand suggested that he would support the notion of “variable geometry” to cooperate in 
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“education, health, justice [and] security” in a way that “complements , rather than competes 
with” the EEC treaty.248 The British government wrote the “Europe – the Future” paper to 
advocate a European common foreign policy and extending the Single Market. This paper 
was partly a response to Mitterrand’s initiative but was more generally a position paper to 
take part in the debate on the “relaunch” of the EC. 
Thatcher approved the “Europe – the Future” paper on 6 June 1984.249 It was written 
in the institutional setting described in the previous section.250 Its main author was Robin 
Renwick, Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the FCO (responsible for European 
integration), with assistance from Michael Butler, head of UKRep, and David Williamson, 
head of the European Secretariat in the Cabinet Office.251 In Whitehall, the paper went 
through a restricted consultation process that only included senior officials of the Cabinet 
Office, DTI, MAFF and the Treasury.252 Roger Bone, Assistant Private Secretary to Geoffrey 
Howe, said that because it was “intended to be a communication from the Prime Minister to 
Chancellor Kohl personally” it did not need to receive “clearance throughout Whitehall”.253 
Geoffrey Howe argued that the paper was “by far the most effective way of influencing the 
debate” on the “future of the European Community” and “by putting forward our own ideas 
on the lines set out in the paper for Chancellor Kohl [the UK government could] set the 
agenda for the discussions likely to take place at and after Fontainebleau in a manner 
consistent with our interests”.254 The paper “Europe – the Future” was shown to Kohl on a 
personal level at a bilateral meeting on 8 June 1984.255 Upon the urging of Crispin Tickell, 
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who had been Roy Jenkin’s Chef de Cabinet, Thatcher agreed that on the day after Kohl had 
received the paper, France, Italy and the President of the European Commission should also 
receive a copy.256 
Margaret Thatcher did not formulate a vision with “Europe – the Future”, in the 
sense of Harold Macmillan’s “grand design” that set the UK on a path to join the EEC. The 
primary sources that detail how Thatcher commissioned and approved both this and the PoCo 
paper of 1985 show that these two papers proposed policies that reflected Thatcher’s broader 
views of the need for a coherent Western response in the Cold War and her preference for 
liberalised markets. John Coles, Margaret Thatcher’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
told the FCO that Thatcher “envisaged the paper concentrating primarily on the future of the 
Community in its relations with the outside world” and wanted to propose ways of improving 
the foreign policy coordination (PoCo) of the EC.257 After the Fontainebleau European 
Council in June 1984, Thatcher tasked the Cabinet and Whitehall with finding areas where 
common standards could lower barriers to trade for businesses in the UK.258 Robert 
Armstrong, the Cabinet Secretary, wrote a memo arguing that Thatcher wanted the 
government to “be ready to put forward within the Community specific initiatives of potential 
benefit to the United Kingdom”.259 The Cabinet sub-committee on European questions of the 
Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (OD(E)) was asked to consider how common 
standards could help British companies trade more with other EC countries. When they 
replied, Charles Powell introduced their efforts to Thatcher in the following terms:  
“this is the response to your request for an initiative at Fontainebleau which 
would be a contribution to the relaunch of the Community in the real 
interests of the UK. … If you agree, I propose to reply emphasising the 
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importance you attach to having concrete and substantial proposal of 
obvious benefit to Britain.260 
 
Geoffrey Howe told Thatcher that “OD(E) agreed that it was very much in the 
United Kingdom’s interest” to reduce barriers to trade caused by differing technological 
standards.261 The OD(E) minutes discussed the need to find common standards to reduce 
barriers to trade and innovation.262 Kenneth Baker, speaking as Minister for Information 
Technology, argued that the UK should “take advantage of Franco-German progress on 
mutual acceptance of national standards”.263 In OD(E) ministers “argued that Europe must not 
become merely the manufacturing arm of the United States and Japanese research and 
technological efforts”.264 OD(E) was favourably disposed towards encouraging research and 
development but found the existing approaches too narrow. Essentially, ministers were 
against “subsidies and grants to persuade companies [to develop technologies] when they 
would not otherwise do [so]”.265 Ministers argued that “the United Kingdom should focus the 
arguments on the job-creating potential of an Internal Market where standards were no longer 
a barrier”, because both officials and ministers argued that market fragmentation was the 
reason why companies traded less across borders in the EC than they could and that it would 
be in the interest of the UK economy to free up these barriers to trade.266  
In summary, with the “Europe – the Future” paper Thatcher’s government wanted to 
influence the debate on the future of the EC by suggesting foreign policy cooperation and 
extending the Single Market. These were the two central policy aims that Thatcher’s 
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government would pursue for the rest of 1984 and 1985. The paper was putting forward a set 
of policies that served as an alternative to the EP’s “Draft Treaty on European Union” and 
Mitterrand’s visionary but vague ideas for a “relaunch” of European integration. The “Europe 
– the Future” paper was presented at the European Council in Fontainebleau, on 25-6 June 
1984, with the intention of demonstrating that the UK government wanted to move beyond 
the dispute on the BBQ and was putting forward ideas on how to develop the EC further. 
Moreover, the “Europe – the Future” paper guided Malcolm Rifkind in his discussions in the 
Dooge Committee, which will be examined in the subsequent two sections of this chapter. 
The scramble to give Kohl the “Europe – the Future” paper in advance, before any of the 
other heads of government had seen it, suggests that both Thatcher and Howe saw Kohl as a 
key ally. They believed that Kohl would help Thatcher in her attempt to convince the 
European Council of the ideas set out in this paper. This focus on convincing Kohl, before a 
European Council meeting, would become a defining feature of Thatcher’s approach to the 
European Council in 1985, which will be explored further in chapter two.  
1. 2. James Dooge in the shadow of Paul-Henri Spaak and Altiero Spinelli 
In the early literature on the history of European integration two among many other 
federalist visionaries hold an important place: Paul-Henri Spaak and Altiero Spinelli.267 As 
chairman of the committee that bore his name, Spaak contributed to a report that became the 
basis for the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on the Common Market and Euratom, 
which led to the EEC treaty in 1957. Altiero Spinelli was a prominent federalist thinker in the 
Italian resistance movement, who became European Commissioner and Member of the 
European Parliament. Both Spaak and Spinelli were in their own ways very influential figures 
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in the European integration project. The Dooge Committee drew on the legacy of these two 
luminaries of European integration. The European Council in Fontainebleau, on 25-6 June 
1984, founded a committee “along the lines of the Spaak Committee” which would be 
constituted of “personal representatives of the heads of state or government” and was tasked 
with finding ways of improving the institutions of the EC.268 According to Geoffrey Howe’s 
informal record of the Fontainebleau European Council, François Mitterrand suggested that 
another “Spaak Committee” was needed to find a compromise on questions of 
“voting/anonymity”.269 Mitterrand argued that there were no “right” or “wrong” solutions but 
that “personal representatives of heads of government” should bring “some order” into the 
different ideas that were currently being discussed.270  
The Dooge Committee was constituted of government representatives as well as 
independent “personal representatives” of the EC heads of government. Immediately after it 
was called, Helmut Kohl enthusiastically said that it should consist of the “best people … 
from outside the institutions”.271 The delegates did not attend in any professional capacity but 
were simply mentioned as “representative of” a head of government.272 Margaret Thatcher 
was represented by Malcolm Rifkind, the minister of state for Europe at the FCO. Rifkind 
recounts in his memoirs that unlike most other members, who he believed were arguing along 
the lines of their personal opinions and were not reflecting their governments’ positions he 
had to seek Thatcher’s “approval” for any recommendations that he wished to make.273 
Rifkind did not feel constrained by this. He argued that because these issues were of “national 
importance”, having to seek Thatcher’s blessing “added to my negotiation strength on the 
committee. If they wanted a united report, they would need to accommodate not only me but 
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her.274 Rifkind recalled that he was fighting for a unanimous report, which the UK 
government could support. However, on Rifkind’s recommendation footnotes were used as a 
mechanism to voice reservations and thus forestall the need for a “minority report”.275 Rifkind 
remembered that under Thatcher “the United Kingdom was a fervent enthusiast of a proper 
Single Market”.276 Rifkind argued that in retrospect, the argument about whether or not to 
hold an IGC was his “main reservation” in the Dooge Committee; yet at the same time he 
argues that “the most historic consequence of our report was the Single European Act”.277 In 
essence, he was saying that he may not have wanted to negotiate changes to the EEC treaty, 
but once the IGC was underway the Dooge Committee made history. 
Malcolm Rifkind distinguished between three kinds of delegates who attended the 
Dooge Committee.278  The first group were ministers, the second group were government 
officials and the third group attended in no official but rather in a “personal” capacity.279 The 
Committee was chaired by James Dooge, a former Irish foreign minister and leader of the 
Senate. Helmut Kohl had wanted Karl Carstens, a former president of Germany, to head the 
committee but Fitzgerald prevailed with his nomination.280 Germany was represented by 
Jürgen Ruhfus, former German ambassador to the UK and Staatssekretär, i.e. holding the 
equivalent rank of a permanent secretary in the German foreign ministry.281 Italy was 
represented by Mauro Ferri, a former MEP. Belgium was represented by Fernand Herman, a 
former minister and MEP. Denmark was represented by Otto Møller, under-secretary at the 
Danish foreign ministry. France was represented by Maurice Faure, a former minister and 
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signatory of the EEC treaty in 1957.282 Greece was first represented by Gregori Varfis, former 
secretary of state for Europe, who was later nominated for the European Commission and 
then replaced with Ioannis Papantoniou, an advisor to the prime minister and former member 
of the European Parliament. Luxembourg was represented by Jean Dondelinger, a former 
permanent representative to the EC and head of the sécrétariat général of the Luxembourg 
government, roughly the equivalent of the Cabinet Secretary in the UK.283 Dondelinger would 
later head the preparatory group of the IGC. The Netherlands were represented by Willem 
Van Eekelen, permanent secretary in charge of European integration.284 The European 
Commission was represented by Frans Andriessen, who was replaced in January 1985 by 
Carlo Ripa di Meana, both European Commissioners.285 
There was heavy symbolism in calling the Dooge Committee the second Spaak 
Committee, which at the same time created high expectations from members of this 
committee. By casting the Dooge Committee in the light of the halcyon days of the creation 
of the EEC, the expectation was to find a way to unify its members by reviving the past and at 
the same time creating something new. The task of the Dooge Committee was to propose 
solutions on how to make the institutions of the EC function better. Both the German and the 
UK governments at various points looked at how the Dooge Committee differed from the 
Spaak Committee of 1956. The important difference between the German and the British 
approach was that in Germany this reflection was put in a summary of the first Dooge 
Committee meeting and was presented directly and personally to the German Chancellor.286 
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In the UK government, the reflections on this question happened six weeks before the Dooge 
Committee was wound up and only went as high as to Patrick Fairweather, the head of the 
European Community department (internal) at the FCO.287 There is no record of this 
reflection ever going to Howe or Thatcher. Would the Dooge Committee be able to live up to 
these expectations? How would the UK government, which had withdrawn from the process 
after the Messina conference of 1955 and was thus not a founding member of the EEC, 
interact in this committee?  
1. 3. Dooge Committee discussions: “wide differences of approach”  
From 28 September 1984 the Dooge Committee met every fortnight on a Wednesday 
evening and on the entire Thursday at the Palais Egmont in Brussels. At its first two meetings, 
the Dooge Committee discussed how it was going to approach the deliberations it was tasked 
to hold. In the first stage of the debate, the proposals of the different countries were brought 
together. At this stage the Dooge Committee was very much the talking shop that the 
literature believed it to have been. Nevertheless, this stage provided an important forum to 
share ideas and to hammer out preliminary compromises that could yield ideas for possible 
policy proposals. At this point the Dooge Committee was a forum to debate ideas. The battle 
of ideas was about what kind of EC the member states wanted to build, which was after all 
what it was tasked to do. At the heart of this debate was the question of what internal and 
external issues the EC should concern itself with, what new powers member states wanted to 
transfer to the institutions of the EC and whether reforms should happen inside or outside the 
EEC treaty. In the early stages of the Dooge Committee alliances were fluid and minds were 
open, especially since as “personal representatives” of the heads of government the delegates 
had a certain degree of independence from their governments.  
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Before the Dooge Committee met for the first time, high-ranking French and German 
officials had a secret meeting in Bonn to coordinate their positions.288 These meetings showed 
that France and Germany saw their bilateral relationship as one of the central driving forces in 
the EC but also that they wanted to exert their influence inconspicuously. According to the 
German archival records, the German delegation told Helmut Kohl that the “atmosphere” of 
the Franco-German meeting had been “excellent” and the German side had had the 
impression that on most points France and Germany were in agreement and that they would 
be the “pacemakers” of the upcoming Dooge Committee talks.289 The German delegation 
argued that such coordination of positions should happen in a “discreet” way, should avoid 
giving smaller countries the impression that they were being outvoted, and would not 
preclude bilateral negotiations with other countries.290 For the officials of France and 
Germany, their aim to coordinate in the Dooge Committee meant that they would be arguing 
for more work in the EC on European Political Cooperation (EPC), security, economic and 
financial policies.291 On the other areas the meeting was more vague and consisted mainly of 
Germany listening to the French officials as to what they had in mind. The officials agreed at 
this meeting that they wanted to steer the Dooge Committee towards calling for a treaty 
commitment on EPC, proposing a new secretariat and a Secretary General.292 Both countries 
agreed that if what they called the “Spaak Committee” could not find an agreement on these 
issues by January 1985, then France and Germany should come forward with their own 
solutions and bilaterally find a way to continue with a smaller group of countries.293  
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The wish lists of both countries for the Dooge Committee were very different from 
each other. Germany wanted a larger political framework. Immo Stabreit, department head 
responsible for economic cooperation at the German Federal Chancellery, told Helmut Kohl 
that the declared aim of both countries was to write a “new treaty” to achieve a “European 
Union”.294 The German officials wanted the Dooge Committee to work on defining the 
“European Union”, agree to a new treaty that would create a political framework to strengthen 
the EC institutions and give “political meaning” to the payments that “richer countries” were 
making into the EC.295 France was more concerned with improving the existing way of 
working in the EC and suggested abolishing the Luxembourg Compromise, the convention 
that allowed a country to invoke a “vital national interest” to defer a vote in the Council of 
Ministers.  Pierre Morel, foreign policy advisor to Mitterrand, and Guy Legras, head of 
European department at the French foreign ministry, suggested that the Luxembourg 
Compromise should either be abandoned, phased out within 10 years, as Altiero Spinelli had 
suggested, or only be used in exceptional circumstances, as France had originally intended in 
1966.296 The importance Morel and Legras attached to the debate in the Dooge Committee on 
how to develop the institutions of the EC is shown by them referring to this as “horizontal 
problems”, because they underpinned all other thematic areas under discussion and therefore 
had to be resolved first .297 These bilateral discussions showed that to France it was more 
important to find specific ways to make decisions more effectively, rather than pronounce 
larger political aims, which was what Germany was favouring. Therefore, the Franco-German 
relationship, on the subject of the Dooge Committee, can be characterised by a willingness to 
work together bilaterally behind the scenes despite holding very different views. 
The first discussion in the Dooge Committee took place on 10-11 October 1984. In a 
largely symbolic act, Altiero Spinelli, the veteran federalist and MEP, and Pierre Pfimlin, the 
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president of the European Parliament, were invited to address the Dooge Committee and 
present the “Draft Treaty on European Union” of the EP. In his presentation, Spinelli blamed 
the European Council, as the only “intergovernmental” body, for a lack of progress towards 
European Union.298 Spinelli argued that to break the stalemate the EP’s “draft treaty” should 
be negotiated in an Intergovernmental Conference and then ratified by all EC countries 
because it provided for a strong executive.299 He suggested that once it was ratified by enough 
countries to cover two thirds of the EC’s population then the “European Union” would 
exist.300 Mauro Ferri, the Italian delegate, agreed with this suggestion so much that he 
reintroduced it as his own proposal on the subsequent day.301 Ruhfus, the German delegate, 
said that it was the declared aim of Kohl to work towards a “European Union”.302 Supporting 
words also came from the representatives of the Benelux countries.303 Therefore, the early 
discussions in the Dooge Committee showed that delegates were listening to federalists, such 
as Spinelli, and were positively disposed towards the “Draft Treaty on European Union” of 
the EP. 
The mood in the Dooge Committee was initially marked by disagreement but also a 
willingness on the part of all delegates to work towards a common solution that would work 
for all EC member states. The federalist-minded aspect of the debate was only one part of 
what happened in the Dooge Committee. Ruhfus’ impression was that the “newer member 
states were more reticent,” with Rifkind emphasising that steps had to be “practical”.304 
Møller, the Danish delegate, was for EPC but against treaty change and Varfis, the 
representative from Greece, warned that European integration should not disadvantage poorer 
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EC member states.305 Pfimlin and Spinelli as well as Herman and Faure all submitted wide-
ranging papers on the political objective of “European Union” and Rifkind submitted a more 
specific paper on the Single Market.306 According to David Butler, head of UKRep, the 
subsequent debate in the Dooge Committee revealed “wide differences of approach”, ranging 
from those who wanted a “new treaty” to those who wanted no change at all.307 At the end of 
the meeting, a lively debate ensued on the form that an interim report should take. Ruhfus 
suggested that Faure should write a draft but there were objections from Møller and 
Papantonio.308 Ferri then suggested that everyone should write a report.309 Dooge eventually 
said he could not stop Faure from writing a draft.310  
The British paper on the Single Market was discussed at the third meeting. When 
presenting the paper, Malcolm Rifkind stressed that he believed what was needed was a clear 
set of objectives and a schedule.311 Rifkind argued that all delegates supported the aim of 
creating a Single Market but there was disagreement on how to achieve this.312 Most 
delegates, particularly Andriessen, Dondelinger, Herman, Faure, Ferri and Ruhfus, argued 
that extending the Single Market also meant reforming the institutions, allowing for majority 
voting and involving the EP to a larger degree.313 Andriessen and Ruhfus added that 
harmonisation of different laws, especially on indirect taxes, plant as well as animal health, 
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and the free movement of people was also required.314 Papantonio suggested that 
liberalisation had to include a level of resource transfer from richer to poorer countries.315 
Møller and Van Eekelen made the case that the present treaties were sufficient to allow for 
extending the Single Market and that all that was required was political resolve.316 Dooge 
asked Rifkind to improve his text to reflect the feedback he had received, especially to 
improve ways of making decisions, such as majority voting, write a timetable, reconcile it 
with the Adonnino Committee and allow for more harmonisation of laws.317 
The feedback that Rifkind received to the paper on extending the Single Market 
reflected two fundamental shortcomings of the paper in the eyes of his continental 
counterparts. One was that the paper was essentially a catalogue of policies on liberalising 
elements of the Single Market, such as lorry quotas or international bus travel and services. 
The speaking notes for Ruhfus argued that Germany supported Rifkind’s initiative but that the 
picture Rifkind painted of the Single Market was “like a simplified woodcarving” of the 
complex reality of the Single Market.318 Waldemar Mueller-Thuns, a department head at the 
German Federal Ministry of Economics, argued that Rifkind’s proposals were in line with 
German thinking but were essentially a list of technical proposals, with an emphasis on 
services.319 Mueller-Thuns argued that what the paper was lacking was a political framework, 
without which the Single Market could not be built.320 What was also lacking was a broader, 
overarching political approach. To provide this, Mueller-Thuns was advocating expanding the 
European Monetary System, harmonising indirect taxes and introducing qualified majority 
voting, even though he recognised that in individual cases this could go against Germany’s 
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interests.321 Therefore, there was a fundamental difference between how the UK and Germany 
approached the discussions in the Dooge Committee. From Mueller-Thuns’ statement one can 
see that in the German government the thinking about reforming EC policies and institutions 
happened in the context of an overarching political framework. In the British government on 
the other hand policies were analysed individually and without putting forward an 
overarching political vision.  
In the eyes of the other Dooge Committee members, the second shortcoming of 
Rifkind’s paper was that it listed policy aims but did not yet outline how they were to be 
achieved. This paper posed difficult questions as to which institutions would be put in charge 
and where decisions on conflicting objectives would be taken, but did not offer specific 
solutions. These issues cut to the heart of the question why the Single Market had never been 
fully completed. There were still persistent non-tariff barriers to trade, even though creating a 
large European market was an objective that had been endorsed in the EEC treaty of 1957. 
Faure and Herman remarked in the second meeting of the Dooge Committee that even though 
everyone agreed on the aim of a Single Market, there still was “paralysis”, which they 
believed was the explanation why the institutions of the EC had to be reformed.322 In their 
view that was why policy aims, such as the ones Rifkind was putting forward, were not 
enough. Most members of the Dooge Committee believed what Mueller-Thuns told Ruhfus, 
which was that a political framework and better functioning institutions were essential to 
reach exactly those policy aims that Rifkind was advocating. What was thus required was an 
institutional framework that made a reality of the shared commitment of the EC countries to 
the Single Market and which would provide a forum to take decisions on details such as lorry 
quotas or how much fuel a lorry was allowed to hold in its tank when crossing a border. For 
the Dooge Committee the question was thus as follows: would the assembled representatives 
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find a way to agree on a proposal for reforming the institutions of the EC and would they be 
able to convince the heads of government who had appointed them to implement such a 
framework? 
The task of proposing an institutional framework of reform was made more difficult 
by the wide remit of the Dooge Committee. Apart from decision making, which underpinned 
all other issues, and internal questions such as the Single Market, a further prominent issue 
was external unity and a common foreign policy, called European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) on the continent and Political Cooperation (PoCo) in the UK. Ruhfus was tasked with 
writing a paper on the issue. He submitted a paper that advocated creating a “common foreign 
policy” by formalising EPC consultations, introducing majority voting on a selection of issues 
(mainly human rights), consulting with the EP, instituting a secretariat in Brussels with a 
Secretary General, creating common embassies in remote countries and coordinating voting at 
the United Nations.323 The paper was generally positively received, with the exception of 
Dooge and Møller. Dooge in this instance spoke as the Irish representative and without 
mentioning Irish neutrality rejected every aspect of the paper, arguing that until the Single 
Market had been completed there was no point thinking about a common foreign policy.324 
Møller expressed himself in favour of the status quo. Malcolm Rifkind supported Ruhfus’ 
“excellent paper” wholeheartedly, except for the issue of majority voting.325 Rifkind argued 
that majority voting on PoCo posed constitutional difficulties but that this might be solved 
with a “commitment” to engage in PoCo and “a safeguard for important national interests”, 
by which he meant the Luxembourg Compromise.326  
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With this PoCo paper, Ruhfus had found an issue on which both the UK and the 
German governments could potentially agree. The German paper contained ideas that found 
wider resonance in the FCO, which would become more pronounced in the first half of 1985. 
Reading this German paper one can find many issues that would resurface in a British paper 
on PoCo in spring 1985 (such as formalising PoCo consultations, common embassies, 
coordination at international organisations). The paper that the FCO was going to write took 
on board many of the themes that Ruhfus had presented to the Dooge Committee but would 
put them firmly on an intergovernmental footing. Moreover, the UK government would later 
suggest that any PoCo agreement between EC governments should lie squarely outside the 
EEC treaty. The British paper slimmed down the institutional, or political, dimension of the 
German EPC proposals. As will be explained in the next chapter, the British paper would 
suggest that the European Parliament should only be updated, rather than given equal say with 
the Council of Ministers in new laws and directives. The secretariat would be part of the 
European Commission and not a new organisation. The important difference between the 
British and the German approach was that the British paper did not include majority voting 
and that the main forum of discussion was the European Council. Therefore, the British PoCo 
paper of 1985 would be much more intergovernmental in its aim than the German paper in the 
Dooge Committee. In the first half of 1985, this paper was going to become the core element 
of the UK government’s European policy making, which will be examined in chapter two.  
1. 4. Dooge report: “a compendium of ideas” 
The interim report, which Maurice Faure had initiated, was presented at the Dublin 
European Council, on 3-4 December 1984, where however it was received largely without 
any discussion. Nevertheless, the Dooge Committee was given a mandate to write a 
commonly agreed final report.327 This report was presented on 29-30 March 1985 but the 
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discussion of the final report was moved to the Milan European Council on 28-9 June 
1985.328 The Interim Report made clear that the Dooge Committee had a mandate from the 
European Council, which was meant to suggest ways regarding how “European cooperation” 
inside and outside the EC  could be improved, along the lines of the “Spaak committee” of 
1955.329 In the debates on how to turn the interim report into a final report, the overarching 
question was whether the members of the Dooge Committee would be able to agree to a 
coherent set of recommendations. If the Dooge Committee could unanimously agree to a 
report with clear policy recommendations then this could serve as a potential blueprint for 
action, much as the Spaak Committee had done in 1957 for the EEC treaty. A weak or 
heterogenic report on the other hand would give licence to controversy and dissent amongst 
its members. Malcolm Rifkind also faced the challenge of reconciling the debates in the 
Dooge Committee with the instructions he received from the Prime Minister to limit the scope 
of the committee’s recommendations. The debates between November 1984 and March 1985 
would in that sense determine the historical importance of the Dooge Committee.  
As explained above, with the support of Ruhfus, Faure had taken it upon himself to 
write his own version of an interim report, which would serve as a discussion paper for the 
final report.330 Rifkind was sceptical of an early report, arguing together with Møller and 
Papantoniou that it was “premature” to issue a report before the recommendations of the 
Dooge Committee were clear, but was faced with a majority view that a strong and substantial 
report was necessary.331 Faure’s report was discussed, amended and refined from the end of 
October until it was presented as a final report to the European Council in Dublin on 3-4 
December 1984. Faure focused in his first interim report on the institutional aspect of the EC 
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and suggested that majority voting should be introduced for all “implementing decisions” but 
unanimity should be retained for “decisions of principle”.332 Faure further suggested that the 
Luxembourg Compromise should be “institutionalised” but had to be “objectively 
justifiable”.333 However, Faure also said that his report did not represent the views of the 
French government. Rifkind was sceptical and asked Faure to define what “objectively 
justifiable” meant.334 Moreover, Rifkind argued that only national governments could have 
the “last word” on invoking the Luxembourg compromise.335  
Margaret Thatcher read Michael Butler’s summaries of the discussions in the Dooge 
Committee and began to form her own thoughts on the proposals that were being put forward. 
Her Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Charles Powell, introduced the summary of the 
Dooge Committee’s interim report to Thatcher by saying “there is some pretty good lunacy 
here” and suggesting that the FCO should write a report on the Dooge Committee.336 Thatcher 
underlined these words and assented. Her thoughts about these telegrams were relayed back to 
the FCO by Powell. He wrote to Colin Budd, Howe’s Assistant Private Secretary, saying that 
Thatcher was “alarmed by some of the ideas” that were discussed in the Dooge Committee.337 
Thatcher was particularly unhappy with the idea to write a new treaty but also disliked the 
proposals to limit the Luxembourg Compromise and give the EP power over the revenues of 
the EC.338 Thatcher saw that Rifkind supported Ruhfus’ paper on PoCo but warned that she 
would not like to see majority voting introduced to PoCo.339 Powell said that Thatcher was 
“dubious about taking on a formal commitment to consult” on PoCo.340 
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Robin Renwick, Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the FCO (responsible for 
European integration), wrote to Derek Thomas, the political director (responsible for PoCo 
consultation with other EC countries) that he did not believe in majority voting on PoCo but 
that the UK had to be seen to go along with the “rhetorical flourishes about the political 
development of Europe” in the Dooge Committee in order to see progress in extending the 
Single Market.341 Renwick thus argued that PoCo and the Single Market were linked. 
Therefore, if the UK could not play a “positive-sounding part” in these discussions then 
France and Germany would come up with their own initiative.342 To convince Thatcher of this 
link between the Single Market and PoCo, Renwick prepared a draft letter for Howe to 
Thatcher.343 This draft letter argued that Chancellor Kohl wanted “some kind of ‘European 
Union’” to come out of the Dooge Committee. Renwick argued that Thatcher should accept 
the formalisation of PoCo as long as it was not legally binding. Renwick suggested that 
Thatcher should convince Kohl that the British paper “Europe – the Future” was “at least as 
valid as the more idealistic approach [Kohl] favours and a good deal more realizable in 
practice”.344 The most important point was not to be seen by Kohl as “the main opponent of 
his ideas” but to emphasise that the “practical differences” between the positions of the UK 
and Germany were small and that “practical” steps had to be taken.345 This letter does not 
appear to have ever been sent to Thatcher but it foreshadows the writing of the PoCo paper of 
1985, Thatcher’s meeting with Helmut Kohl and her insistence to keep it out of the EC treaty 
structure.  
When the Dooge Committee’s interim report was discussed again on 7-8 November 
1984 the debate became heated. Faure suggested a report that outlined a “majority” and a 
“minority” view, which was “forcefully” criticised by Rifkind, Van Eekelen, Møller and 
 
341 TNA FCO98/2025, folio no. 31, R. Renwick to D. Thomas, “Anglo-German summit: Development of the 
Community”, 30 October 1984. 
342 Ibid. 
343 TNA FCO98/2025, draft letter G. Howe to M. Thatcher, “Anglo-German summit: Development of the 
Community,” n.d. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Ibid. 
 78 
Papantonio.346 Rifkind said that if such a course was followed then positions would 
prematurely harden and further discussions would no longer serve any purpose.347 Herman 
countered that Rifkind was “repeating the same old story as has been heard from the UK since 
Messina” but later offered an apology.348 The German records argued that even though 
Rifkind, Møller and Papantoniou entered a fundamental reserve on the interim report they still 
were prepared to continue working on the basis of it.349 The rest of the meeting was devoted 
to discussing majority voting and whether any kind of “objective” invocation of the 
Luxembourg Compromise was possible.350 The meeting ended inconclusively but the idea of 
a report that split the Dooge Committee into two groups seemed to have been killed off by 
Rifkind’s vigorous defence. Interestingly, despite resisting the suggestion of a 
majority/minority report at this stage, Rifkind himself would later reintroduce the idea of a 
section referring to a majority and minority in the final report, but only for the part that dealt 
with majority voting, which will be looked at further below. UKRep was instructed by the 
FCO that the formal position of the UK government was that Rifkind would continue to 
suggest improvements but was not yet ready to make commitments, especially not on 
strengthening the EC institutions, nor on calling an IGC to negotiate changes to the EEC 
treaty.351   
On 16 November 1984, Colin Budd sent Thatcher the report that she had asked for 
two weeks earlier. Budd reported that the views in the Dooge Committee were heterogenic, 
some were “quite unrealistic” and that it was impossible to say how events would turn out.352 
He argued that for the UK government three proposals were the most important ones: 
Rifkind’s paper on the Single Market, Ruhfus’ ideas on PoCo and Faure’s draft interim 
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report. On the Single Market, Budd argued that Rifkind’s proposals were welcomed in the 
Dooge Committee but that after the Iberian enlargement more majority voting was necessary 
in order “to prevent filibusters by the smaller member states”. Budd suggested that provided 
the Luxembourg Compromise remained in place, the UK had “nothing to lose” by examining 
majority vote on a “case by case basis”.  Budd argued that Ruhfus’ PoCo paper “follows the 
lead which we gave in ‘Europe – the Future’” and that endorsing it in its entirety would “go a 
long way to satisfying Chancellor Kohl’s wish to see positive results from the work of the 
Dooge Committee”. Moreover, Budd said that majority voting for PoCo and an “obligation to 
consult” would both be unacceptable to the UK. Geoffrey Howe was in favour of formalising 
such informal practices only if it did not result in binding obligations. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, Budd argued that Faure’s report was a “compendium of ideas”. Budd told 
Powell that what was clear from these discussions was that the other countries wanted to 
achieve something more ambitious than just completing the Single Market.353  
Colin Budd said that Geoffrey Howe had instructed Rifkind he should “steer the 
[Dooge] Committee’s work in a direction we could accept”.354 Charles Powell suggested to 
Thatcher that the FCO needed to know her thoughts on how to take the discussions further.355 
Powell assumed that certain ideas from the Dooge Committee were unacceptable to Thatcher, 
such as “objective tests” for the Luxembourg Compromise, a “declaratory treaty on European 
Union”, majority voting on PoCo, giving more powers to the European Parliament and taking 
part in EMS.356 Powell proposed that it might be acceptable to “formalise existing 
commitments” on PoCo in a non-binding way in order to “head off much more ambitious 
ideas”.357 In response, Margaret Thatcher scribbled by hand “no” next to that point and 
commented that “In view of our manifesto … I do not see how we can?”.358 Charles Powell 
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replied that “I have some difficulty in interpreting your comments … we are already saying 
no to virtually all the things you dislike”.359 Powell argued that the paramount task was to 
“rein the Germans and others back from some of their more madcap schemes: a new Treaty: a 
political entity etc.”. Powell suggested that to do so Thatcher should give some ground but 
should determine clear limits on how far the UK government was prepared to go. Firstly, 
majority voting should be examined on a “case by case basis”, while keeping the Luxembourg 
Compromise intact. Secondly, Powell suggested that “existing commitments in PoCo” should 
be formalised. “What’s the point?” of formalising PoCo, Powell asked rhetorically?360 “In the 
real world none at all. But it might help head the Germans and others off something far more 
ambitious”.361 
The outcome of this exchange between Powell and Thatcher was a letter that Charles 
Powell wrote to Colin Budd in which he listed all issues that Thatcher believed that the UK 
government should oppose in the Dooge Committee: firstly, “majority voting in PoCo or any 
other commitment which hinders us from acting in defence of essential British interests”; 
secondly, “extension of the powers of the European Parliament”; thirdly, “‘objective tests’ for 
invoking the Luxembourg Compromise”; fourthly, “a new European Treaty”; fifthly, The UK 
would not join the Exchange Rate Mechanism; sixthly, “Community social legislation”; 
seventhly, “Community preference in arms procurement”.362 Powell said that Thatcher 
wanted Rifkind to take a “slightly more open position” in the Dooge Committee, on the issues 
of PoCo and majority voting, but insisted that “the Luxembourg Compromise should be 
preserved intact”. Powell argued that what Thatcher could accept was to “formalise existing 
informal arrangement” of PoCo as long as this did not “hinder our ability to promote our 
interests as we think best”.363 Powell’s memo shows how the Prime Minister’s office had 
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placed limits on what Rifkind and the FCO could agree to in the Dooge Committee. Most 
importantly, any discussion of changes to treaties and institutions were for Thatcher out of the 
question. What Powell was in effect saying was that the only course of action the British 
government would sanction was formalising the existing informal PoCo arrangements.  
This memo is a significant piece of evidence that shows the strictures which 
Thatcher placed on what Rifkind could or could not accept in the Dooge Committee. The 
possible contradiction between formalisation and doing so in a non-binding way was never 
really addressed. As described above, Powell had earlier argued to Thatcher that if PoCo was 
formalised this would prevent any proposals for treaty change by Germany. Powell’s 
preoccupation with Germany reflects a wider current in the British government’s policy 
making, which saw Germany as the key ally in convincing other members of the European 
Council. To some extent this could have been reflective of Germany’s much stronger 
economic position in the 1970s and 1980s, relative to other European countries and even the 
USA, and a readiness to play a more active role in in international diplomacy, both within the 
EC and towards the USA.364 The focus of the UK government’s European policy making on 
Germany, could also have been designed as a way to break into the Franco-German axis, 
which however was never clearly formulated as policy. The next chapter shows that in the 
FCO the idea of breaking into the Franco-German relationship was occasionally alluded to, 
especially in the context of wanting to influence Kohl before Mitterrand had a chance to do 
so. Such considerations served to make the focus of the British government on Germany and 
on Kohl even more pronounced. Yet with regards to the Dooge Committee, a focus on 
Germany risked overlooking Faure’s prominent position in this committee. When France and 
Germany agreed on an issue in the EC then it had a high likelihood of succeeding. Ruhfus’ 
support of Faure’s interim report in the Dooge Committee was just one small case in point. 
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The Franco-German consultations before both the Dooge Committee and the Milan European 
Council showed that both countries were aware of their important positions and tried to use 
them to their advantage.  
On 30 November 1984, Rifkind briefed Thatcher personally on the progress of the 
work done in the Dooge Committee.365 He euphemistically likened the interim report to the 
story of the curate’s egg, which although it was completely rotten was described as “good in 
parts” by the curate because he was overawed by having breakfast with the bishop. Rifkind 
said that the interim report looked like an “unrealistic” final report. The redeeming features of 
this interim report were the commitment to the Single Market, the plan to reduce the number 
of European commissioners and the codification of PoCo. The “less palatable” parts of the 
curate’s egg were the ideas to give the European Commission and the EP more power, the 
idea to phase out the “use of the veto”, i.e. the Luxembourg Compromise, and the increased 
use of majority voting. Rifkind believed that these ideas were in part driven by Helmut Kohl 
wanting a “qualitative leap” forward. However, Rifkind argued that there was still enough 
time to combat such ideas and steer them towards “practical proposals”, without the UK 
isolating itself in the negotiations.366  
The interim report of the Dooge Committee took as its fundamental problem the “10 
years of crisis”, arguing that in terms of GDP growth the European economies were being 
outpaced economically as well as technologically by Japan and the USA.367 In the interim 
report, the Dooge Committee argued that the answer to the EC’s problems was “a true 
political entity among European states, i.e. a European Union”.368 To achieve the “European 
Union”, decisions in the Councils of Ministers should be made by qualified majority voting, 
except on new policies or enlargement of the EC and new member states.369 The right to 
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invoke a “vital interest”, i.e. the Luxembourg Compromise, should become temporary, and 
had to go through, a more formalised process that would still have to be defined.370 On the 
former proposal, Rifkind placed a reserve but agreed in principle to the increased use of 
majority voting. On the latter issue, five other countries refused to take a position.371  
The interim report advocated a series of measures to improve the working of the 
Single Market, such as recognising common standards that included not just goods but also 
insurance, liberalising public procurement, some form of technological cooperation, a 
“common transport policy”, the “free movement for European citizen”, standardisation of 
taxation, the “free movement of capital” and monetary integration.372 The European market 
was thus understood very broadly as “homogenous internal economic area”.373 Because of 
this holistic view the report advocated that part of the aim was to equalise living standards in 
the EC.374 An integral step towards this new market where everyone was on the same level 
was the ECU as a currency, which would not only be traded by central banks as a reserve 
currency but would be developed into a fully-fledged currency.375 In addition, the interim 
report called for more foreign policy coordination, a secretariat, security cooperation and 
coordinating the positions of EC countries at international organisations, such as the United 
Nations.376 Rifkind entered one reserve in the section on the EMS, which objected to a 
European currency, a central bank and European Monetary Fund.377 However, unlike 
Denmark and Greece, the UK did not enter a reserve to the preface.  
Even though the final report was handed to the European Council in March it was 
not going to be discussed in detail until the European Council in Milan on 28-9 June 1985. In 
the debate on turning the interim report into a final report, the picture that emerged in the 
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Dooge Committee was one where the Danish and the Greek representatives objected to 
almost every paragraph and all other countries focused on a more selected use of placing 
reserves on texts. The footnotes in the interim as well as the final report say almost more than 
the text of the report about where each country stood. The final Dooge Committee report 
contained seventeen formal reservations by Greece (three comments of dissent, which was not 
a formal objection but merely expressed a diverging point of view), two by Denmark (seven 
comments of dissent), three by Germany (no comment of dissent), none by France and only 
one by the UK (two comments of dissent).378 The use of reserves was important because they 
publicly recorded divergences. Rifkind had suggested that reserves should be recorded in the 
footnotes because this would prevent a majority/minority report and to allow all delegates to 
continue working on the report, even though they might not subscribe to all proposals. 
Placing reserves in the Dooge report also allowed the FCO to say to other departments that 
Rifkind had recorded their doubts.379 Moreover, the objections in the footnotes conceivably 
avoided presenting Thatcher with a long list of issues that she by all accounts would have 
rejected out of hand. It was, therefore, successful in minimising the internal conflict over 
grand sounding plans of European unity.  
Patrick Fairweather, head of European Community Department (Internal) at the 
FCO, argued that concerning the issue of majority voting Rifkind had “a tricky hand to play 
[because] we [were] not in favour of any amendment [of] the treaties”.380 The Interim Report 
of the Dooge Committee advocated “new general voting principles”, under which the 
decisions in the Council of Ministers should be made by a simple or qualified majority, 
except for “new areas of action and new accessions”.381 Malcolm Rifkind placed a general 
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reserve on this text.382 Fairweather suggested going “a little beyond our formal position” by 
accepting that any final report of the Dooge Committee would have to include an element of 
majority voting.383 To this end, Fairweather suggested that majority voting should be accepted 
to the full extent of the existing EEC treaty but any additional majority voting should be dealt 
with on a “case by case examination of treaty provisions now requiring unanimity”.384 
Fairweather argued that such a study was designed “not to identify possible candidates for 
majority voting, but to bring others to accept that amendment of these articles is not 
practicable”.385  
It is significant that Fairweather believed a detailed examination of majority voting 
would not lead to more majority voting but would bury the question in a detailed study. David 
Williamson, head of the European Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, believed that the UK 
could consider allowing more majority voting in the Council of Ministers but argued that 
weakening the Luxembourg Compromise was out of the question.386 Williamson was 
convinced that as long as the Luxembourg Compromise was intact then more majority voting 
could be in the interest of the UK. Therefore, the UK government wanted to keep a clear 
distinction between provisions for majority voting and the Luxembourg Compromise, with 
the informal practice to invoke a “vital national interest” to delay or prevent being outvoted in 
the Council of Ministers.387 
On 18 February 1985, Rifkind told Geoffrey Howe that he was facing a “difficult 
situation” in the Dooge Committee and that he would like to agree to holding an IGC in 
exchange for concessions on majority voting and the European Parliament.388 Howe replied 
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that he “could not agree in advance” of the European Council to an IGC. However, Howe 
suggested that “something a bit more positive than the existing footnote” should be said. 
Howe argued that Rifkind should aim to “get options into the paper” but that these should be 
worded as “the views of some members of the committee … and not as a 
British/Greek/Danish position” because “their position was harder than ours”.389 In this 
discussion between Rifkind and Howe one can see that agreeing to more majority voting was 
designed to take part constructively in the discussions of the Dooge Committee but to do so 
only to a limited extent. On the one hand, this more positive approach was hemmed in by the 
notion expressed by Patrick Fairweather: the hope that studying detailed questions of majority 
voting would convince other countries that it was undesirable. On the other hand, this more 
open approach was limited by referring all questions about an IGC to the European Council 
and thus to Margaret Thatcher, who would have to decide for the British government if she 
could agree to holding an IGC with the objective to change the EEC treaty. The briefings for 
Rifkind are very clear that the decision on whether or not an IGC would be held “must be left 
entirely open for heads of government to decide”, which would happen at the European 
Council on 28-9 June 1985 in Milan.390  
The final version of the report of the Dooge Committee, although in substance not 
much different from the interim report, has nevertheless a number of interesting additions. A 
paragraph was inserted that argued that the Dooge Committee’s aim was not to write a treaty 
but to point out goals and measures that would bring back the “vigour and ambition” of 
European integration.391 The next step on the road to implement the Dooge Committee’s 
recommendations, just like after the Spaak committee, should be an IGC to thrash out a “draft 
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European Union treaty”.392 The final report strengthened this recommendation by using the 
term “propose”, which to some extent implied that this was a unanimous recommendation of 
the Dooge Committee.393 The report argued that the proposed conference should be based on 
the Dooge Committee, the acquis communautaire,394 the “Solemn declaration of European 
Union”, signed by heads of government in the European Council on 19 June 1983, and the 
“Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union”, passed by the European Parliament on 14 
February 1984.395 The final report of the Dooge Committee closed with the words that the 
intended treaty would “constitute the founding of [the] European Union”.396  
The final version of the report softened the recommendations for majority voting 
significantly.397 Instead of suggesting majority voting in all cases, the final version of the 
report stated that most members of the Committee were generally arguing for such a position 
but were also recognising that some decisions had to be taken unanimously.398 A minority in 
the Dooge Committee, namely Denmark, Greece and the UK, argued that when enough time 
had been spent discussing an issue, a vote should be called but only whenever the EEC treaty 
allowed. Moreover, they argued that the Luxembourg Compromise should remain in place. 
The difference between the two lay largely in the aspect of whether more majority voting than 
the EEC treaty prescribed should be allowed or whether the current treaty provisions were 
sufficient. In a nutshell, it was the difference between changing the EEC treaty or not. To split 
the argument into a majority and minority position was an idea that Rifkind put forward.399 
He argued that splitting the recommendations was seen as a way, by the delegates who were 
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in the minority, to make sure that the Dooge Committee report also recorded their views 
which could potentially make it easier to convince the Prime Ministers of Denmark, Greece 
and the UK to agree to an IGC.400  
The final report showed that Rifkind had followed Geoffrey Howe’s instructions to 
include more “options” into the final report and to present it as a broad difference of views. 
Because members put their names in support of each option into the footnotes, Rifkind could 
not prevent this looking like a British, Danish and Greek minority position, which was an 
impression Howe had originally wanted to avoid. However, presenting these two options 
meant doing exactly what Rifkind had refused to do earlier, when on 7-8 November he 
criticised the notion of a minority report with the argument that it would prematurely harden 
views and make further discussions impossible. The implicit recognition in splitting the 
paragraph on majority voting into two parts, was that on the subject of changing the EEC to 
include more majority voting the views of all members had ossified with the UK, Denmark, 
and Greece building a minority that refused to contemplate such a policy. 
The Dooge Committee was only discussed in the full Cabinet on 21 March 1985, 
when its final report was finished. The Cabinet discussions reveal that the government 
considered the strategy chosen for the Dooge Committee “had enhanced respect for the 
arguments which we were advancing”.401 Rifkind was lauded for the way he defended the 
position of the UK on “controversial issues”, such as the European Parliament.402 The Cabinet 
believed that when the final report of the Dooge Committee was made public “it would 
become clear that the views of other Community Governments were closer to those of the 
United Kingdom than might appear from the positions taken by some non-Government 
representatives in the Committee itself”.403 What is interesting in this paragraph is how 
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convinced the Cabinet members were that the other countries’ positions were moving towards 
the position of the UK government.  
Just as the Dooge Committee had begun with a discussion on the historical 
importance of the Spaak Committee, so was this discussion raised again when the Dooge 
Committee was wound down. The question in March 1985 was whether the Dooge 
Committee should be continued to form a more permanent institution, or cease to exist after it 
had submitted its final report?404 The FCO was aware that Thatcher had expressed herself in 
favour of the latter option.405 With a permanent role, the Dooge Committee could potentially 
have eclipsed the Spaak committee in historical influence or prominence. However, the 
Dooge Committee was never given such a permanent role. In this the view of the UK 
government was aligned with the majority. The Dooge Committee’s impetus may also simply 
have petered out. When its final report was submitted to the heads of government, the forum 
of debate on the future of the EC was back again in the intergovernmental realm. The 
questions for the next two chapters will be what national leaders, and the UK government in 
particular, would make of the ideas, visions and proposals and the compromises that were 
discussed in the Dooge Committee. Would they call an IGC? Would they formalise 
PoCo/EPC? Would they extend the Single Market? Would they resolve to give more power to 
the EP? In March 1985 these were still a series of ideas that had as yet to publicly attract 
high-profile backing from a head of government. The subsequent ten months would decide 
the fate of these ideas.  
In conclusion, this chapter explained the legacy of the BBQ and how the paper 
“Europe – the Future”, which Margaret Thatcher presented to the European Council in 
Fontainebleau on 25-6 June 1984, became the opening position of the British government in 
the Dooge Committee. Moreover, by examining how the Cabinet, the FCO and UKRep 
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interacted, this chapter clarified the underpinning assumptions of this dissertation on the 
structures in government and Whitehall that assessed policy options and devised policy. The 
UK government suggested formalising existing informal practices of foreign policy 
coordination (PoCo) and extending the Single Market. The Dooge Committee went through 
two stages. The first stage saw a large number of proposals being debated. This stage ended 
with Maurice Faure writing an interim report that helped to turn these ideas into a list of 
proposals. In the Dooge Committee, Malcolm Rifkind tried to minimise the use of reserves to 
show a level of commitment of the UK government to the ongoing discussions. The Danish 
and Greek representatives, Møller and Papantonio, added many more footnotes than Rifkind. 
On the proposals to give the EP more power, or to extend the EMS, Rifkind entered a reserve. 
In discussing these issues and in pre-charting their possible compromises, the Dooge 
Committee was already preparing the ground for the IGC which would take place a year later. 
The Dooge Committee was a battle of competing ideas about what the EC was and 
how it could be developed in the future. In the second stage of the Dooge Committee, the 
question was which of the recommendations should make it into the final report. At this stage, 
the deliberations of the Dooge Committee met with the critical scrutiny of Margaret Thatcher 
and her advisor Charles Powell. Powell said that Thatcher was “alarmed” at how wide-
ranging the policy proposals of the Dooge Committee were. To limit its scope, or the scope of 
what Rifkind could agree to, Thatcher gave the FCO a list of all the policies she would not 
accept, such as majority voting for PoCo, extending the EMS and European social legislation. 
Thatcher assented to two policies that Rifkind could pursue further. Firstly, Rifkind was 
permitted to agree to a case-by-case examination of introducing majority voting. Secondly, 
Thatcher agreed to a codification of hitherto informal PoCo practices, such as consultations 
and common positions at international organisations, as long as this did not lead to any 
binding commitments in the process of forming foreign policies. These strictures which 
Thatcher imposed on the Dooge Committee would chart the course of action that the UK 
government was going to follow in 1985 and would be reflected in a paper in which the UK 
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government proposed the codification of PoCo. This paper will be looked at in the next 
chapter in the context of a meeting between Kohl and Thatcher.   
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Chapter 2. Thatcher’s bid to lead the EC into foreign policy 
coordination: “wooing” Helmut Kohl 
Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl met on 18 May 1985 at Chequers, the country 
seat of the British Prime Minister. This meeting was a vital staging post because it influenced 
the outcome of the European Council in Milan. The Anglo-German summit at Chequers was 
the only high-level bilateral meeting that Thatcher accepted before the European Council in 
Milan. Apart from Kohl, the Prime Ministers of Belgium and Italy also asked for a meeting 
with Thatcher.406 Their requests for meetings were turned down because Thatcher said that 
there was “no time”.407 Thatcher refused these meetings against FCO advice, who explained 
to her that especially a meeting with Bettino Craxi, the Italian Prime Minister, could have 
helped shoring up support against the idea to hold an IGC to negotiate changing the EEC 
treaty.408 The meeting between Thatcher and Kohl illustrated how different the views of the 
two leaders on European integration were. By devoting an entire high-level summit to 
convincing Kohl and refusing to meet anyone else, Thatcher showed that she perceived Kohl 
to be a key ally in the European Council. 
The meeting with Kohl brought to the fore Thatcher’s own views on the EC, which 
centred on liberalising markets and strengthening the West in the Cold War. When Geoffrey 
Howe, the foreign secretary, suggested to her a paper on foreign policy coordination (PoCo) 
she enthusiastically described it as a “stroke of genius” and agreed to share it privately with 
Kohl.409 The way Thatcher espoused this initiative as her own shows that she did not have a 
vision for European integration that she set out in a document, like for instance Harold 
Macmillan’s “grand design” of 1961 to take Britain into the EEC, but rather held a set of 
views that informed her policy making. Howe told Thatcher that with this PoCo paper she 
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could present her own initiative to Kohl in order to shape the agenda early, “impress” him and 
head off “far-fetched ideas”, such as an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to change the 
EEC treaty.410 The records of the meeting between Thatcher and Kohl show that she put 
forward the PoCo paper because she wanted to present an alternative proposal to counter what 
she saw as introspective, protectionist and possibly anti-American ideas. Therefore, with this 
paper she wanted to break down barriers to free trade and strengthen the Western security 
aspect of the EC, without changing the institutional setup of the EC or any of its treaties.  
The idea of writing a paper to advance the proposals of the British government came 
from Robin Renwick, Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the FCO (responsible for 
European integration), who was an important advisor to Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe 
and accompanied him to European Council meetings. He had already been influential as main 
author of the “Europe – the Future” paper, which was introduced in the previous chapter. 
Thatcher accepted the suggestion and agreed to present it personally as a high-level initiative 
at the upcoming European Council. With this paper, Howe and the FCO prompted Thatcher 
to clarify her own thinking on European integration, which was a way for Howe to deal with 
the unknown component of Thatcher’s views on how to develop the EC further. Moreover, 
for Renwick, writing such a paper could have been motivated in part by the notion of 
breaking into Franco-German leadership of the EC. The British ambassador to Germany, 
Julian Bullard, suggested to Renwick that the UK would be confronted with a Franco-German 
initiative, which he believed had to be pre-empted with “a proposal of our own”.411  
For the FCO, this encounter between Kohl and Thatcher also was an important 
element in their overall strategy that they had displayed in the Dooge Committee, which was 
to steer the ongoing discussions on developing the European Community in a direction that 
would be acceptable to the UK. Robin Renwick wrote to ambassador Bullard, saying that the 
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FCO “attached the greatest importance” to this meeting and that the intention was to persuade 
Kohl to “start following the kind of course we believe would lead to positive results. 
Otherwise we must indeed expect more emphasis to be placed on Franco-German 
initiatives”.412 What these initiatives would be was not yet clear at the time, but these words 
show a concern that European policies could be determined by Bonn and Paris. Bullard had 
been told by German sources that the German government was thinking of forming a “core-
Europe” to establish a cooperation with those EC countries that were willing to sign a new 
treaty on “Political Cooperation; security; counter-terrorism; and perhaps cultural, educational 
and scientific cooperation”.413  
In their bilateral meeting, Thatcher gave Kohl a paper, which came to form a central 
part of the UK government’s strategy to prepare for the upcoming European Council in 
Milan. This paper, and the way in which Thatcher gave it to Kohl, reveals much about the 
British policies towards European integration in 1985. The summit at Chequers was 
significant because it showed the specific policy aims and strategies of Thatcher. Analysing 
Kohl’s policy aims and his reaction to Thatcher’s paper adds context and allows this chapter 
to comment on the successful and unsuccessful elements of the British approach. At this high-
level bilateral meeting it became clear how important Germany was for British policy making 
towards the EC. Whilst the meeting showed commitment to European integration on 
Thatcher’s part, it also revealed the limits of these commitments to Kohl. This chapter looks 
at what Thatcher wanted to achieve in her meeting with Kohl, which was the only high-level 
bilateral meeting she had before the European Council, and how this compares to what her 
German counterpart wanted to accomplish. The first section of this chapter examines the 
British negotiating aims for the meeting between Thatcher and Kohl. The second part 
examines the German negotiating position. The third part of this chapter looks at the first-
hand accounts of the meeting in order to explain how the two strategies came together. 
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Finally, the elements are drawn together to show the successes and the shortcomings of the 
strategy to prepare a European Council meeting by lobbying the German Chancellor. This 
chapter argues that in spring 1985, Thatcher’s European policy making was focused on 
convincing Kohl to back her initiative to codify PoCo. The differing conceptions of European 
integration by both leaders and their uneasy relationship was cast into the spotlight by their 
bilateral meeting. When subsequently the UK government also sought the backing of France, 
Thatcher’s PoCo paper became an initiative with which she wanted to lead the EC into the 
codification of foreign policy coordination in the EC.  
The bilateral meeting with Kohl has not yet been analysed by the existing literature. 
It has mainly been recorded in the biographical literature. For instance, Hugo Young argues 
that after the European Council in Fontainebleau, “Thatcher began to utter sentiments that 
were impeccably communautaire”.414 There was, in Young’s view, “a whiff of collaborative 
promise” in the air.415 In her memoirs Thatcher explained that the paper on PoCo which she 
presented to Kohl was motivated by some of the “waver[ing]” or on occasion “downright 
hostile” attitudes of other EC member states during the Falklands War.416 She argued that the 
PoCo paper was designed to “strengthen the West” in the Cold War.417 In addition to foreign 
policy cooperation, Thatcher wanted to further develop the Single Market, make the processes 
of how decisions were reached in the community better, and make more use of new 
technologies.418 Thatcher argued that she was against changing the treaties because she felt 
that “all my instincts warned me of what federalist fantasies might appear if we opened this 
Pandora’s Box”.419 Thatcher remembered the content of the paper to have been 
“ostentatiously communautaire”.420 Thatcher’s recollection was that “Chancellor Kohl 
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seemed pleased” with the PoCo paper.421 Geoffrey Howe mentioned this meeting between 
Thatcher and Kohl only in passing to illustrate his point that foreign policy coordination was 
an issue on which agreement in the EC was possible.422 Interestingly, neither Kohl nor his 
foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, mentioned the meeting in their memoirs.423  
2. 1. British negotiation aims: “stroke of genius” 
The strategy of the British government for the bilateral summit with the German 
Chancellor was to avoid an IGC and press for decisions to be made at the upcoming European 
Council meeting in Milan.424 In the FCO, Robin Renwick feared that a conference that 
combed through the EEC treaty in search of articles where majority voting could be 
introduced would be met with opposition from other departments in Whitehall.425 However, 
as explained in the last chapter, Thatcher was prepared to consider a case-by-case extension 
of majority voting within the scope of the EEC treaty. Renwick reiterated the proposal Howe 
had made to the Prime Minister, arguing that invoking the Luxembourg Compromise should 
be formalised and some decisions delegated to lower-level councils. Moreover, Renwick 
argued that nobody, including Kohl, wanted to abolish the Luxembourg Compromise. Lastly, 
the perceived gulf between British and German views on the European Parliament was in 
Renwick’s view overstated.426  
The PoCo proposals, which Thatcher would hand over personally to Kohl, advocated 
collaboration in foreign policy and security in a Western framework, mainly NATO.427 These 
proposals were designed in a way that would allow governments to act independently and 
meant they were not forced into any foreign policy commitments in advance.428 The PoCo 
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paper was thus a purely intergovernmental agreement to codify the hitherto informal foreign 
policy practices and was in no way a plea for European unity. The fact that this paper would 
neither please Helmut Kohl nor François Mitterrand was its main shortcoming, which both 
the ambassadors to France and to Germany pointed out when they saw it.429 The strategy of 
the British government was firstly to persuade Kohl in a high-level meeting with Thatcher of 
the merit of these ideas.430 Secondly, Mitterrand would be approached indirectly, and 
according to the British ambassador to France “very privately”, through Roland Dumas, the 
French minister for European Affairs.431 Thirdly, with a minimum involvement of 
government officials, Renwick suggested that Thatcher could  present the paper as a personal 
initiative at the Milan summit, where the heads of government themselves would decide how 
to develop the question of the future of the European Community.432 Other countries should 
not see the document in advance and only receive a copy just before the Milan European 
Council to avoid these proposals being watered down before Thatcher presented them.433 In 
effect, Renwick suggested that Thatcher could, in cooperation with Germany and France, lead 
the EC into codifying the hitherto informal practice of PoCo. 
The PoCo paper was written by Robin Renwick in the same institutional setting as 
the “Europe – the Future” paper, which was explained in the previous chapter. In essence, this 
paper advocated recognising the status quo and formalising Political Cooperation in exactly 
the way it was already practiced in order to become a “coherent force in international 
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relations” and engage more “in  joint action in world affairs”.434 The objective was to get 
governments talking to each other about the challenges in international affairs, reach agreed 
positions at international organisations, avoid arguing against the interests of other EC 
members and keep those EC countries informed that were not there.435 Moreover, when a 
country determined a position in world affairs it would take into account the views of other 
EC countries.436  
With the PoCo paper the UK government suggested that EC countries should 
collaborate in foreign policy and security matters in organisations of “western security”, 
which should include NATO, the UN and WEU.437 In these organisations no EC country 
should vote for, or co-sponsor, a resolution that “might gravely affect the vital interests” of 
another EC country.438 Finally, in this Atlantic security context the countries involved should 
also increase their collaboration in research and development of weapons technology.439 The 
British government envisaged the PoCo paper as an intergovernmental agreement. The 
European Council would be the main discussion forum, but both the European Commission 
and the European Parliament should be kept informed.440 Crucially, none of the agreements 
proposed would change any of the treaties of the European Communities.441 This meant that 
in essence, the UK government was proposing a standalone agreement which would not 
amend the EEC treaty and therefore lay outside the treaty framework of the EC.  
Two observations can be made about the PoCo paper, one relating to the history of 
the UK and the EC, and another one to the Cold War. Firstly, the suggestion that PoCo should 
be based on NATO or WEU is in some ways strangely similar to “plan G” from 1956, when 
during the negotiations for the EEC treaty the UK government proposed the formation of a 
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free trade area, based on the OEEC.442 The similarity lies in the notion that if the spectre of 
supranationality was again to be feared – this time in the guise of a new treaty on “European 
Union” – the answer should lie in the revitalisation of pre-existing intergovernmental 
organisations. In this context the British PoCo paper advocated that foreign policy 
coordination in the EC should be based on existing treaties and not prevent any form of 
national foreign policy. Therefore, the paper could be interpreted in a sense of attempting to 
lead the EC in a direction that would lead the discussions away from the notion of 
supranationality. This is however, where the similarities end. PoCo was not the “destructive 
embrace” that Gladwyn Jebb had wanted to give the nascent EEC.443 By 1985 the UK had 
become part of the EC, the USA had not just intervened to denounce EFTA, and the 
discussion was not only focused on trade but also on security.  
Secondly, the PoCo paper was focused on security collaborations through the 
frameworks of NATO and WEU. Such a focus, combined with the sentence that these 
organisations would work towards “western security” gave this paper a distinct Cold War 
theme.444 If one looks at the wording of the PoCo paper, it is set in a way such that it does not 
commit countries to specific actions but rather to interact more in principle inside existing 
Western security forums, especially NATO. For instance, in article eight on defence 
collaboration, it is not clear whether these are monetary or foreign policy commitments. It is 
hard to believe that this vagueness was not deliberate. Surely it is not a coincidence that the 
areas of collaboration proposed coincided with one of the principal strengths of the UK, as a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council and strong NATO member. As such the PoCo 
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paper attempted to codify the practice of Political Cooperation as it stood in 1985, having 
emerged informally since the early 1970s, and did not propose any new policies.  
The internal comments of the FCO on the PoCo paper noted that it reflected already 
existing commitments and that many of the consultations proposed in the paper were in fact 
already practised by the UK.445 The necessary provisions had already been agreed in 1977 but 
the PoCo paper was worded in a way that the UK could always vote independently in the UN 
Security Council. Moreover, the FCO comments argued that the PoCo paper “in no way” 
impaired the ability of the UK to “go it alone” and if required the UK could disregard the 
positions of other EC countries at international organisations.446 This document also drew on 
the existing EC treaties and current discussions on how to “relaunch” European integration. 
The preamble was taken from the treaties and article one from the Luxembourg Report, which 
in 1970 already argued for a form of Political Cooperation. Article two drew on the “solemn 
declaration on European unity” made in 1983. The existing agreements in the community on 
these issues were linked to a provision in the paper “Europe – the Future”, which the previous 
chapter examined, and which also suggested that positions and engagements at international 
organisations should be coordinated.447  
Margaret Thatcher accepted this paper and agreed to show it to Helmut Kohl and 
propose it herself to the European Council. As with the “Europe – the Future” paper, the 
PoCo paper was not a vision but was a statement of policies that Thatcher felt she could 
accept because they reflected her views. One can see in this paper a commitment to strengthen 
the West in the Cold War. Moreover, creating the Single Market was in line with the reforms 
of Britain’s economy that Thatcher was pursuing at home. Thatcher’s views on the notion of 
“European Union” were more complex and ambivalent. They combined a broad commitment 
to the EC in principle, which she had shown in the referendum campaign on EEC 
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membership in 1975, with scepticism towards anything that looked like idealism or 
federalism. One of her most coherent statement on European integration, before the SEA was 
agreed, was a speech to the Franco-British Council, which Edward Heath set up to foster a 
better understanding between both countries, on 30 November 1984. In this speech, Thatcher 
outlined what she understood by the term “European Union” and why she was uncomfortable 
with the notion: 
“Several distinguished Europeans gave me advice on what to speak about 
tonight. They all suggested European Union. I think I rather shocked them 
by replying that I would need to know what is meant by it before I could tell 
whether I was for it or against it. Unhappily I must report that those who 
advised the subject did not cast much light on its meaning. Let me say at 
once: I do not believe that we shall ever have a United States of Europe in the 
same way that there is a United States of America. The whole history of 
Europe is too different. I do believe however that for Nations of the 
European Community freely to work together and to strengthen their 
cooperation is just as worthy a purpose. But to submerge their identity and 
variety would be contrary to the instincts of our peoples and therefore could 
not bear fruit. It is on the basis of working towards common goals, of using 
our strength and influence together that you will find Britain a strong advocate 
for a more united Europe. We want to see greater unity of the Community 
market, greater unity of Community action in world affairs, greater unity 
of purpose and action in tackling unemployment and the other problems 
of our time and greater unity in the development and application of new 
technology. That is what I understand by a united Europe.”448 
 
These paragraphs show that by the end of 1984, Thatcher was committed to the EEC 
as it stood in 1984-5 and wanted to work towards breaking down barriers in Europe and 
strengthening the foreign policy coordination of the EC. In essence, she was comfortable with 
the status quo. Yet her view of the EC was clearly intergovernmental in the sense that it was 
based on an assumption of the nation state as the building block of international organisations. 
As such, as this quote clearly shows, these nations should work together to achieve shared 
aims. Yet they should not give up their “identity” or powers to a larger bloc, whatever its aim. 
Therefore, what she disagreed with was broad ambitions instead of precise policy, and 
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regulation instead of free markets. The quotes above show that Thatcher did not believe in 
open-ended commitments, but rather wanted to know the clear bounds of a policy before 
agreeing to it – except perhaps in her broader belief in markets. The themes of making the EC 
outward looking, by giving its member states a more coherent foreign policy, and more 
market led were the two core themes of both the “Europe – the Future” paper of 1984 as well 
as the PoCo proposals of 1985. With the latter, Thatcher wanted to lead the EC into an 
intergovernmental agreement to codify the hitherto informal practice of foreign policy 
coordination in order to give the foreign policy of EC countries more coherence and to make 
the community more outward looking. 
Geoffrey Howe had a different idea of European integration, which emphasised that 
European integration was a process and relied on forming good relationships with other 
countries. For Howe, the tactical purpose of the PoCo paper was to present a series of policy 
options to forestall more “far-fetched ideas” of reforming the EC.449 By “far-fetched ideas” 
Howe meant an IGC and everyone demonstrating “how ‘European’ they can be”.450 Based on 
advice from Robin Renwick, Howe argued that this paper would “make a considerable 
impression” on Helmut Kohl.451 Howe believed that presenting such a paper was important 
because “whoever puts forward their own ideas first will be able to oblige the others to work 
on that basis”.452 These comments show how authorship of initiatives was seen as a way to 
shape the negotiations from the outset. Yet at the same time he also had to manage his own 
relationship with Thatcher. In his memoirs, Howe explained that it was actually Kohl himself 
who had given him the idea to approach Germany bilaterally.453 Kohl remarked to Howe, 
curiously in the gentlemen’s restroom, that Thatcher should “woo” her counterparts more, 
which in Kohl’s view would be more effective than her “argumentative” approach.454 Howe 
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said in his memoirs that it was the idea of “urging Margaret to ‘woo people’ more openly” 
which was at the back of his mind when he suggested that Kohl should be invited to an 
“intimate” meeting at Chequers in order to present the paper as a collaborative initiative.455 
Kohl may not have meant what Howe interpreted and probably did not realise that an off-
hand remark at the bathroom sink was behind his invitation to Chequers. 
The focus on Germany was a defining element in Thatcher’s European policy 
making in spring 1985. One can see this in how the PoCo paper was written and the way it 
was presented to convince Helmut Kohl first and win his support at the upcoming European 
Council meeting. One of the principal architects of this approach was Robin Renwick, 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the FCO (responsible for European integration), who 
was an important advisor on European policies to Geoffrey Howe. Renwick had already 
written the “Europe – the Future” paper, which is explained in the first chapter. The 
institutional background was the same and is also explained in chapter one. The PoCo paper, 
the approach of “impressing” Kohl and to use this paper to focus the discussion in the 
European Council on new proposals were all suggested by Robin Renwick.456 Renwick 
recommended that Howe should seek the approval from Thatcher to proceed with this 
approach. Bringing the discussion away from treaty change and to a new intergovernmental 
agreement was important because amending the EEC treaty was only in the UK’s interest if 
the Luxembourg Compromise could be extended to all articles, which was not deemed to be 
realistic. Moreover, Renwick believed that avoiding an IGC was not going to be easy because 
Italy and the Benelux countries would continue to push for an IGC. Renwick argued that the 
best approach to avoid holding an IGC was to take the necessary decisions on the highest 
political level in the European Council in Milan, on 28-9 June 1985, which the summit with 
Kohl was supposed to prepare. 457 
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The PoCo paper was written in the context of a bilateral summit with Kohl – the only 
one Thatcher held – to prepare the upcoming European Council in Milan, on 28-9 June 1985. 
The British government clearly felt that to show Kohl a copy of the PoCo paper first would 
help to convince the rest of the European Council. Kohl thus was deemed to be a key ally of 
the British government in the EC. In his briefing about Kohl, the British ambassador to 
Germany, Julian Bullard, explained to the Robin Renwick how important the term “European 
Union” was to Kohl.458 Bullard explained that the German Chancellor saw 1985 as a “year of 
destiny” and was committed to the notion of “European Union”.459 Ambassador Bullard 
argued that Kohl was very conscious of history in general and wanted to “earn his place in the 
history books”.460 Binding Germany into a stronger European Union was going to be the way 
for him to achieve this ambition. Bullard loosely quoted Kohl in arguing that in the German 
Chancellor’s view European integration was “irreversible” and “integration” of Germany into 
“the West” was the German “Staatsräson” – its “raison d’état”.461 Bullard confessed that he 
had always believed such rhetoric to be “a sham, but I now believe it to be genuine, if often 
muddled”.462 In Bullard’s view such sentiments explained why Kohl was in favour of 
European integration and why he believed that now was the time to reinforce the political 
element of the European Community.  
Julian Bullard proposed that in order to respond to Kohl’s ambitions, the British 
government should come forward as soon as possible with a paper on PoCo and give it the 
title “European Union”.463 Kohl’s team would have to be made aware that Thatcher was going 
to present a major new initiative to him. However, Bullard suggested that this treaty should be 
kept outside the EEC treaty. Bullard argued that such a treaty was in keeping with the current 
policy objectives of the UK towards to EC, as outlined in the “Europe – the Future” paper and 
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reflected in the position Malcolm Rifkind took in the Dooge Committee. Bullard argued that 
since the Fontainebleau summit of June 1984, Germany had recognised that the UK was 
playing an influential role in the discussions on how to proceed with European integration. 
Bullard believed that in the aftermath of the Fontainebleau summit, and with EC enlargement 
on the horizon, the UK, France and Germany had to work together better than before to 
achieve results. Therefore, the UK had to “box her full European weight from now onwards”. 
To this end, the UK government should present a series of “bold” and “daring” proposals, 
which Bullard suggested should be called “European Political Union” and be centred on 
foreign policy coordination.464  
Julian Bullard suggested that in practice such language meant implementing the 
recommendations of the Dooge Committee as far as possible, working on extending the 
Single Market and keeping majority voting as it was in the EEC treaty.465 The new treaty 
should take from the Dooge report the idea to develop PoCo with a secretariat, and a way to 
work together in security and defence. However, the Luxembourg Compromise should be 
kept intact. The new treaty should also take from the Adonnino Committee aspects on culture 
and learning languages. Most importantly, the UK government should be ready to agree to an 
“eye-catching preamble” that referred to what such a union stood for in terms of “freedom, 
democracy, peace and human rights” and that “European Union” was “irreversible”. Bullard 
argued that terms such as “union” or “irreversible” should not cause the British government to 
worry because it just meant “flying [the] flag of European Union”.466 In some ways, Bullard 
was thus continuing with the kind of advice that Lord Carrington had given to Thatcher 
before she signed the “Solemn Declaration of European Unity” of 1983 in Stuttgart, arguing 
that these broader declarations of intent were merely rhetorical devices with no specific legal 
meaning.  
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Bullard warned that if the UK did not pursue such a policy then Mitterrand would 
have Kohl “in his pocket” and Kohl would arrive at Chequers with his mind already made 
up.467 Bullard believed that the German government was examining the formation of a “core 
Europe” to work together in areas that were not yet covered by the EEC treaty.468 Michael 
Butler, head of UKRep, countered this argument by saying that he believed there was 
“confusion in the minds of the Germans if they really think that they can build European 
Union in any real sense separate from the European Community”.469 Butler was convinced 
that if Germany wanted to build a “European Union” they had to build it on the existing EC. 
The head of UKRep believed that a separate treaty on PoCo was a realistic aim but that it 
could only exist together with the EC, which could eventually be called a “European Union” 
because the EC and its foreign policy were “two sides of the same coin”.470  
Bullard’s letter was significant because it was a formal letter sent in preparation for 
the Chequers meeting to Renwick. What Renwick learned from the UK ambassador was just 
as important as his reaction, because what he recommended had an impact on British policy 
making. Robin Renwick replied to Julian Bullard that Margaret Thatcher was “not committed 
to the idea of a treaty”.471 She was opposed to submitting a “declaratory treaty” to the House 
of Commons. Renwick acknowledged that the British PoCo paper was not what Germany 
wanted. Renwick argued that the FCO should try to find a way of taking on board Kohl’s 
aspirations but in a way that would be politically acceptable to the UK. The FCO was 
working on convincing ministers in other government departments to give them “flexibility” 
on the issue of PoCo. At the same time the challenge was to get the Prime Minister to accept 
the PoCo agreement. Renwick suggested that Thatcher should tell Kohl that the British PoCo 
paper could be the first stage in a process that eventually would lead to an agreement “in 
principle” at the European Council in Milan. Most importantly, Renwick argued that an IGC 
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to revise the EEC treaty should be avoided and decisions should exclusively “be taken by the 
heads of government themselves”.472 However, for tactical reasons an IGC should not be 
opposed openly, especially since the Italian government was holding the rotating European 
Council presidency and was very much in favour of convening an IGC.473 The plan was that 
once an agreement on the PoCo paper had been reached the paper could be turned into a 
formal agreement. However, Renwick added that the circle of officials who would see it 
should be kept to a small “drafting group”.474  
Geoffrey Howe presented the PoCo paper to Thatcher as a commitment to do more 
in an area where the British government was already active and to do so within a NATO 
context. He argued this paper suggested that PoCo would be kept in an intergovernmental 
framework.475 Therefore, Howe said that the commitments entered into as part of this 
agreement would not prevent a country from acting in its own national interest. The paper 
largely described existing foreign policy consultations. The only new element was a 
commitment to support the foreign and security policies of other EC countries, but to do so in 
a non-binding way. Howe argued that the point of an agreement on foreign policy cooperation 
was to prevent “public rows” between EC member states on questions of foreign policy. 
Howe also said, however, that he believed the other EC countries wanted to see a mention of 
security cooperation within the EC in such an agreement.476  
At the beginning of May, the Prime Minister approved the draft paper on PoCo.477 
After reading the paper again a week later she reportedly described it to Geoffrey Howe as “a 
stroke of genius”.478 Why Thatcher was suddenly so elated about the paper is not recorded. A 
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possible explanation could be that it was in line with her original thinking in response to the 
report of the Dooge Committee, to which she had commented that she could not agree to 
majority voting on PoCo, nor indeed to extending the scope of the current informal practice. 
However, she had said that she was prepared to formalise the existing form of PoCo provided 
the ability to act independently was maintained. Very importantly, Thatcher did not accept the 
suggestion to call the PoCo paper a “treaty”.479 The most she was prepared to do was call it a 
“draft”.480 It is significant that Thatcher neither opted for Bullard’s “bold” idea of an “eye 
catching preamble” nor agreed to include the words “treaty” or “European Union” in the title. 
The fact that Thatcher toned down the proposal for PoCo and disagreed to calling the 
document a “treaty” is important because giving the paper the form of a treaty was precisely 
what the French and German governments wanted to do.  
The question of whether or not to give the PoCo paper the force and status of a treaty 
gives us a small window into the differences in attitudes towards European integration 
between Thatcher and the FCO. Robin Renwick wrote to Charles Powell to explain that 
Bullard’s idea of calling this paper a “treaty” was good and that he was not prepared to 
abandon it just yet.481 Nevertheless, he felt that it was still too early to raise the issue with 
Thatcher again.482 Renwick said to the British ambassador to France that even though he 
“hope[d]” that eventually Thatcher was going to acquiesce to calling the paper a “treaty”, the 
strategy for the time being was to not tell anybody that the FCO was already prepared to do 
so.483 Malcolm Rifkind, who was Thatcher’s “personal representative” to the Dooge 
Committee also shared this view.484 However, Charles Powell told Colin Budd that “the 
Prime Minister was not convinced it would be right to describe the agreement as a treaty”.485 
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On the whole, the way in which the PoCo paper came about was not characterised by 
adversity between Thatcher and the FCO. On the contrary, the FCO worked within the policy 
framework that Thatcher had set out and Thatcher took the advice of the FCO and made the 
PoCo paper the central pillar of her policy towards the EC in spring 1985.  
In summary, convincing Germany played an important role in Thatcher’s strategy to 
lead the EC into the codification of PoCo. Thatcher displayed not only confidence in Kohl 
himself, but also a belief that through him she would be able to convince the rest of the 
European Council. The preparations for the bilateral meeting between Thatcher and Kohl 
brought into focus the attitudes of both leaders towards European integration. The British 
ambassador to Germany told the FCO that Kohl wanted to “earn his place in the history 
books” by advancing European integration, which Bullard was now beginning to take 
seriously, and that the UK government should prepare “bold” proposals that would go some 
way to meet Kohl’s aspirations. Bullard argued that by proposing such a paper the UK would 
stand a chance to “box her full weight” in the European boxing ring, where France and 
Germany were the two major players. Such a paper would thus advance the UK’s aspirations 
to leadership in the EC. The next section of this chapter analyses the German government’s 
negotiating aims. In the final section British and German negotiating aims will be brought 
together to shed new light on how successful the first step of Britain’s strategy to lead the EC 
into a codification of PoCo by convincing Helmut Kohl to back Thatcher’s proposal actually 
was.  
2. 2. German negotiating aims: “European Union” 
How was the Chequers meeting prepared in Germany and how was the British 
negotiating position seen from Bonn? Horst Teltschik, one of the closest foreign policy 
advisors of Helmut Kohl,486 said to Julian Bullard that the Chequers meeting would constitute 
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“the most important discussions on Europe this year”.487 In Bullard’s view this clearly 
illustrated that Germany attached the highest importance to this meeting.488 The briefing that 
the German foreign ministry prepared for Helmut Kohl began with the issue of European 
integration and emphasised the importance of the Dooge Committee.489 Many of Kohl’s 
briefings for other bilateral meetings began with broader international questions, mostly the 
Cold War or SDI, whereas this one put these discussions points after the issue of European 
integration. The fact that the German government wanted to speak about European integration 
first and everything else later says a lot about the importance Kohl attached to the ongoing 
discussions about how to further European integration. Kohl added handwritten comments to 
the paper, emphasising what he thought were important points or simply adding “ja” for 
paragraphs he agreed with. Unlike Margaret Thatcher, who did this routinely, such 
handwritten additions do not feature very often in the files on Europe at the Federal 
Chancellery. The German foreign ministry argued that the purpose of the bilateral Kohl-
Thatcher meeting was to “persuade the UK to progress further in European politics than [had 
been achieved] in the Dooge Committee and aim towards developing the community into a 
political union”.490  
Why was the German foreign ministry under the impression that such progress was 
necessary, or that Kohl could do that? In many ways the answer to this question rests in the 
closeness of the negotiating position between the two countries. Both wanted the Single 
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 111 
Market extended and both were for foreign policy cooperation.491 Scope for movement on the 
part of the UK government to further close the gap between the positions of Germany and the 
UK seemed possible because the German foreign  ministry believed that Geoffrey Howe had 
made a “fundamental statement” when he argued that the UK was committed to European 
integration and that this was not a “static” but an evolving “process”.492 This statement was 
based on the belief that Thatcher had committed the UK to playing a positive role in the EC 
when she presented the paper “Europe – the Future” at the European Council in 
Fontainebleau, in June 1984.493 In spite of this perceived commitment, the German embassy 
reported that Thatcher was critical of the idea to hold an IGC and that the British government 
was keeping its options open.494 An internal document at the German foreign ministry 
suggested that Kohl should not commit himself to an IGC either because this would create 
public expectations that perhaps could not be met.495 Afterwards, a handwritten note was 
scribbled on the briefing by someone in the German foreign ministry which argued that the 
German government was either for an additional treaty or for changing the EEC treaty.496 
Even though an unattributed scrawl is weak evidence, this note shows that although an IGC 
was not yet confirmed policy it was discussed in the German foreign ministry. 
At the Chequers meeting the German government wanted to explain their position on 
the issue of “European Union” and find out the British views on “this fundamental 
question”.497 Because of the historically different use of the term “Union” in the UK, Kohl 
was briefed that he should explain to Thatcher “our fundamental position on the question of a 
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496 Ibid. 
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[European] Union”:498 The German view was that the envisaged “Union” would show that 
“for those who join it, the process of political unification [would be] irreversible”.499 The 
evidence shows that the German government wanted the UK to be included because Kohl was 
briefed to tell Thatcher that he “expressly” wanted to see the UK play an “active role” 
because the “European pillar which we want to strengthen would be weakened from the 
outset” if the UK was not included.500 Horst Teltschik wrote in his briefing to Kohl that he 
saw “a certain contradiction” in the British position.501 On the one hand, Geoffrey Howe 
argued for “formalising the currently informal institutions (of EPC)”.502 On the other hand, 
Malcolm Rifkind, although interacting “quite constructively” in the Dooge Committee, said 
that “the UK saw no need for a new treaty”.503 Therefore, Teltschik was “doubtful” whether 
the UK would support a treaty on “European Union”.504 He emphasised that from the point of 
view of the German government the report of the Dooge Committee “could be characterised” 
as a “first step towards a Union”.505  
In the German thinking on a “European Union”, foreign and security cooperation 
played an important role.506 To deepen such cooperation, “binding commitments” on foreign 
policy consultations should be entered into and a small secretariat should be established.507 
Teltschik argued that the “current” way of coordinating foreign policy, which was largely 
“based on a series of declarations”, was “not enough if the EC wanted to take a serious step 
towards a common European foreign policy”.508 One option to strengthen security 
 
498 "Es wäre daher wichtig, PM Thatcher noch einmal unsere grundsätzliche Haltung zur Frage einer ‘Union’, zu 
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cooperation could be to do so in the Western European Union (WEU).509 The WEU could be 
linked to the security objectives of a “future ‘European Union’”.510 Teltschik’s briefing for 
Kohl argued further that the EP should be given “more than just symbolic co-decision making 
powers in the real legislative processes of the community” because the community would 
grow apart from its citizens if the democratic element of the EC were not strengthened.511 To 
this text Kohl added the comment, “yes, more responsibility”.512 One point where Kohl wrote 
in his own hand the word “important” twice, and further underlined much of the text was 
where the document mentioned extending the Single Market.513 The briefing argued that 
Germany and the UK both agreed on the “urgent necessity” of extending the Single 
Market.514 Germany was aware that the UK was “especially insistent” on reducing barriers to 
trade in services.515 The German position was that these barriers, such as liberalising the 
insurance or travel markets, could only be reduced if this was accompanied by policies to 
harmonise laws in order to prevent market distortions and to protect consumers.516 Germany 
hoped that the UK would not take an “all or nothing position” on this issue and would accept 
the liberalisation of insurances for large industrial risks as a first step, i.e. a concession.517 
Three observations can be made about Kohl’s briefing for the Chequers summit: 
firstly, it shows how unflinching German support for European integration was. The German 
government saw it to be in their national interest to base their foreign policies in a European 
context and Kohl was prepared to make commitments strengthening European institutions. 
These documents show that the British ambassador, Julian Bullard, had been entirely correct 
in his assumptions of Kohl’s intentions to take steps towards a European Union.518 The case 
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516 Ibid. 
517 “Alles-oder-Nichts Haltung” (my translation) Ibid., fol. 177 
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of liberalising the insurance market also shows that the German commitment to European 
integration went hand in hand with defending German interests on points of detail. The larger 
point for the German government was that some kind of shared foreign policy mechanism 
was not going far enough in terms of new commitments to European integration. This relates 
to the second observation: although Germany insisted that the proposed “European Union” 
would not be as strong as it could be if the UK was not included, there was a veiled threat in 
this text of moving ahead anyway. The text spoke of “those who enter” the proposed “union” 
would affirm that European integration was “irreversible” for them.519 To clarify this point 
further, the briefing has a section which pointed out that if not all member countries were 
prepared to join the proposed “union” then Germany would be thinking about moving ahead 
with a “core group” of countries.520 Kohl, however, underlined the part where an “active 
British role” was mentioned, which indicates that he absolutely wanted to include the UK, or 
at least believed this to be the preferable option.521  
Thirdly, it is on the question as to how this term – “European Union” – would be 
interpreted that would decide whether the difference in the negotiating positions between 
Germany and the UK was large or small. The German government was aware of the priorities 
of the UK government, which emphasised completing the Single Market and codifying 
foreign policy cooperation.522 Germany and the UK agreed on the broader issues of extending 
the Single Market and formalising EPC/PoCo. Their differences consisted of more detailed 
questions on how the market for services should be liberalised, the extra powers that the 
European Parliament should be given and the much broader notion of “European Union”. If 
one interpreted the term “European Union” as a rhetorical device, possibly designed to rally 
the pro-European members of the Bundestag around a policy, the differences in reality would 
have been very slight indeed. Geoffrey Howe subscribed to this view when he told Thatcher 
 
519 "diejenigen die ihr beitreten"; "irreversibel" (my translation) BArch, B136/30076, H. Teltschik to W. 
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that the pragmatic ideas which the UK was advocating would eventually carry the day 
because the “doctrinal” arguments were over and the “far-fetched” ideas would eventually be 
abandoned in favour of polices to which the UK could agree.523 Howe did not spell out what 
the differences between these policies were. However, if this assumption was wrong and 
European Union meant a serious and irreversible pooling of aspects of sovereignty, then the 
term European Union could mean a great deal more. In the former case, both countries would 
have wanted to achieve the same policies, but by a different name. In the latter case, both 
positions would be diverging rapidly from each other to expose fundamental differences on 
substantive policy questions. This was eventually what happened. What these questions were 
and how the differences over them were laid bare, in this one crucial encounter between 
Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher, will be examined in the following section of this 
chapter. 
2. 3. Competing views on the European Community 
The third part of this chapter aims to bring together the threads of the previous two 
sections by explaining how the meeting between Thatcher and Kohl on 18 May 1985 played 
out. This analysis is based on three first-hand accounts of the meeting. The first is a summary 
of the meeting prepared by Margaret Thatcher’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Charles 
Powell.524 The second and third are two accounts of the meeting by Walter Neuer.525 Neuer 
was a foreign policy advisor to Kohl as well as a department head at the German Federal 
Chancellery.526 One is a summary and the other is a very detailed, almost verbatim report of 
the meeting.527 With such detailed evidence of what was discussed, it is possible to compare 
 
523 TNA PREM19/1491, G. Howe to M. Thatcher, “Milan European Council: Development of the Community,” 
25 June 1985. 
524 TNA FCO30/6202, folio no. 25, C. Powell to L. Appleyard, “Prime Minister’s meeting with Chancellor Kohl: 
Development of the European Community,” 19 May 1985; attachment: “Prime Minister’s meeting with 
Chancellor Kohl: Development of the European Community,” 19 May 1985. 
525 BArch, B136/30076, “Vermerk, Treffen des BK mit PM Thatcher in Chequers 18.05.1985,” 19 May 1985, 
fol. 239 ff. 
526 He was head of the department "European integration, bilateral relations to states of Western Europe and 
Turkey” (“Europäische Einigung, bilaterale Beziehungen zu westeuropäischen Staaten und der Türkei", my 
translation) Pautsch et al., Akten Zur Auswärtigen Politik Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1985, 2016, 2: 1942. 
527 BArch, B136/30076, “Vermerk, Treffen des Bundeskanzlers mit PM Thatcher in Chequers am 18. Mai 
1985,” 22 May 1985, fol. 259 ff. 
 116 
and contrast the minutes from the German and the UK sources. The fact that both 
governments kept such detailed accounts of this meeting goes some way to show that it was 
judged to have been an important encounter. For the UK government this meeting was 
important because the entire diplomacy of the British government for the European Council in 
Milan hinged on it. As explained above, Thatcher did not meet any other heads of government 
before the Milan summit. Whether or not she could persuade the European Council to back 
her plans to lead the EC into the codification of PoCo depended therefore to a large extent on 
Thatcher’s ability to convince Kohl of her ideas. Hence, the stakes were high for the British 
government. What was discussed at this high-level bilateral meeting turned out to be an 
important part in the history of the SEA.528  
On 18 May 1985, Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl and their advisors sat down to a 
four-hour meeting which was only interrupted by a short break to read the documents which 
Thatcher gave to Kohl. Thatcher was accompanied by David Williamson, head of the 
European Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, and Charles Powell, Thatcher’s Private Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs. Helmut Kohl was flanked by Horst Teltschik and Walter Neuer, two 
close political advisors, as well as Jürgen Ruhfus, who was the former German ambassador to 
the UK, the German representative in the Dooge Committee and Staatssekretär (i.e. holding 
the rank of a permanent secretary) in the German foreign ministry. The meeting began with a 
short discussion of the American Strategic-Defence Initiative and then turned to European 
questions.529 According to Charles Powell’s summary, Thatcher began by explaining that she 
did not think an IGC to change the EEC treaty “would help” in the “future development” of 
the EEC and that “rather to her surprise she had found that Mitterrand shared this view”.530 
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She said she preferred deciding the future of the EC in the European Council.531 Walter 
Neuer’s account argued that Thatcher sounded “disinclined” to hold an IGC.532 According to 
Neuer, Thatcher suggested that every European Council meeting was in essence an IGC.533 
Thatcher told Kohl that she wanted to codify PoCo and extend the Single Market in an 
intergovernmental agreement, which she argued was preferable to holding an IGC. She 
believed this was achievable because “the Europeans have become more realistic”.534 After 
all, “one had to take into account the national interests and what one’s own parliament could 
agree to”.535 In addition, Thatcher believed that Mitterrand was against holding an IGC too.536 
Kohl replied noncommittally that the decision to convene an IGC could only be taken after 
the European Council in Milan, when it would become clear if an IGC would be successful.537 
Thatcher proceeded to present her PoCo draft and according to Powell explained that 
“we had not yet shown this to anyone else” and that Thatcher “would prefer knowledge of it 
to be closely restricted”.538 The German side was aware that Thatcher asked Kohl to “treat” 
her PoCo draft “very confidentially”.539 They understood that Geoffrey Howe would show the 
paper on 21 May to the French government.540 They learned that the intention of the British 
government was to present the PoCo paper together with France and Germany, either before 
or at the upcoming European Council in Milan.541 The German minutes of the meeting noted 
that Thatcher said she might be ready to present this document as a “treaty” to the House of 
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Commons.542 Charles Powell’s summary makes no mention of this eventuality. According to 
the German minutes, Kohl replied that he welcomed this paper, adding that both countries 
were in agreement on the majority of issues but that the German government wanted to “go 
further” in pursuing a shared foreign policy.543 In Powell’s summary Kohl’s reply looks very 
different. Powell noted that Kohl “very much agreed with the Prime Minister on the 
desirability of a formal agreement on political co-operation. We would not find Germany an 
obstacle to that”.544 Neuer also remembered that Kohl argued that “he hoped very much that 
the United Kingdom, France and FRG could get together to work up ideas which all three of 
them could sponsor at the Milan European Council”.545  
Helmut Kohl and his advisors read the documents during a break. Kohl said that “the 
Federal Republic would be able to agree broadly with them” and that there should be “early 
discussions between senior officials”.546 Moreover, he hoped that “France could also be 
drawn in”.547 According to the Neuer’s account, Kohl said that the German government 
would be in touch to suggest alterations or additions within the next few days.548 Kohl argued 
one could “go furthest” in the EC when the UK, France and Germany agreed on a “shared 
position”.549 Kohl did not explain what this position should be, nor who should coordinate or 
lead it. It is highly significant that Powell and Neuer had very different views on this 
particular part of the discussion. Powell emphasised the general agreement to work 
collaboratively. Neuer on the other hand put a lot of emphasis on what to the UK sounded like 
a vague notion of “going further”. Kohl would before the Milan summit mention “going 
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further” again to Thatcher in a personal letter, which shows that he attached importance to it. 
From neither of the accounts is it clear whether any explanation was attempted of what “going 
further” would mean in practice. However, there is evidence in all three minutes that Kohl 
promised to set the wheels in motion to get senior officials to discuss the PoCo paper that 
Thatcher had given to him. However, as will be explained below, these consultations on 
developing the PoCo paper into a shared Anglo-German initiative never took place. 
Towards the end of the afternoon, Kohl asked Thatcher what would happen if not all 
countries supported strengthening foreign and security policies?550 Powell’s account states 
that Thatcher only replied that “this would require careful thought”.551 According to Neuer’s 
summary, Kohl professed to wanting to pursue the envisaged policies together with the seven 
or eight countries that were in favour of PoCo.552 With this question Kohl arguably 
contradicted his earlier statement saying that he refused to accept “two groups of member 
countries”, one for “trade” and the other one for “defence”.553 Kohl said he did not believe 
that Europe could only work on an economic basis and be defended by the USA.554 
According to Powell’s account, Thatcher agreed and argued that the British PoCo paper 
provided for a way to conduct more consultations on security issues.555 Kohl replied that he 
had thought about increasing security cooperation through the Western European Union 
(WEU).556 According to Neuer’s account, Thatcher replied that she saw possibilities to pursue 
these policies in the framework of WEU but that Spain and Portugal should also be 
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included.557 However, Thatcher said that “any anti-American accentuation should be 
avoided”, which she believed was one danger in pursuing these initiatives in the framework of 
WEU.558 She argued that “under no circumstances” should the EC “alienate” the USA and 
Canada.559 Thatcher asked if the USA and Canada could not be given observer status at the 
WEU?560 Jürgen Ruhfus interjected that he believed Atlantic relations were already very 
close.561  
Thatcher also presented Kohl with a timetable on implementing the Single Market. 
According to Powell, Kohl said that he was “fully in favour of a timetable for work on the 
Internal Market” and that the “Dooge Committee had done some useful work”.562 Kohl 
explained that he thought transport and capital transfers should be liberalised but “had 
difficulties over insurance”.563 According to Neuer, Kohl replied that the problem he had with 
liberalising the insurance market was that the time horizon suggested by the British 
government was too short.564 Germany was committed to liberalising services even though 
this might prove challenging for some sectors of the Germany economy.565 Returning to the 
larger issues, Kohl argued that in the conversation on the Single Market one also had to talk 
about shared European norms, “otherwise the discussion was pointless”.566 Kohl hoped that 
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the proposals of the Dooge Committee could be the basis on which to develop the question of 
the Single Market further.567 Kohl said that “open borders” were for Germany “no 
problem”.568 Thatcher replied that she was worried about a “drug problem”, to which Kohl 
replied that this was compounded in Germany by all the American soldiers who were 
stationed in Germany.569  
The third paper that Thatcher gave to Kohl argued that the European Council should 
set certain frameworks and goals for a time of twelve months and could work as a mechanism 
for countries to agree not to use the Luxembourg Compromise.570 Thatcher reiterated that 
“she saw no need to alter the [EEC] Treaty: all that was necessary could be achieved by 
altering current practice within the treaty” to make use of existing provisions for majority 
voting in the EEC treaty, which were currently often taken unanimously.571 According to 
Neuer, Thatcher said that she was prepared for more majority voting but that the UK wanted 
to keep the Luxembourg Compromise.572 All minutes state that Thatcher argued for keeping a 
reference to “a very important national interest” or “vital interests”, which she believed was a 
“practical necessity” and in everyone’s interest.573 Kohl replied that he wanted to see the 
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568 “Offene Grenzen seien für D kein Problem" (my translation) Ibid. 
569 "Drogenproblem" (my translation) Ibid. 
570 TNA FCO30/6202, folio no. 25, C. Powell to L. Appleyard, “Prime Minister’s meeting with Chancellor Kohl: 
Development of the European Community,” 19 May 1985; attachment: “Prime Minister’s meeting with 
Chancellor Kohl: Development of the European Community,” 19 May 1985; BArch, B136/30076, “Vermerk, 
Treffen des BK mit PM Thatcher in Chequers 18.05.1985,” 19 May 1985, fol. 241; “Vermerk, Treffen des 
Bundeskanzlers mit PM Thatcher in Chequers am 18. Mai 1985,” 22 May 1985, fol. 266. 
571 TNA FCO30/6202, folio no. 25, C. Powell to L. Appleyard, “Prime Minister’s meeting with Chancellor Kohl: 
Development of the European Community,” 19 May 1985; attachment: “Prime Minister’s meeting with 
Chancellor Kohl: Development of the European Community,” 19 May 1985, 4. 
572 BArch, B136/30076, “Vermerk, Treffen des BK mit PM Thatcher in Chequers 18.05.1985,” 19 May 1985, 
fol. 241; “Vermerk, Treffen des Bundeskanzlers mit PM Thatcher in Chequers am 18. Mai 1985,” 22 May 1985, 
fol. 266. 
573 “Vitale Interessen…praktisches Erfordernis” (my translation) Ibid; TNA FCO30/6202, folio no. 25, C. 
Powell to L. Appleyard, “Prime Minister’s meeting with Chancellor Kohl: Development of the European 
Community,” 19 May 1985; attachment: “Prime Minister’s meeting with Chancellor Kohl: Development of the 
European Community,” 19 May 1985, 4. 
The reference to “a very important national interest, or “vital interests”, was another way of referring to the 
Luxembourg Compromise, because of the way this compromise was originally worded, which allowed for 
discussions in the Council of Ministers to continue until such time as the vital interest of the country that 
invoked the agreement had been taken into account. 
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Luxembourg Compromise abolished and refocus decision making on the EEC treaty.574 
However, since Germany paid the most into the EC budget he wanted to keep a “veto” on 
financial issues.575 According to Powell’s minutes he spoke of a “financial veto”.576 All 
accounts of the meeting are broadly in line on the issue of votes and vetoes. The nuance 
between the two leaders’ views on how to develop the issue is however interesting. Thatcher 
wanted to develop the issue by extending majority voting within existing EEC treaty 
provisions and wanted to keep the status quo of the Luxembourg Compromise. Kohl wanted 
in the long term to return to the status quo ante, abolishing the Luxembourg compromise 
despite his government having just invoked it, but was not sure if on financial issues it might 
not be better to keep it.  
All accounts are clear that the most obvious point of disagreement between Thatcher 
and Kohl was about how much additional power should be given to the EP and whether or not 
it was a parliament at all.577 According to Powell, Kohl said that he wanted to give the EP 
more power because it was directly elected.578 Thatcher replied that it already had a 
significant say in the budget making process but “showed no sign of using these powers 
responsibly”.579 According to Neuer, Thatcher was “categorically” against giving the EP more 
powers and described it as “petulant and petty”.580 She referred to the EP as “assembly” and 
argued that under no circumstances should it be given the right to levy taxes, a right which in 
 
574 BArch, B136/30076, “Vermerk, Treffen des BK mit PM Thatcher in Chequers 18.05.1985,” 19 May 1985, 
fol. 241; “Vermerk, Treffen des Bundeskanzlers mit PM Thatcher in Chequers am 18. Mai 1985,” 22 May 1985, 
fol. 263. 
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576 Helmut Kohl quoted in TNA FCO30/6202, folio no. 25, C. Powell to L. Appleyard, “Prime Minister’s 
meeting with Chancellor Kohl: Development of the European Community,” 19 May 1985; attachment: “Prime 
Minister’s meeting with Chancellor Kohl: Development of the European Community,” 19 May 1985, 3. 
577 Neuer’s account noted that Kohl concluded the discussion on this topic by saying that there was "no 
agreement”. (“keine Übereinstimmung”, my translation) Ibid., fol. 268. TNA FCO30/6202, folio no. 25, C. 
Powell to L. Appleyard, “Prime Minister’s meeting with Chancellor Kohl: Development of the European 
Community,” 19 May 1985; attachment: “Prime Minister’s meeting with Chancellor Kohl: Development of the 
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580 "kategorisch" (my translation) BArch, B136/30076, “Vermerk, Treffen des BK mit PM Thatcher in Chequers 
18.05.1985,” 19 May 1985, fol. 242. 
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the UK only the House of Commons had.581 Kohl “interjected that constitutions could be 
changed” but said that the larger point he wanted to make was that because the EP was 
democratically elected he thought it should be given more competences.582 Thatcher replied 
that the EP “was only an ‘assembly’, which did not have the character of a parliament – nor 
did it have the same coherence”.583 Thatcher also mentioned an incident when members of the 
EP walked out during an address by US president Ronald Reagan, which to Thatcher showed 
that “this body should have no additional powers”.584 All accounts match on Thatcher’s only 
suggestion for a compromise. She suggested that as long as the European Council kept the 
last word the EP could be involved more through the already existing conciliation procedure, 
by which differences in views between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament 
were reconciled in a committee.585 
According to Powell’s account, Kohl said that the issue of technology had not yet 
been covered today but that “the French clearly attached great importance to this and would 
probably provide proposals for discussion at Milan”.586 Thatcher suggested holding further 
consultations but argued that the “French ideas were imprecise” and that the principal 
problem was one of accessing the entire European market for companies that sold 
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18.05.1985,” 19 May 1985, fol. 242; B136/30076, Vermerk, Treffen des Bundeskanzlers mit PM Thatcher in 
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“Prime Minister’s meeting with Chancellor Kohl: Development of the European Community,” 19 May 1985; 
attachment: “Prime Minister’s meeting with Chancellor Kohl: Development of the European Community,” 19 
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586 TNA FCO30/6202, folio no. 25, C. Powell to L. Appleyard, “Prime Minister’s meeting with Chancellor Kohl: 
Development of the European Community,” 19 May 1985; attachment: “Prime Minister’s meeting with 
Chancellor Kohl: Development of the European Community,” 19 May 1985, 4. 
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technologically advanced products.587 The German impression was that Thatcher was “very 
reserved” on the issue of technological cooperation and said that such partnerships should be 
based on relations between companies and institutions.588 Thatcher argued that “the problem 
was that the Europeans were conducting research and the Japanese were implementing it”.589 
Thatcher said that she was against new institutions coordinating research because Japanese 
companies were better at implementing research and at anticipating customers’ needs, which 
showed that the emphasis should lie on the implementation of research by private 
companies.590 A further problem was that the Japanese market was closed to exports from 
Europe.591 To respond with import quotas, which the Italians had imposed, was not the 
answer.592 Kohl agreed on the issue of Japan but argued that the UK and Germany should 
present a united response to the request for a collaborative response to SDI, the French 
EUREKA proposals and any proposal from the European Commission.593 Kohl was worried 
that the results of the research for SDI would stay in the USA and the benefits would not flow 
back to Europe.594 Yet the German Chancellor said he did not think the EC was the right 
forum to pursue these policies because it was too “ponderous”.595 Thatcher responded by 
warning that the USA should not be made to believe that the Europeans were “ganging up” 
against them when they were trying to exert influence together.596 Both heads of government 
agreed to coordinate their responses to SDI bilaterally with the USA.597 
 
587 Ibid. 
588 BArch, B136/30076, “Vermerk, Treffen des BK mit PM Thatcher in Chequers 18.05.1985,” 19 May 1985, 
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1985,” 22 May 1985, fol. 259-60. 
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If one looks at the outcome of this meeting, then the subject of technological 
research is the only area where specific further action was agreed. It was agreed that the UK 
would send the chief scientific advisor, Robin Nicholson, to pursue further Anglo-German 
talks and Howe would talk to the French government.598 Kohl asked to be personally briefed 
on the outcome of these talks in preparation for his meeting with the French President.599 On 
the issue of technology one can see that there was a clear difference in focus between the two 
leaders. Kohl was in favour of a European response to SDI in terms of its technological 
developments and wanted to make sure he included Mitterrand’s suggestions. Thatcher saw 
the problem not in technological terms but in terms of market access and therefore as a 
problem that companies had to resolve themselves. In her view, the role of the EC and its 
governments was to open markets and guarantee equal access to all European companies. 
Where the two leaders agreed, however, was that research coordination should not be 
included in the remit of the European Commission. 
The most important issue on which both leaders agreed was that foreign policy 
should be coordinated more in the EC and that the Single Market should be extended. Where 
they disagreed was how this should be done. Powell said that Kohl agreed that PoCo should 
be codified and the Single Market be extended. According to Powell, on both issues Kohl said 
that Germany “would not be an obstacle”.600 Powell said that he “was struck that [Kohl] never 
once, in the course of the day, referred either to European Union or to a new Treaty”.601 In 
Powell’s account, Thatcher’s refusal to change the EEC treaty features prominently. 
According to the German account, Thatcher said that in the right circumstances she was 
willing to present the PoCo paper as a treaty to be ratified by the House of Commons, rather 
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than an intergovernmental agreement.602 Kohl promised that once he had read the paper, he 
would initiate bilateral consultations on a diplomatic level. There is no reaction by Thatcher 
recorded to this remark. 
Both Neuer’s and Powell’s accounts mention that German officials would be asked 
to discuss and consult on the PoCo paper. Very significantly, Kohl’s remark that he wanted to 
“go further” in shared foreign policy is only in the German minutes,  but is not in Powell’s 
notes.603 This may have been because either Powell missed this particular remark, which 
would be extraordinary, or that he judged it not to be important enough to be included in his 
summary. This remark would later encapsulate a part of the explanation why Kohl would 
submit a new German-French paper that would propose creating a “Treaty of European 
Union”. Interestingly, Kohl used exactly the same phrase to Thatcher in a letter one month 
later, which will be discussed in the next chapter. However ambiguous this phrase to “go 
further” was, for Kohl it had meaning. The fact that his offer to consult with UK officials was 
never taken up, nor repeated, could well have motivated him to work with Mitterrand to 
develop the notion of a “European Union”, rather than support the intergovernmental PoCo 
agreement that Thatcher was proposing. Both Thatcher and Kohl’s talks with Mitterrand, and 
how Thatcher’s proposal for a PoCo agreement fared in the preparations for the Milan summit 
in June 1985, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
In conclusion, the meeting between Thatcher and Kohl was an important turning 
point in the UK policy making towards the EC in 1985. It sheds light on the British approach 
to prepare for the upcoming Milan European Council. This meeting also sowed the seeds for 
Mitterrand and Kohl, taking their own secret initiative to amend Thatcher’s paper and 
presenting it as their own, which is part of the events that will be analysed in the next chapter. 
This chapter argued that Thatcher made a mistake by presenting her PoCo paper as a personal 
 
602 BArch, B136/30076, “Vermerk, Treffen des BK mit PM Thatcher in Chequers 18.05.1985,” 19 May 1985, 
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initiative and by discussing it only with Kohl. By only meeting the German Chancellor, and 
simply informing France on the sidelines, Thatcher risked missing out on how central the 
German-French partnership was on a European level. In addition, by neither informing the 
presidency of the European Council nor the European Commission, Thatcher circumvented 
many institutions of the EC. They could have helped her to turn the PoCo paper into a shared 
agreement. The FCO would have had structures and people in place to negotiate such an 
agreement, UKRep being a case in point. Thatcher presented Kohl with three papers: one on 
PoCo, one on the Single Market and one on taking decisions in the EC. Geoffrey Howe had 
suggested this approach to Thatcher and argued it would give her the ability to shape the 
discussion at an early point and force other countries to work on the basis of her proposals.  
The three papers suggested an extension of the Single Market and a codification of 
PoCo. However, their aim was also to proactively suggest a way forward, not just for Britain 
in the EC but for the entire community. This is an important aspect because it shows that 
Thatcher’s policy towards the SEA was not insular but relied on a strategy that placed Britain 
at the centre of decision making in the EC. Moreover, it was an attempt to lead in the 
European Council together with Kohl, but also by keeping France informed, in the 
expectation that Mitterrand would back Thatcher. As Thatcher saw it, her policy suggestions 
would work not only for Britain but would improve the way people lived and how politics 
worked, throughout the entire EC. This aspect of leadership and its wider European focus 
were important. The next chapter will argue that they became the cornerstone of Margaret 
Thatcher’s strategy for the European Council in Milan, on 28-9 June 1985. Thatcher believed 
that these policies, with adaptations that allowed for national interests and Europe’s diversity, 
could work for Europe. Most importantly, she advanced these proposals because she wanted 
to present a coherent alternative to what she saw as more introspective, protectionist and 
possibly even anti-American policies.  
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It is on the more contentious issues of foreign policy and defence that the different 
ways of negotiating in an EC context between Thatcher and Kohl become most apparent. 
Thatcher was fighting for principles, such as breaking down barriers (mostly to free trade), or 
western security, and saw detailed policy questions as aspects of these larger themes. She 
wanted to convince her interlocutors of the merit of these themes and the validity of the 
proposals that flowed from her thinking about them. In that way she presented both her views 
and also the manner in which she negotiated on points of detail as a coherent argument. 
Kohl’s approach was different because he fought for the broader theme of “European Union” 
and wanted to base German foreign policy in the EC. Powell noted that he was “struck” that 
Kohl did not talk about this more at Chequers.604 This comment shows that Powell may not 
have fully realised what Kohl meant when he talked about the issue or how it served as an 
umbrella term for Kohl’s other European Policies. “European Union” for him was not a 
policy that had to be achieved tomorrow, but was an overarching theme that brought together 
German foreign policy and set it in a European context. On points of detail Kohl firmly 
fought the corner of German national interests, policy by policy, whilst always affirming his 
commitment to the broader notion of “European Union”. The fact that this notion was open 
ended and might entail future commitments did not worry him as much as it did Thatcher. 
Elements of broad thinking were in this way for Kohl somewhat removed from specific 
policy questions. For Thatcher, however, the specifics were always part of how she looked at 
broader political questions. 
If the aim of the meeting was to clarify the views of Thatcher and Kohl to each other, 
then the summit was a success. Perhaps this was what Kohl expected. Bullard reported that 
the German Chancellor had been “in excellent spirits, rhapsodising about Chequers … he 
obviously felt that he had had a good day and agreed with the Prime Minister about most of 
 
604 TNA FCO30/6202, folio no. 25, C. D. Powell to L. Appleyard, “Prime Minister’s meeting with Chancellor 
Kohl: Development of the European Community,” 19 May 1985. 
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the points discussed, even though not about the powers of the European Parliament…”.605 
Based on this evidence, Stephen Wall believed that Kohl was so happy on his way home 
because he had never wanted to convince Thatcher in the first place.606 Wall argued that since 
Kohl thought that Thatcher was not committed to the EC, he formed a “conclusion that an 
argument with the Prime Minister was best avoided”.607 However, comparing the British and 
German records of the meeting shows that there was much on which Kohl and Thatcher 
agreed in principle. Kohl and Thatcher were both in favour of extending the Single Market, 
both were for formalising foreign policy cooperation, both were against common taxes or 
financial regulations and both felt the need to take more decisions by majority voting. The 
points of agreement were thus all about policies for the EC that could work in the present. 
Where the two leaders disagreed was about how to develop the EC in the future. The two 
leaders differed on how much majority voting each found permissible and the question 
whether the Luxembourg Compromise should be institutionalised or abolished. In addition, 
Thatcher and Kohl disagreed on how much additional power the EP should be given. Finally, 
the greatest point of difference between both leaders was how comfortable they were with the 
term “European Union”. 
In the points of disagreement one can see the fundamental misreading by Thatcher of 
Kohl. Thatcher’s PoCo paper was specific and detailed. This gave her control over the extent 
of European cooperation that she would or could commit to. Kohl’s notion of “going further” 
was vague, his aim of “European Union” broad and the road of how to get there not yet 
spelled out. Thatcher was sceptical about the term “European Union” but Kohl embraced it 
fully by arguing that it meant basing German foreign policy in a stronger, more 
institutionalised European context. Thatcher underestimated the extent to which Kohl was 
ready to collaboratively work out the details of the broad aims that he was pursuing. His offer 
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to collaborate in high-level diplomatic consultations to refine the paper was in all likelihood 
sincere. Yet why he did not repeat the offer, nor press it on an official level, is unclear. 
Perhaps he thought it would not be taken up by the UK. It is also not clear how far Thatcher’s 
ambitions to lead the EC into the codification of PoCo together with Germany and France 
went. If Thatcher really wanted to break into the bilateral relationship between France and 
Germany and make it a trilateral triumvirate, then holding a high-level summit only with one 
side was a mistake. Kohl’s regular meetings with Mitterrand could have been instructive here. 
The way in which both leaders spoke about Mitterrand and France is interesting. Thatcher 
expressed how “surprised” she was to find that Mitterrand did not want to hold an IGC either. 
This surprise suggests distance and unfamiliarity. Kohl told her confidently that he knew 
Mitterrand was attaching a lot of importance to technological cooperation, knowledge which 
suggests familiarity and closeness. These points could have just been turns of phrase. 
However, the way in which Mitterrand was informed of Thatcher’s PoCo proposals whereas 
Kohl was invited to be “wooed” at Chequers suggests that Thatcher saw the German 
Chancellor to be her key ally in convincing the European Council to support her proposal to 
lead the EC into an intergovernmental agreement to codify PoCo.  
This chapter showed how Thatcher accepted a plan that Geoffrey Howe had 
proposed, for an intergovernmental agreement to formalise PoCo and to work towards 
improving the EC within the remit of the existing EEC treaty, with a view to liberalise the 
Single Market further. Kohl’s vision for a “European Union” was one of pursuing similar 
policies but to embed them in a political framework that would strengthen European 
integration and give the institutions of the EC more competences. Moreover, the two leaders 
had very different understandings of how diplomacy was conducted in the EC, which came to 
the fore in how they engaged in the European Council in June 1985. The next chapter will 
explain how Geoffrey Howe introduced the PoCo paper to other foreign ministers but ruled 
out consulting through official channels, which severely limited the ability of other countries 
to debate its content and sign up to the initiative. Moreover, the next chapter will analyse the 
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UK’s preparations for the Milan European Council and examine how a German-French 
proposal, which was based on the British PoCo paper, came to overtake Thatcher’s initiative 
to lead the EC into the codification of PoCo.  
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Chapter 3. Milan European Council: the end of Thatcher’s leadership 
ambitions in the EC 
At the European Council in Milan, on 28-9 June 1985, for the second time in the 
history of the European Community (EC), a major Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was 
convened. The first IGC resulted in the founding treaty of the EEC, signed as the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. The second IGC, in 1985, was a watershed in the history of the EC because it 
was a substantial renegotiation of the EEC treaty – for the first time since the EEC was 
created in 1957.608 The EEC treaty defined an IGC as the only way to negotiate changes to the 
articles of the treaty.609 The Milan European Council convened an IGC by majority vote and 
not as a unanimous decision, which had never been done before in the history of the EC. 
Therefore, this summit was an important turning point in the history of the Single European 
Act (SEA) as well as the entire EC. From a British standpoint, the key difference between the 
IGC in 1957 and the one in 1985 was that since 1973 the UK had been a member of the EC, 
which gave it the full rights of a member state to engage in the ongoing negotiations.  
In the run-up to the European Council meeting in Milan, the policy making of the 
British government was focused on strengthening Anglo-German relations, which was seen to 
be of vital importance in persuading the European Council to adopt the policies that Thatcher 
was advocating. The previous two chapters argued that at the heart of the British policy 
making towards the EC was a paper that advocated codifying PoCo as intergovernmental 
agreement outside the EEC treaty. This chapter argues that the PoCo paper was an attempt by 
Thatcher to lead the EC, in cooperation with France and Germany, into the formalisation of 
European Political Cooperation (PoCo). Thatcher accepted the recommendation from 
Geoffrey Howe and the FCO to present the PoCo proposal personally as a high-level initiative 
 
608 The Merger Treaty of 1965 had brought the institutions of the EEC, ECSC and Euratom together but did not 
change the articles of the treaties in any other way. 
609 See article 236 of Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC treaty), accessed 22 
December 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Axy0023. 
 133 
to the upcoming European Council in Milan.610 It was personal because she would present it 
herself to her fellow heads of government in the upcoming European Council and high-level 
because she was going to do so without prior consultations by officials. As part of this 
strategy, Thatcher had handed Kohl in confidence an advance copy of her proposal. The 
Chequers meeting between Kohl and Thatcher, on 18 May 1985, showed that the difference 
between the positions of both governments was small on aspects of the Single Market and 
PoCo but much larger on questions of institutions and the broader scope of European 
integration. The differences between Thatcher and Kohl on these issues revealed 
fundamentally diverging attitudes on European integration and towards the role of EC 
institutions. 
This chapter analyses the UK government’s preparations for the Milan European 
Council. Geoffrey Howe suggested that Margaret Thatcher should present the British PoCo 
paper personally to the European Council, without the prior involvement of officials from any 
country. However, this presentation never came about because the British PoCo paper was 
wholly subsumed in a German-French proposal, which emerged just before the European 
Council.611 This German-French counter-proposal took the British paper as starting point but 
enhanced its institutional dimension and gave it the title “Treaty of European Union”. This 
chapter sheds light on the question why and how the British policy towards the Milan 
European Council could be overtaken by a German-French initiative. This chapter first looks 
at a short meeting between Thatcher and Mitterrand, where both expressed themselves against 
holding an IGC. This section explains how the French government was shown a copy of the 
British PoCo paper under the condition that it was confidential. The UK government asked 
 
610 The term Political Cooperation (PoCo) was used in British primary sources, whereas European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) was used in French and German sources. They are otherwise synonymous. They both mean 
EC countries collaborating in aspects of foreign policy, such as in sharing information on their respective 
policies, coordinating statements or taking a common position at international organisations. My usage of these 
terms has followed the primary sources. For a study of EPC from 1970 to 1974 see Möckli, European Foreign 
Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity. 
611 The paper is called German-French because the German government had taken the initiative to start these 
consultations and was leading them. 
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that officials should neither be allowed to discuss nor alter it. Secondly, this chapter looks at a 
meeting of foreign ministers to prepare the Milan European Council. Geoffrey Howe showed 
his counterparts the PoCo draft but explained that it was not supposed to be discussed by 
anyone until Thatcher herself had presented it to the European Council. I argue that this 
meeting was a missed opportunity to secure support for Thatcher’s initiative, in a multilateral 
setting. Thirdly, this chapter analyses primary sources from the German Bundesarchiv and the 
Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts to explain how Germany and France secretly wrote a 
paper that took the British proposals as starting point, but attempted to develop them 
further.612 The way in which Germany and France wrote their own EPC paper is important to 
contextualise British policy making and to gauge if there was any foul play involved in 
writing a conflicting paper, based on the British version, but without consulting the UK 
government. The final section of this chapter analyses how Thatcher and Howe negotiated in 
the Milan European Council.  
This chapter argues that the European Council in Milan represented for Margaret 
Thatcher a moment when she showed an ambition to lead the EC into the codification of 
PoCo, in cooperation with Germany and France. This initiative had been Geoffrey Howe’s 
suggestion, which he presented to Thatcher as a way to head off what he called “far-fetched 
ideas”. Thatcher accepted this suggestion and was prepared to present the PoCo to the 
European Council in Milan. Since her personal representations had worked to settle the BBQ, 
perhaps she thought that she could build on this success in European diplomacy. Armed with 
this paper, Thatcher went to Milan with a plan to personally present her PoCo proposals. With 
these proposals, Thatcher wanted to lead the debate about how the EC should be reformed. 
The paper was designed to put forward a positive idea on collaborating more in foreign policy 
making but to do so without changing the EEC treaty. However, Thatcher’s ambition to lead 
the EC into the formalisation of PoCo was shattered when it emerged that France and 
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Germany had been working on their own paper to reform the EC, which was based on an 
advance copy of Thatcher’s draft. Germany and France took Thatcher’s paper and turned it 
into an institutionally more ambitious “Treaty of European Union”.  
During the Milan summit it turned out that Mitterrand and Kohl were much more 
ready to hold an IGC than Thatcher and the FCO had assumed. Their previous conditional 
denials about wanting to hold an IGC was put to a test in a vote, where they were faced with a 
choice of either backing an IGC, or exposing their rhetoric of wanting to unite Europe as 
hollow. They voted to hold an IGC. Thatcher voted against an IGC but was outvoted seven to 
three. When thus outvoted, the policy of refusing to discuss changing the EEC treaty in an 
IGC became an untenable position for Thatcher. This was the moment when the UK 
government turned its focus away from attempting to lead the EC, with a proposal to 
formalise the hitherto informal practice of PoCo in an intergovernmental agreement, to one of 
cautiously engaging in the IGC. This vote exposed the crucial difference between the BBQ 
negotiations and the Milan European Council. In the former, Thatcher was in a position to 
prevent the EC from receiving more funds, because an increase in the VAT threshold needed 
all member states’ support. However, to win support for her PoCo proposals in Milan, she 
needed to convince the other heads of government that her proposals were the best way of 
reviving the process of European integration. 
The question of Political Cooperation and Britain’s relations with France and 
Germany had been an important issue since the beginnings of European integration. The story 
of how the UK government stayed outside the ECSC, withdrew from the Messina talks in 
1955, did not become a founding member of the EEC in 1957, and then negotiated three times 
for entry has been well-told. The “Pleven plan” for a European Defence Community and a 
supranational army came to naught when the French Assemblée Nationale refused to ratify it 
on 30 August 1954. Two months later, the Western European Union (WEU) was created in an 
amendment of the Brussels treaty that founded the Brussels Treaty Organisation, which both 
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were early forms of defence cooperation.613 In 1961, Charles de Gaulle proposed the “Fouchet 
plan” as an intergovernmental “union of states” to coordinate foreign policy and defence of 
the six EEC countries, which held the prospect of including the UK.614 However, De Gaulle’s 
alternative grouping of states around the notion of Political Cooperation never materialised. 
Instead, the EEC members established the Common Market, the Common Agricultural Policy 
and began accession negotiations for Denmark, the UK and Ireland, which were however 
brought to an abrupt halt by de Gaulle in 1963. 
During what came to be known as the “Soames affair”, Charles de Gaulle attempted 
to bring the EC and EFTA together into a looser grouping of nation states. The plan fell apart 
when the UK informed Germany and the other EC countries of the idea. Furby and Ludlow 
argued that the Soames affair has been much researched because it sheds light on the question 
of whether or not a close relationship between Gaullist France and the UK under Prime 
Minister Wilson was ever possible.615 More broadly, the Soames affair illuminated the tension 
between Soames’ attempt to negotiate bilaterally with de Gaulle and the FCO advising Harold 
Wilson not to risk the Franco-German relationship over such uncertain negotiations.616 
Wilson decided to inform Germany and the other EC countries of the talks with de Gaulle, 
which brought the plot into the open and at the same time shut down these talks before they 
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even had begun. The Soames affair usefully illustrates the tension between bilateral and 
multilateral diplomacy in the EC. 
Between 1970 and 1974, during the time when the UK successfully negotiated to 
join the EEC, Heath, Brandt and Pompidou collaborated successfully in forging a European 
Political Cooperation (EPC), whereby they defined common foreign policy and defence 
positions, which culminated in the passing of a “declaration on European identity”.617 Daniel 
Möckli argued that for a brief moment an “Anglo-French-German triangle" emerged, which 
however folded in 1974 under the pressure of the USA and internal disagreements within the 
EC.618 N. Piers Ludlow explained how transatlantic fences were mended and Political 
Cooperation re-established under US president Gerald Ford, once Henry Kissinger had 
stepped down as National Security Advisor.619 Ludlow argued that the second half of the 
1970s saw improved bilateral relations between the USA and the UK, France as well as 
Germany, which resulted in a resumption of EPC and strong representation of European 
countries in the emerging international high-level summits, such as the G7.620 These summits 
have been studied elsewhere as phenomenon in their own right, especially in the context of 
the economic tensions that followed in the wake of the energy crisis of 1974.621  
By 1985 the new international summits had become firm fixtures on decision 
makers’ calendars. Until the ratification of the SEA, PoCo policies had been informally 
coordinated through statements on international events and voting at international 
organisations, which happened outside the formal remit of the EC. Thatcher wanted not to 
alter but simply to formalise this process in a non-binding way, in an intergovernmental 
agreement that was outside the existing EEC treaty. The previous chapter explained how 
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Thatcher agreed to present this proposal to codify PoCo to Helmut Kohl. This chapter 
explains how with this paper she attempted to lead the EC into the codification of these 
hitherto informal practices. However, her attempt to lead the EC into formalising PoCo was 
short lived. The initiative was overtaken by a German-French initiative, entitled “Treaty of 
European Union”, which was based on the British PoCo paper but was broader in its 
institutional ambition than the British initiative. Then her proposal was overtaken by a vote in 
the European Council to hold an IGC to amend the EEC treaty. 
3. 1. Bilateral Thatcher-Mitterrand meeting: “unenthusiastic” about an IGC  
The differences between Thatcher’s bilateral meeting with Kohl and the one with 
Mitterrand illustrated the relative importance of both leaders in Thatcher’s European policy 
making. Kohl was invited for an entire day to Chequers. Mitterrand was given 45 minutes in 
the margins of an economic summit in Bonn on 3 May 1985. The two meetings showed how 
Thatcher’s bid to lead the EC into the codification of PoCo relied on winning over Kohl first. 
She only intended to inform Mitterrand after her meeting with Kohl. However, the meeting 
with Mitterrand on 3 May 1985 was important because it gave Thatcher the impression that 
they agreed on the issue of not wanting to call an IGC. This section analyses a brief meeting 
between Thatcher and Mitterrand in which they both expressed themselves against holding an 
IGC to change the EEC treaty. Firstly, this section sheds light on a short but significant 
meeting between Thatcher and Mitterrand. In this meeting both leaders said that they did not 
want to hold an IGC. The British ambassador to France believed Mitterrand was against 
holding an IGC because of the upcoming French elections. Shortly thereafter, Geoffrey Howe 
shared the British PoCo paper with the French foreign minister, Roland Dumas, under the 
condition of secrecy and insisted that diplomats should not discuss or alter the paper in any 
way until Margaret Thatcher had presented it to the European Council.  
During a ceremony to award the Légion d’honneur to former foreign minister Claude 
Cheysson, François Mitterrand remarked in passing to the assembled French dignitaries that 
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he wanted to launch a “surprise initiative”, with which he wanted to “transform the European 
institutions”.622 This announcement left the French media speculating as to what exactly the 
French president was planning to do next. The ideas aired by the media ranged from a French 
plebiscite on a yet unknown European issue to a conference of foreign ministers along the 
lines of the Messina conference in 1955.623 Mitterrand thus deliberately kept everyone in 
suspense over his intentions. When Mitterrand announced his “surprise initiative”, the 
German foreign ministry concluded that “paternity” of European policies was at stake and 
worried that Germany risked being “left out” of the discussions.624 In the German Federal 
Chancellery it was suggested that Germany should work with Italy and France towards 
developing a “mandate” for an IGC, which already contained the “structural elements  of a 
treaty on [a European] ‘Union’”.625 
In contrast to Thatcher, Helmut Kohl met both Thatcher and Mitterrand for bilateral 
summits. He was also mindful to involve Italy in every step of the discussions between 
France and Germany. As shown in the previous chapter, Kohl wanted to launch a “European 
Union”. Helmut Kohl’s briefing for his bilateral meeting with Mitterrand, on 25 March 1985, 
said that he should expect an explanation from Mitterrand as to what this “surprise initiative” 
was going to be.626 During their bilateral meeting, Mitterrand and Kohl said they both wanted 
to pursue the “political integration of Europe” and they believed the Dooge Committee 
showed that there was scope for such an agreement.627 They agreed that to keep the 
momentum going there should be bilateral talks on the subject which had to be kept at the 
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highest level and should not be delegated.628 Kohl said he agreed with holding an IGC to keep 
the proposals in play but that he was worried about a lack of unity within the EC.629 Kohl 
argued to Mitterrand that the UK should be “pushed to go further on institutional questions, 
which was why we should work towards an IGC”.630 Kohl added that the “Franco-German 
understanding” was crucial in this process but that they should “seriously consider” involving 
Bettino Craxi to work out new proposals for reforming the EC.631 The Kohl-Mitterrand 
meeting showed that in principle they both wanted to work with Italy and the UK and were 
willing to engage in early multilateral consultations on the future of the EC. 
While Mitterrand was keeping everyone guessing about the content of his “surprise 
initiative”, he was pursuing the idea of an agency that would coordinate technological 
innovations in the EC. On 17 April 1985 Mitterrand suggested creating an agency, named 
EUREKA, which would coordinate the research and development of European companies as 
well as finance research into new technologies, such as industrial lasers and microchips.632 
The French government wanted to take EUREKA out of the EC to allow Austria, Sweden and 
Switzerland to participate.633 Hubert Curien, the French minister for research and technology, 
argued that SDI was the “detonator” or “catalyst” of the EUREKA programme, which gives it 
an interesting Cold War dimension.634 EUREKA was not the only such programme but it 
became prominent because Mitterrand backed it personally.635 Thatcher countered 
Mitterrand’s idea by suggesting a “Euro-type warrant” which proposed giving companies a 
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kind of EC-wide patent for their innovations. EUREKA forms part of the broader setting in 
which the policy making of the UK government took place. Since EUREKA and the other 
research programmes were run independently and were not included in the SEA, they lie 
outside the scope of this research.  
Margaret Thatcher’s bilateral meeting with François Mitterrand, on the sidelines of 
the economic summit in Bonn on 3 May 1985, lasted exactly 45 minutes. The two heads of 
government discussed SDI, the channel tunnel, a European fighter aircraft, GATT, and briefly 
touched upon the EC.636 In this meeting, Thatcher was accompanied by Robin Butler, her 
Principal Private Secretary, and Mitterrand was flanked by Jacques Attali, who was a close 
confidant and “special advisor” to Mitterrand on foreign policy matters. Their discussion on 
the subject of the Milan European Council is summarised in one paragraph and consists of 
only two statements by each head of government. Thatcher told Mitterrand that she was 
“unenthusiastic” about holding an IGC.637 Mitterrand replied by saying that “he was also not 
very keen” on holding one but said that he wanted to “make progress on the political 
formation of Europe”.638 Mitterrand also said that he was worried about “disappointing public 
opinion if [the] results [of the IGC] failed to match expectations”.639 This reference to public 
expectations can be explained by the fact that on 16 March 1986 France was going to hold 
elections. Therefore, the reasons why Mitterrand told Thatcher that he did not want an IGC 
were very different from Thatcher’s thinking. Mitterrand was worried about disappointing 
public opinion just before an election if an IGC turned out to be inconclusive. As shown 
above, Thatcher wanted to avoid such a conference because she wanted to develop the EC 
outside the EEC treaty, with an intergovernmental agreement to codify PoCo, and within the 
EEC treaty by further liberalising the Single Market. 
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Three days after the Thatcher-Kohl meeting, on 21 May 1985, Geoffrey Howe had a 
meeting with the French foreign minister and close friend of Mitterrand, Roland Dumas. 
Howe was tasked with explaining to Dumas the British PoCo paper on a confidential basis, 
and to hand over a copy “privately” and “after” the meeting had finished.640 By doing so, 
Howe was asked to: 
“…emphasise that this was a personal communication for M. Dumas and the 
President from the Prime Minister, which [Thatcher] would want to discuss at 
the Milan European Council. We must insist that it should not be put in the 
hands of foreign ministry officials or start becoming the subject of 
negotiations meanwhile.”641 
 
Robin Renwick, Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the FCO (responsible for 
European integration), said in his analysis in preparation for Howe’s meeting with Dumas that 
“we still have no precise indication of the proposals on institutional matters President 
Mitterrand is likely to make or support at or before the European Council”.642 Renwick 
speculated that “Mitterrand will seek to win a propaganda advantage and to depict himself as 
being much more positive about ‘progress’ in Europe than we are – the more so as he knows 
that he can rely on the Prime Minister to defend a number of points of importance to the 
French”.643  
The manner in which Germany and France were shown the PoCo paper reveals that 
Thatcher and Howe believed the key to convincing the European Council was to work 
bilaterally with Kohl and to involve Mitterrand only on the sidelines. It is striking that Kohl 
was invited to Chequers for an entire day, whereas Mitterrand was only briefly asked, in the 
course of a short meeting, if he was supporting an IGC. Moreover, Thatcher personally gave 
Kohl a copy of the PoCo paper, whereas Mitterrand received one through his foreign minister 
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as a courtesy. Judging by the length of these meetings and the depth at which these issues 
were discussed, Mitterrand simply did not receive the same level of Thatcher’s attention, 
compared to Kohl. The shortness of the meeting with Mitterrand could also be explained by 
the fact that both leaders were at the same place for a different occasion. Nevertheless, the 
difference between the two high-level meetings is still striking. With Kohl, every issue of the 
upcoming European Council in Milan was discussed in great detail. Kohl was given 
privileged access to a major policy initiative that Thatcher wanted to present personally in 
Milan. Mitterrand by contrast was given a copy of this paper, but was only asked if he was in 
favour of holding an IGC or not – and told by Thatcher that she was against holding such a 
conference. The one aspect that Thatcher’s bilateral approach to both France and Germany 
had in common was that she insisted on presenting the PoCo paper as high-level initiative and 
did not want to let diplomats discuss it before she had presented it herself at the Milan 
European Council on 28 June 1985.  
In summary, François Mitterrand announced a “surprise initiative” to change the 
institutions of the EC and expressed his support for the European Parliament’s “Draft Treaty 
on European Union”. In his conversation with Kohl, Mitterrand said that he was in favour of 
working towards increasing the “political integration of Europe”. However, when Mitterrand 
met Thatcher, he largely confirmed to her what she wanted to hear, saying that he too was 
against holding an IGC. The British ambassador to France, John Fretwell, believed that 
Mitterrand was only ready to back policies that he could defend in the upcoming French 
elections. Lastly, Geoffrey Howe presented Thatcher’s PoCo initiative to the French foreign 
minister but told him that it was confidential and that diplomats were not allowed to discuss it 
until Thatcher had presented it in the upcoming European Council in Milan.  
3. 2. Stresa foreign minister meeting: “a personal initiative by the Prime Minister” 
On 8-9 June 1985, the foreign ministers of the EC countries met for an “informal” 
meeting in Stresa, on the shores of the Lago Maggiore, to prepare for the upcoming European 
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Council. Geoffrey Howe told the assembled foreign ministers that the PoCo paper was “a 
personal initiative by the Prime Minister. She will want to get reactions of other heads of 
government at Milan. [Howe added that the paper was ] Not for discussion by officials 
meanwhile”.644 Howe said he was “authorised to hand over [the] draft agreement [on PoCo]”, 
explain its contents but that he expected nobody would discuss the PoCo paper, or propose 
any amendments, until Thatcher had presented it herself to the other heads of government.645 
The tactic of keeping the paper on the highest political level and not to seek input from 
officials meant it could not become an initiative with broad support in a multilateral setting. 
At the same time, the fact that the paper was out in the open robbed it of the element of 
surprise. Stresa could have been the setting for a broadening of the initiative in order to lobby 
other member states, garner their support and present the paper as a collective effort at the 
upcoming European Council meeting in Milan. Such a strategy would have meant 
compromising on some aspects of the paper, in all likelihood giving it the status of a treaty, 
but the outcome would have been a collective effort with broad support from other members.  
As explained in the previous chapter, Geoffrey Howe had suggested that Thatcher 
should present the PoCo paper personally, i.e. herself, as high-level initiative to the European 
Council. Howe had also advised that she should first win over Kohl bilaterally, before sharing 
the paper more broadly. Thatcher agreed with these suggestions and reportedly described the 
paper as a “stroke of genius”, but was against giving it the status of a formal treaty. The 
previous chapter showed that Thatcher accepted the PoCo paper and followed Howe’s advice 
on its presentation. A further element of Howe’s strategy was to keep diplomatic 
consultations with other countries on the PoCo paper to a minimum, until Thatcher had 
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introduced it at the Milan European Council. Robin Renwick, Assistant Under-Secretary of 
State at the FCO (responsible for European integration), was instrumental in devising this 
strategy. He warned that “we do not want the draft to be widely disseminated before [the 
Milan European Council], as some of the smaller member states in particular would try to 
‘improve’ the text before we ever got to Milan”.646 Robin Renwick told Antony Acland, 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the most senior advisor on 
foreign policy to Howe, the PoCo paper was intended “for heads of government and not for 
discussion at official level before Milan”.647 Acland commented in handwriting that he 
thought the paper was “most ingenious”.648 Why Acland though the paper was so “ingenious” 
is not in the records. Was the paper a resourceful way of leading the EC in an area that 
utilised the UK’s strong position in international affairs, such as NATO and as permanent 
member of the UN Security Council? Or was the clever part prompting Thatcher to clarify her 
thinking on European integration? Even though the PoCo paper itself may have furthered the 
UK’s broader foreign policy aims, if the attempt was to surprise everyone then it was 
executed inconsistently because other countries were aware of the proposals but could not 
interact with them.  
Despite the PoCo paper being a closely-guarded secret, the FCO took steps to inform 
other countries of it in order to prepare the ground for Thatcher’s introduction of the paper. 
However, by doing so, they departed to some degree from Howe’s strategy of presenting this 
paper as Thatcher’s “personal initiative”. Renato Ruggiero, Secretary General at the Italian 
foreign ministry, was given the PoCo paper by David Williamson on 28 May 1985.649 The 
Irish government received a copy on 5 June and was told that Ireland would not have to sign 
up to the article that dealt with security cooperation in a NATO framework.650 Ireland was a 
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neutral country and not a member of NATO. Renwick argued “we cannot be diverted from 
pursuing our initiative by Irish objections. They will be more than content to depict 
themselves as being in a more advanced position than us on other issues”.651 By sharing the 
paper so widely, even though Germany, France, Italy and Ireland were all asked to keep it a 
secret, the FCO gave up the element of surprise. In a seemingly sombre mood Renwick told 
Geoffrey Howe’s Assistant Private Secretary, Colin Budd, that the Italian political director 
“has managed to reveal to other member states that there is a British text”.652 Two days before 
the Stresa meeting of foreign ministers the paper was thus turning from a secret high-level 
initiative to a mystery paper that everyone knew about but nobody could interact with. The 
element of surprise was gone. Italy, Germany, France and Ireland all had seen the text. Yet 
they were asked not to share their thoughts about it until Thatcher had presented it on 28 June 
1985.  
In Stresa, the Italian government distributed a “draft mandate” which called for an 
Intergovernmental Conference to create a “true political entity, the European Union” as well 
as a “homogenous internal economic area”.653 The Italian “draft mandate” drew heavily on 
the Dooge Committee, the “Stuttgart Solemn Declaration of European Unity” and the “Draft 
Treaty adopted by the European Parliament”.654 Colin Budd, the Assistant Private Secretary 
to Geoffrey Howe, believed that the Italian “draft mandate” was not supported by everyone 
and that Italy would work out proposals for the Milan summit that included the ideas the UK 
had presented.655 Moreover, Jacques Delors announced that the European Commission would 
soon present a “White Paper” on the Single Market.656 Delors, Dumas and Genscher all 
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emphasised that it would be in Milan where heads of governments would have to show how 
committed they were to future European integration.657 Both Giulio Andreotti and Hans-
Dietrich Genscher, made passionate pleas for a “European Union”, arguing this had been 
discussed since 1972 and that the public expected a positive outcome from Milan.658At the 
Stresa meeting of foreign ministers, it became clear that Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Ireland and Germany had pronounced themselves in favour of holding an IGC. 
Arguing against a conference were the UK, Denmark and Greece. The position of France was 
as yet undecided. Howe argued against an IGC, saying that the European Council was the 
most effective IGC. Furthermore, Howe said that he was in favour of more majority voting, 
extending the Single Market, a “formal, binding commitment” on PoCo, the formalisation of 
the Luxembourg Compromise.659  
After Stresa, even though six foreign ministers had pronounced themselves in favour 
of holding an IGC, Britain’s strategy of ruling out an IGC and introducing the PoCo paper as 
a personal initiative by Thatcher was not changed. When Colin Budd, Assistant Private 
Secretary to Geoffrey Howe, sent Thatcher a briefing on the Stresa meeting of foreign 
ministers for Prime Minister’s Questions, he told Charles Powell that “the Foreign Secretary 
found that no other member state had as clearly worked out a position as we do on the future 
development of the Community”.660 The briefing explained that the British ideas had been 
“more precise” than those of any other EC country.661 However, whether these ideas would be 
pursued or not was going to be decided by the heads of government at the European Council 
in Milan on 28-9 June 1985.662 The principal shortcoming of the strategy to introduce the 
PoCo paper as a high-level initiative, which Thatcher was supposed to present personally to 
 
657 TNA FCO30/6170, folio no. 232, R. Renwick to C. Budd, “Stresa: Discussion on the development of the 
community,” 10 June 1985, attachment: “informal meeting of the foreign ministers of the European community 
at Stresa on 8/9 June 1985, record of discussion on 8 June about the development of the Community”, n.d. 
658 Ibid. 
659 Ibid. 
660 TNA FCO30/6170, folio no. 231, C. Budd to C. Powell, “Development of the Community: Prime Minister’s 
Questions,” 11 June 1985. 
661 Ibid. Attachment: “brief for Prime Minister’s question time: Future development of the community” n.d. 
662 Ibid. 
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the European Council, was that the British views were already known to the other EC 
countries but could not be interacted with. Because the FCO officials were not permitted to 
consult with other diplomats on the PoCo paper, the process of sharing drafts and re-drafting 
could not happen. This meant that the PoCo paper could not be developed further, nor altered 
in any way. The foreign ministers and diplomats were thus prevented from attempting to 
prepare a compromise agreement to build alliances and win other countries’ support. 
Therefore, the PoCo paper ended up being neither a surprise initiative nor a shared 
multilateral proposal. However, at Stresa Howe could have secured the support of other 
member states for the PoCo paper. This would have necessitated altering certain aspects of 
the paper, perhaps broadening its scope and giving it the status of a treaty. Keeping the paper 
as a personal high-level initiative and the involvement of officials to a minimum proved to be 
a missed opportunity in multilateral diplomacy. 
In summary, the Stresa meeting of foreign ministers of EC foreign ministers could 
have been the setting where the UK government turned the PoCo paper into a truly 
multilateral initiative. Instead, Geoffrey Howe presented the paper but did not allow officials 
to do what they did best – find areas of compromise. Howe ruled out official consultations to 
discuss the PoCo paper until Thatcher had presented the paper to the Milan European 
Council. Howe had recommended to Thatcher before her meeting with Kohl that she should 
present the PoCo paper as a countermeasure to what he called “far-fetched” ideas of a 
“European Union”. The next section will trace how this plan began to fall apart when the 
FCO learned that Germany and France had been secretly consulting and had been busy 
rewriting the PoCo paper that Thatcher had given to Kohl. 
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3. 3. Secret German-French talks on “European Union” 
The German-French “Draft Treaty on European Union” was written in a combination 
of a long process and a last-minute dash.663 The paper was a response to the lack of an 
institutional dimension in Thatcher’s PoCo paper. Especially Germany wanted a treaty that 
would give the institutions of the EC more power, especially the EP, and called for a 
“European Union” to give the paper a more political dimension. The German-French paper 
emerged out of consultations that both countries held regularly. In parts it was therefore a 
testament of the close working relationship between the two countries. The UK and Germany 
also held regular bilateral meetings but the PoCo paper was never discussed in these bilateral 
consultations. This section aims to reconstruct how Germany and France wrote a paper that 
was largely based on the one they had received in confidence from Thatcher. Examining the 
French and German intentions is important because it puts British policy making towards the 
SEA into context and goes some way to explain more fully the outcome of the Milan 
European Council. For the history of British policy making, examining how the 
counterproposal to the British PoCo paper came about is relevant because it answers the 
question of whether there was any foul play involved in the way that the German-French 
paper was prepared for the Milan European Council. Since Thatcher had intended to present 
this paper as a personal high-level initiative, it is important to examine how she suddenly saw 
her own ideas being presented to her by Kohl and Mitterrand but with a title that she 
thoroughly disliked.664  
The German-French working group that was tasked with preparing for the upcoming 
European Council was led by Jacques Attali and Horst Teltschik and only included a small 
group of senior officials.665 Attali worked in an office just next to the French president as his 
 
663 This paper is referred to as German-French, instead of Franco-German, because the archival sources reveal 
that the consultations were initiated by Germany. When reference is made to the more general Franco-German 
consultations I have kept the conventional use of the term. 
664 This is how both Howe and Thatcher present it in their memoirs. See Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 
549; Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, 409. 
665 For the first two meetings there is no list of participants on file. On 4 June the French delegation included 
Attali, Morel, Guigou, Védrine, Bernard and Vidal. The German delegation consisted of Teltschik, Trumpf, 
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“special advisor” on foreign policy.666 Teltschik was a foreign policy advisor and close 
confidant to Helmut Kohl – sometimes dubbed “Kohl’s Kissinger”.667 Annotated comments 
in Helmut Kohl’s handwriting on the summary of the meeting for 24 May 1985 attest to the 
high level on which these meetings were held and show the close interest that Kohl took.668 
Particularly, Helmut Kohl thought it was “important” that the French delegation was reluctant 
to commit to changing the EEC treaty.669 Interestingly, the French side said they had not 
heard of a British draft treaty.670 As shown above, this was not true because Geoffrey Howe 
had given the French foreign minister Roland Dumas a copy of the PoCo paper and briefed 
him on the subject on 21 May 1985. France was adamant that EPC should first be agreed 
bilaterally with Germany and that they did not want to hold an IGC because they saw an 
agreement with all ten member states as unrealistic.671 Attali and Teltschik agreed in these 
talks that majority voting should be extended but France wanted to reduce the “veto” to be 
used only in the Foreign Affairs Council.672 Germany, however, did not want a “‘legalisation’ 
of the veto” and pronounced themselves ready to completely abolish the Luxembourg 
Compromise.673 
To prepare for the consultations with France, the German foreign ministry wrote a 
policy brief that explained the position of the German government towards the British PoCo 
proposals.674 The initial aim of the German-French consultations was to prepare a common 
 
Stabreit, Thiele and Hartmann. BArch, B136/30681, H. Teltschik to W. Schäuble, 31 May 1985; “Deutsch-
französische Gespräche am Dienstag, 4. Juni 1985," n.d.; PAAA, B200, Bd. 130388, J. Trumpf to G. Massion, 
“Deutsch-französische Gespräche zur Vorbereitung des Europäischen Rats von Mailand, hier: 3. Treffen der 
Gruppe Teltschik/Attali im Bundeskanzleramt am 04.06.1985,” 4 June 1985. 
666 "Sonderberater" (my translation) Pautsch et al., Akten Zur Auswärtigen Politik Der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1985, 2016, 2: 1898; Jacques Attali, Verbatim, tome 1: chronique des années 1981-1986 (Paris: 
Fayard, 1993). 
667 Bertram, ‘Kohls außenpolitischer Berater’. 
668 The fact that these meetings are much better documented in the files of the Bundesarchiv than the Auswärtige 
Amt serves as further proof that the Chancellery was in charge of these meetings. 
669 “wichtig” (my translation) BArch, B136/30681, “Deutsch-französisches Arbeitsgespräch am Freitag den 
24.5.1985 in Paris," n.d. 
670 Ibid. 
671 Ibid., 3. 
672 Ibid. 1. 
673 “‘Legalisierung des Vetos” (my translation) Ibid. 
674 BArch, B136/30873, W.-D. Schilling to A. Meyer-Landrut, "Britisches Papier zur EPZ," 28 May 1985. 
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position with France, with which the UK government could be approached.675 The aim was 
not yet to write a competing paper. This declaration of intent to consult with the UK is 
important because it matches with the account of the Thatcher-Kohl meeting on 18 May 1985. 
Therefore, Germany planned to engage in multilateral talks with the UK government on the 
British PoCo/EPC paper. The German policy brief noted from the outset that the German 
government supported the codification of EPC because it would make EPC more “efficient” 
and would give it more “continuity”.676 However, Germany wanted to lessen some of the 
Atlantic security focus of the British paper and replace it with the recommendations of the 
Dooge Committee.677 To this end, Germany wanted to write a document with treaty force, for 
which the British paper could serve as a basis if it could be “enriched”.678 Asking for 
consultations to act as “coherent force in international relations”,679 as the British paper 
suggested, was “too weak”; instead, similar to what the Dooge report suggested, Germany 
wanted the treaty to say that “every effort should be made to arrive at a common position and 
to act in common accord”.680 To Germany, such a close foreign policy coordination that was 
anchored in a treaty was part of their broader aim of “creating a European Union, i.e. a united 
Europe”.681 
By the end of May 1985, the German government had written a “draft treaty” that 
was “based on the British EPC paper and was enriched according to our position”.682 
Germany suggested to turn this into a German-French compromise paper, which with a few 
 
675 Ibid. 
676 "Effizienz ... Kontinuität" (underline in the original, my translation) Ibid.; “Anlage 2, Stellungnahme zum 
britischen EPZ-Papier," 2, 4. 
677 “ausgewogener” (my translation). Ibid., 2-4. 
678 "bedarf nach unserer Auffassung jedoch der Anreicherung" (my translation) Ibid., 2. 
679 TNA FCO30/6168, “Draft Agreement on Political Cooperation”, n.d., art. 2 
680 "zu schwach", "alle Anstrengungen zu unternehmen, um zu einer gemeinsamen Position und zu 
gemeinsamem Handeln zu gelangen" (underline in the original, my translation) BArch, B136/30873, W.-D. 
Schilling to A. Meyer-Landrut, "Britisches Papier zur EPZ, Anlage 2, Stellungnahme zum britischen EPZ-
Papier," 28 May 1985, 2. 
681 “die Schaffung einer Europäischen Union bzw. eines vereinten Europeas" (underline in the original, my 
translation). Moreover, the London report on Political Cooperation of 13 October 1981 and the “solemn 
declaration of European Unity” of 19 June 1983 should be “anchored” (verankert, my translation) in this treaty. 
Ibid. 
682 “Vertragsentwurf”, “lehnt sich an das britische EPZ-Papier an und ist im Sinne unserer Position angereichert" 
(my translation) BArch, B136/30873, W.-D. Schilling to A. Meyer-Landrut, "Vorlage eines EPZ-Papiers für den 
Europäischen Rat in Mailand," 31 May 1985. 
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changes all EC countries could agree to. Various parts of the text had been taken from the 
“Solemn Declaration of European Unity” and the final report of the Dooge Committee.683 The 
initiative was intended to be truly multilateral and in tune with other discussions on the future 
of the EC. On 4 June 1985, Horst Teltschik gave Jacques Attali in “strict confidence” the 
“draft treaty” that Germany had prepared.684 He explained that for Germany this issue was 
important and that it was not enough to simply affirm EPC in the way that it already existed. 
Teltschik said that he was proposing to codify EPC with a formal treaty to show its political 
importance.685 Attali thought the draft was “excellent” but enquired who would present the 
draft at the Milan European Council.686 Teltschik replied that for now the draft should not be 
shared with anybody, adding that only after Germany and France had agreed on a text, then 
Italy could be asked to present the proposal to the European Council.687 The way in which 
Kohl and Mitterrand’s aides agreed to their draft treaty showed that the German government 
was in the driving seat and wrote the document in close consultation with the French officials. 
However, time was running out. By the time Attali and Teltschik had agreed to a draft, but 
not yet on who would present it, they only had just over three weeks left until the European 
Council in Milan, on 28-9 June 1985. 
As shown above, Germany had intended to consult with the UK after talking to 
France about how to “enrich” the British PoCo paper. Germany wanted to first make sure that 
France could support their suggestions. However, these consultations never happened. 
Instead, Kohl wrote a letter to Thatcher to tell her that he was grateful for the confidence that 
she had shown by sharing with him her EPC paper.688 Crucially, Kohl added that “in my view 
we should go a step further to secure EPC with a treaty” and that with this treaty he also 
 
683 Ibid. 
684 Emphasis in the original. "streng vertraulich" (my translation) BArch, B136/30681, “Zweites deutsch-
französisches Arbeitsgespräch am Dienstag den 4. Juni 1985 in Bonn," n.d., 4. 
685 Ibid. 
686 "ausgezeichnet" (my translation) Ibid. 
687 Ibid., 4. 
688 TNA PREM19/1491, H. Kohl to M. Thatcher, 19 June 1985. 
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wanted to “formalise the creation of a European Union”.689 Kohl’s letter should not have left 
Thatcher in any doubt that he supported EPC and the Single Market but that he wanted to 
embed such endeavours in a formal treaty that contained a political framework and included 
the EP, which was in line with what he had told Thatcher when they had met on 18 May 
1985. Kohl wrote this letter directly to Thatcher and it was sent as personal letter from the 
German ambassador to No. 10 Downing street. These remarks leave little doubt as to his 
ambitions but were also not the consultations that Kohl had promised. Maybe Kohl knew that 
Howe had ruled out such consultations at the summit of foreign ministers in Stresa. So, Kohl 
was left no other option than re-stating his opinions in a personal letter to Thatcher and in this 
way keeping the issue in the bilateral high-level setting of their earlier meeting at Chequers.  
We do not know if Julian Bullard, the British ambassador to Germany, knew of this 
letter. It is not mentioned in any of the telegrams he sent about his many conversations with 
German officials. Bullard’s telegrams convey the impression of an outspoken and self-assured 
diplomat. As the previous chapter has shown, all of Bullard’s assessments emphasised the 
closeness of the British and the German positions. Bullard believed that the German 
government was still “undecided” on how to approach the upcoming European Council.690 
Bullard pointed out that there were disagreements between Genscher, who wanted to put as 
much of the Dooge Committee into practice as possible, and Kohl who was in Bullard’s 
words “more pragmatic”.691 Bullard did not spell out what he meant by pragmatism but from 
the context it could be that he believed Kohl was not convinced that changing the EEC treaty 
was necessary. On 25 June 1985, a day before the story of the secret German-French draft 
treaty broke, Bullard said to Horst Teltschik, one of Helmut Kohl’s closest political advisors, 
 
689 “Aus meiner Sicht sollten wir aber noch einen Schritt weitergehen um eine vertragliche Absicherung der EPZ 
anzustreben. In einem solchen Vertrag sollte auch das Ziel der Schaffung einer Europäischen Union 
festgeschrieben werden" (my translation) Ibid. 
690 TNA FCO30/6203, folio no. 38: telegram no. 620, J. Bullard to FCO, “Run up to Milan,” 20 June 1985. 
691 Ibid. 
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“all that lies between us are the words treaty and union”.692 In the same meeting, Horst 
Teltschik tried to warn Bullard by telling him that Kohl wanted to “hoist the flag of treaty 
amendment and give others the opportunity to do likewise so as to expose where the 
opposition to this lay”.693 This admission by Teltschik that Kohl wanted to amend the EEC 
treaty was important because in his conversations with Thatcher, Kohl had always been cagey 
on the question of whether or not he wanted an IGC. However, to Bullard the conversation 
with Teltschik confirmed that the differences between both countries were in effect very 
slight, which could have meant that the PoCo proposals which the UK government was 
putting forward were standing a good chance of being received favourably at the upcoming 
European Council. The personal letter from Kohl to Thatcher showed that Bullard was wrong 
in his assessment on the closeness of the British and German positions. This was unfortunate 
because on 15 April 1985 Bullard had recommended to put a series of “bold” or even 
“daring” ideas to Kohl, call them “European Union” and be ready to give them the status of a 
treaty. Therefore, instinctively the ambassador had been right in April. However, in June he 
was wrong in advising that because Kohl’s government was internally divided, treaty change 
was a question of mere formality to Kohl and that therefore these internal divisions would 
inhibit Kohl from going down the path of treaty change. 
The plan for a German-French multilateral negotiation effort fell apart in two stages. 
Firstly, in the afternoon on 26 June 1985 the German press spokesman mentioned off the 
record that a German-French draft treaty for a “European Union” existed.694 The following 
day, on 27 June 1985, Kohl suddenly revealed the existence of the German-French draft treaty 
in the Bundestag.695 The exposure of the secret German-French talks baffled and angered 
 
692TNA FCO30/6203, Folio no. 42, Telegram no. 640, J. Bullard to FCO, “European Council: FRG position,” 25 
June 1985. This meeting would be re-examined when Bullard asked Teltschik later why he did not tell him about 
the German-French talks, which is recounted towards the end of this chapter. 
693 Ibid. 
694 TNA FCO30/6199, Memorandum by A. Leslie, “Milan: What happened?,” 11 July 1985. 
695 Ibid.; TNA PREM19/1491, telegram no. 667, J. Bullard to FCO, “My telno 662, Milan Summit: Franco-
German draft treaty,” 27 June 1985; Helmut Kohl in Deutscher Bundestag, “Plenarprotokoll,” 10/149, 27 June 
1985, accessed 18 January 2019, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/10/10149.pdf, 11097. 
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Kohl’s French partners.696 How did this come about? Attali said in his published diary that on 
22 June “Teltschik was panicking” because Helmut Kohl had told Bettino Craxi that he would 
table a “treaty on European Union” in Milan, even without agreement from Italy or France.697 
When Attali met Teltschik and Ruggiero, on 26 June 1985, there was still no clarity whether 
or not Italy was going to present the proposals, in which case Teltschik proposed to present 
the draft treaty the following day together with France. The French president agreed with this 
idea. Then on the next day, even before hearing from the Italians, Kohl announced the 
existence of the German-French draft agreement to the Bundestag.698 The Italians were 
“furious” and the French president “took the news very badly of this muddled announcement 
that risked compromising everything”.699 With one stroke, the German attempt of a German-
French-Italian diplomatic initiative turned into a unilateral statement of intent in the German 
Bundestag. Germany’s quest to “enrich” the British PoCo paper multilaterally had failed. 
There is an element of domestic politics in this story. Before the diplomatic talks 
with France were fully finalised, Kohl used the existence of his initiative on a “European 
Union” to raise his profile on European issues in domestic politics. In the German Bundestag, 
the exposure of the secret talks between Germany and France happened amid a heated debate 
on Europe. Hans-Jochen Vogel, the leader of the opposition, egged on by loud cheering from 
all parties, accused Kohl of not following through on his own pro-European commitments and 
thereby neglecting the German-French relations.700 Vogel argued that by not doing enough for 
European integration, Kohl was harming the German national interest.701 Kohl, when thus 
pressured, countered that he was working hard for European integration and disclosed that he 
was going to present a “Treaty of European Union” as well as convene an IGC that would 
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697 “Teltschik en est paniqué” (my translation) Attali, Verbatim, tome 1, 826–27. 
698 Ibid. 
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Ibid., 828. 
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make changes to the EEC treaty at the upcoming Milan European Council.702 Therefore, it 
seems that Kohl disclosed the existence of the his diplomatic talks with France, the UK, Italy 
and the Benelux countries essentially for reasons of domestic politics. Kohl’s revelation in the 
Bundestag let diplomats set in motion the wheels to smooth over any relations that could have 
been ruptured. On 27 June the German ambassador to the UK received a telegram asking him 
to go “without delay” to the Foreign Secretary and let him know of the German-French 
proposal.703 A copy went to all other European capitals, except the German embassy in 
Denmark, which by that time was already closed.704 
Until a day before the European Council, the preparations for the British delegation 
to Milan were still progressing along the lines of the high-level intervention with which 
Thatcher wanted to present her PoCo proposals.705 Howe, having argued in April that a PoCo 
paper would make a “considerable impression” on the German Chancellor, now told Thatcher 
that Kohl was “indicating” that he could accept the British paper, as opposed to “his idea of a 
separate treaty on European Union” – but on the condition that it would be a treaty.706 
Therefore, Howe had come round to believing that any agreement that would come out of the 
Milan European Council had to be given the status of a treaty. However, this letter shows that 
Howe believed his fundamental approach of a high-level initiative to be sound. Two days 
after sending this letter, events overtook Howe’s assessment. On the day before the European 
Council and on the day when Kohl revealed his “treaty of European Union” to the German 
Bundestag, Charles Powell received a telephone call from Horst Teltschik to inform him of 
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703 "unverzüglich" (my translation) PAAA, B21, Bd. 134808, H.-D. Genscher and R. Dumas to German 
Embassy London, “Deutsch-Französischer Entwurf für einen Vertrag über die Europäische Union," 27 June 
1985; TNA FCO98/2361, R. von Wechmar to G. Howe, 27 June 1985; folio no. 173, "Drahterlass des 
Ministerialdirektors Edler von Braunmühl," 27 June 1985 16:45 in Pautsch et al., Akten Zur Auswärtigen Politik 
Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1985, 2016, 1: 911–16. 
704 Handwritten note in PAAA, B21, Bd. 134808, H.-D. Genscher and R. Dumas to German Embassy London, 
draft telegram, “Deutsch-Französischer Entwurf für einen Vertrag über die Europäische Union," 27 June 1985. 
705 TNA PREM19/1491, C. Powell to D. Williamson, “European Council: Milan,” 26 June 1985; FCO30/6306, 
folio no. 26, S. Wall to D. Williamson, “Milan European Council: Steering Brief,” 13 June 1985; folio no. 35, R. 
Renwick to C. Budd, “Milan European Council,” 21 June 185.  
706 TNA PREM19/1491, G. Howe to M. Thatcher, “Milan European Council: Development of the European 
Community,” 25 June 1985 
 157 
the existence of a German-French proposal that was essentially based on the PoCo paper 
which Thatcher had given to Kohl. Powell was furious and in his own words said the 
following to Teltschik: 
“The Prime Minister had taken the Chancellor in her confidence … Now we 
were suddenly informed, less than 24 hours before the beginning of the 
European Council, that the Germans and the French had agreed a text which we 
had not even seen or been consulted about. It seems to me that we were being 
very shabbily treated. I thought that the Prime Minister would justifiably 
feel that the Chancellor had failed to reciprocate the confidence which she 
had placed in him. […] I said I was not talking about the substance of the 
German proposals, indeed could not do so since we had not yet seen them. For 
all I knew they might in large part be acceptable to us. My strong feelings 
were based on the procedure which had been followed of producing a text 
behind our backs and agreeing it with the French without making any 
attempt to consult us. Speaking personally, I thought it a black day for our 
co-operation”.707 
 
The distinction between form and substance is significant in this quote. Powell was 
angry about the way in which diplomacy had been conducted and not about what France and 
Germany had talked about. In a nutshell, Powell felt that Thatcher had been left out. This was 
the moment when Thatcher’s aim to lead the EC into the codification of PoCo was overtaken 
by a German-French bilateral effort. Franco-German leadership of the EC was reasserting 
itself. The substantive changes to the British PoCo paper were actually fairly minor. When 
David Williamson, the head of the European secretariat at the Cabinet Office, saw the content 
of the German-French paper he noted that it was largely based on the British paper.708 More 
importantly, it did not include much that was new, except the title “European Union”. 
Williamson could not detect any additional competences being transferred, except the 
European Council possibly being called the “Council of the European Union”, and that it 
would be given a secretariat.709 He dismissed the reference to the Dooge Committee as “a 
nod” towards what the committee was advocating.710 Only hours before the Milan European 
 
707 Emphasis added. TNA PREM19/1491, C. Powell to C. Budd, 27 June 1985.  
708 TNA PREM19/1491, D. Williamson to C. Powell, “French Memorandum for the European Council, 28-9 
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Council, the British PoCo paper was in this way overtaken by a German-French initiative, an 
act that Julian Bullard described as having “thrown an apple of discord into the Milan 
meeting”.711 The term is symbolically important because in Greek mythology it described a 
small act, which by creating a fight of vanity, sparked the Trojan War.712 The war never came 
but the Milan summit turned into a watershed that forced a chaotic meeting between heads of 
government into holding an IGC that would pave the way for the SEA. 
Kohl’s unexpected disclosure of the secret German-French talks caused 
consternation in France and fury in the UK, which set the scene for the European Council in 
Milan on 28-9 June 1985. By tracing in this section how the German-French paper came 
about, it is possible to show that Kohl did not initially intend to deceive Thatcher. He merely 
had different goals and wanted to work with the UK, France, Italy to implement them. This 
process proved so cumbersome that he simply ran out of time. The process also shows that in 
a sense the UK had a workable policy. However, the British strategy of a personal high-level 
intervention by Thatcher was not carried out consistently. The PoCo initiative was neither a 
surprise document that Thatcher could pull out of her handbag, nor was it a truly multilateral 
initiative that could count on the support of other heads of government. Therefore, whenever 
the UK government presented the PoCo paper (to Kohl, Dumas, the foreign ministers at 
Stresa and at the European Council in Milan), the process of garnering support was severely 
hampered by the condition of inalterability that the UK government had imposed. Had 
Thatcher presented the same ideas but been willing to give them the status of a treaty, and 
allowed diplomatic consultations, she might have gone further in convincing her partners to 
accept her PoCo paper. However, she would have had to explain in the House of Commons 
why a new treaty was necessary. Moreover, the “ingenuity” of the British proposals, as 
Anthony Acland described them, of garnering the power of the EC in multilateral 
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organisations but to do so without restricting any room for manoeuvre of national 
governments, may in part have been lost.  
In summary, the German-French paper was a counterproposal to Thatcher’s PoCo 
proposal that took on board its content but was meant as a formal treaty. This meant that the 
German-French paper criticised the intergovernmental focus of Thatcher’s proposals and 
suggested with the title of a “Treaty of European Union” a political dimension that aimed to 
strengthen the institutions of the EC. The substantive part of the paper had been taken from 
the draft which Thatcher had prepared. Germany had found the focus of the British PoCo 
paper too narrow and wanted to rework the proposals. Their approach to writing such a paper 
was radically different from Thatcher’s in that they consulted intensively, but secretly, with 
the Italian and French governments. The German government afterwards said that they had 
intended to consult with the UK, but this never happened. An analysis of these meetings 
shows that Teltschik and the German delegation argued consistently for a new treaty on EPC 
to advance their aim of a “European Union”. Attali initially opposed changing the EEC treaty, 
because the French government was more focused on creating the technology research agency 
EUREKA, but came to support the German idea of an EPC paper as the talks progressed. The 
result was a secret draft treaty that was supposed to be presented at the European Council in 
Milan by the Italian presidency. The German tactic failed because Attali and Teltschik ran out 
of time. Eventually, when Kohl was confronted by the opposition leader in the Bundestag 
over his European credentials, he revealed that he had indeed been working on a new “Treaty 
of European Union”. Therefore, Kohl revealed the existence of these talks because of 
domestic politics. This announcement threw all preparations for the Milan European Council 
into disarray. The consequence was an end to Kohl’s effort to present this paper as a 
multilateral initiative. Instead, he had to present it as a German-French paper. The next part of 
this chapter looks at how Margaret Thatcher fared at the Milan European Council and how the 
Italian presidency turned a summit that was broadly against an IGC to change the EEC treaty, 
into one that by a majority of seven to three endorsed holding exactly such a conference. 
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3. 4. Unfolding of the Milan European Council: “isolating the UK” 
The European Council meeting in Milan, on 28-9 June 1985, was an important 
turning point in the history of the SEA. For the British government it was a watershed in the 
sense that their attempts to table new initiatives ceased and the UK government began to 
engage in the IGC, without yet committing fully to the outcome of the conference. Therefore, 
the approach of the UK government changed from proactively proposing new policies to 
reactively examining them and preparing a response. A defining feature in the chapters above 
was that the UK government formulated a plan to lead the EC into the codification of PoCo 
and how to make the Single Market work more effectively. After Milan, the UK government 
was content to follow the discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on the basis 
of proposals that other countries put forward. To analyse this shift in policy making on the 
part of the UK government, this section examines the unfolding of the Milan European 
Council. This summit was important because Thatcher was outvoted on the question of 
holding an IGC. The European Council voting on a decision came as a surprise to most 
participants because decisions were usually made by consensus. The Italian government 
tabled this vote because they were convinced that reforming the EC needed treaty change and 
on the second day of the European Council, they found that it was in their power to table a 
vote on the issue. Thatcher, who had until then firmly ruled out treaty change, faced the 
question whether she wanted to disrupt the entire European Council by not accepting the 
result of the vote, or concede to holding an IGC. Whilst the FCO had at least entertained the 
notion that an IGC might have to be agreed to, for Thatcher this represented a major policy 
concession.  
A meeting of the European Council in the 1980s lasted normally two days.713 It was 
organised by the country which at the time held the rotating European Council presidency for 
 
713 On the founding of the European Council see Mourlon-Druol, ‘Filling the EEC Leadership Vacuum?’; 
Mourlon-Druol, ‘“Managing from the Top”’; Mourlon-Druol, ‘The Victory of the Intergovernmental Method? 
The Emergence of the European Council in the Community’s Institutional Set-up (1974-77)’. 
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six months. The European Commission president participated at the level of heads of 
government. The circle of those who were present was usually highly restricted.714 A 
president or Prime Minister was often only joined by one or two officials – usually the foreign 
or finance minister – and exceptionally a few other officials who got red badges to enter for a 
short period of time.715 The heads of government’s level of preparedness and their ability to 
broker compromises was therefore of crucial importance.716 There were typically three levels 
on which negotiations took place. One was between the heads of government at formal 
sessions or when they had working breakfasts, lunches or dinners. Usually, the foreign 
ministers also held sessions in the Foreign Affairs Council that dealt with the same or related 
issues. Finally, in the corridors and rooms of the delegations, informal bilateral or multilateral 
brokering could take place, the results of which were then fed back into the plenary 
negotiations. These side negotiations were important to break deadlocks or reach compromise 
agreements. These conversations would probably be some of the most interesting ones to 
listen to, but rarely have they been recorded in much detail. They mostly feature in memoirs 
and are therefore based on one individual’s recollection.717 
There was no formal mechanism for keeping minutes because each meeting had been 
intended as an intimate high-level summit.718 Officially, the conclusions were prepared 
beforehand by the government holding the rotating European Council presidency.719 In 
practice, they were usually written in advance by the Secretariat of the European Council, 
particularly its influential Secretary General, Niels Ersbøll.720 Other notes that would point to 
 
714 Stephen Wall compares it to a boxing match, where officials could hold a proverbial towel and cheer, but the 
leaders had to “slug it out”. Wall, A Stranger in Europe, 56. 
715 Ibid. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, 305. 
716 Wall, A Stranger in Europe, 55–56. 
717 For example, Jacques Attali, a close advisor to François Mitterrand, claimed that Thatcher was “on the verge 
of tears” when a compromise on the BBQ was brokered in one such meeting (“au bord des larmes” (my 
translation) Attali, Verbatim, tome 1, 660). Whether or not there had really been any tears and whether they were 
of rage or sadness, is of course very difficult for the historian to verify. 
718 Wall, A Stranger in Europe, 55–56. 
719 The conclusions of the European Council were summarised in the Bulletin of the European Communities. 
After most European Council meetings, the heads of government held a series of press conferences and 
interviews. 
720 Thank you to N. Piers Ludlow for pointing this out to me. 
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a process of how compromises were reached and disagreements settled mostly exist only 
insofar as they were retold afterwards or written up informally by a head of government or 
foreign minister. For the Milan European Council, a British “informal record” survived. It 
was informal because it was based on a number of handwritten notes, mainly taken by 
Geoffrey Howe.721 The cover note from UKRep to Stephen Wall, the head of the European 
Community Department (internal) in the FCO, argued that “most of our record – and about 
half of that of other governments – will be based on [Howe’s] comments”.722 Wall argued that 
because Geoffrey Howe was a lawyer he was very good at taking detailed notes, while at the 
same time also taking part in the discussions.723  
Bettino Craxi, the Italian Prime Minister, chaired the European Council because he 
was the head of government of the country that held the rotating presidency. 724 When he 
opened the summit, Craxi said that holding an IGC was an “option” which however could 
also take place within the European Council itself.725 This view of taking decisions directly at 
the European Council and not calling a formal IGC was close to what Margaret Thatcher was 
advocating.726 Thatcher argued that the decisions to extend the Single Market and formalise 
PoCo should be taken here and now at the Milan conference, and not be referred to an IGC.727 
Mitterrand and the Prime Ministers of Greece and Denmark said they agreed with Thatcher.728 
Kohl left the question about an IGC open, saying that provided a “mandate” for such a 
conference was clear, he was prepared to hold one.729 The Prime Ministers of Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg echoed this sentiment.730 Mitterrand kept his options open by 
 
721 TNA FCO30/6307, folio no. 80, P. Goulden to S. Wall, “European Council: Milan: 28-29 June 1985,” 
appendix “European Council: Milan: 28-29 June 1985,” n.d.; “Informal Record of Milan European Council, 
28/29 June,” 5 July 1985, https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/204623. 
722 TNA FCO30/6307, folio no. 80, P. Goulden to S. Wall, “European Council: Milan: 28/29 June,” 5 July 1985. 
723 Wall, A Stranger in Europe, 56. 
724 “Informal Record of Milan European Council, 28/29 June,” 5 July 1985, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/204623. 
725 Ibid., 2. 
726 Ibid., 6-8. 
727 Ibid.; PREM19/1491, “European Council: Milan, Development of the Community, Opening Statement,” n.d. 
728 “Informal Record of Milan European Council, 28/29 June,” 5 July 1985, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/204623, 4, 6–9. 
729 Kohl said that for such a mandate, a “timetable and a checklist” were required. Ibid., 3. 
730 Ibid., 2-5, 8-9. 
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arguing that the EEC treaty should be fully applied first but also said that the European 
Council was the framework to decide on new issues. However, Mitterrand said if an IGC was 
called by the presidency it should be “a success”.731 Only Jacques Delors, the president of the 
European Commission, was unequivocally in favour of an IGC.732  
The level of support for proceeding without an IGC was further underlined in a 
bilateral conversation on the sidelines between Geoffrey Howe and Helmut Kohl.733 They 
both agreed that a decision on PoCo, possibly based on all existing drafts, should be taken in 
Milan and a list of issues should be defined, focusing on how decision making in the EC 
could be improved and which could be implemented without treaty change.734 The 
disagreement between Kohl and Mitterrand was further underlined when the French press 
office ran rumours saying that their president was not supporting the German-French 
proposal, which annoyed Kohl greatly.735 The account of the first day showed that when the 
European Council opened, not only the UK’s but also Denmark, Greece and to some extent 
France expressed themselves against holding an IGC. Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg said they only supported holding an IGC if there was a reasonable chance of it 
concluding with an agreement. 
After dinner, the foreign ministers met to hammer out a potential compromise on the 
thorny issue of whether or not to hold an IGC. Howe described it as “one of the worst 
[Foreign Affairs] Councils he had attended”.736 The secretary of the European Council, Niels 
Ersbøll, and the Italian foreign minister, Giulio Andreotti, were rooting around for ideas how 
they could “force an agreement” on holding an IGC, for instance by delaying progress on the 
 
731 Ibid., 9-10. 
732 Ibid., 4-5, 10-11. 
733 TNA PREM19/1492, C. Powell, “note for the record,” 28 June 1985, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/204714. 
734 Ibid. 
735 Folio no. 175 “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Staatspräsident Mitterrand in Mailand," 29 June 1985 
in Pautsch et al., Akten Zur Auswärtigen Politik Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1985, 2016, 1: 924 ff. 
736 “Informal Record of Milan European Council, 28/29 June,” 5 July 1985, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/204623, 17. 
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Single Market.737 In retrospect, Robin Renwick believed that the German foreign minister, 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher “gave Andreotti a new lease of life and reinforced his determination 
and ability to work not for agreement, but clear disagreement between those who favoured a 
conference and (unspecified) treaty amendment, and those who did not”.738 In essence, 
Renwick believed that Italy wanted to convene an IGC and Germany supported them from the 
first day of the Milan European Council.  
When the foreign ministers met again the following morning, they had before them a 
text that proposed convening an IGC through article 236 of the EEC treaty.739 Giulio 
Andreotti suggested that an IGC to discuss modifying the EEC treaty could be held if a 
majority agreed.740 Kohl took this as a cue to promote his government’s paper by arguing that 
Milan was “the moment of truth” and that an IGC with a “clear mandate” should be 
arranged.741 The idea for an IGC received support from Martens, Lubbers, Santer and 
Mitterrand – all arguing for an IGC and suggesting that the German-French paper could serve 
as the “clear guidelines” that were needed to convene an IGC.742 By receiving these four 
immediate endorsements, Kohl not only strengthened the case for an IGC but also his own 
position. The German-French paper was by that time the most widely accepted basis on which 
to call an IGC to negotiate changes to the EEC treaty. However, this was not a universally 
accepted idea. By lunchtime the general mood had become “very strained”.743 Thatcher had a 
“furious row” with Kohl over who was more interested in advancing the case of the European 
 
737 Ibid. 
738 TNA FCO30/6307, folio no. 77, R. Renwick to J. Bullard, “Milan,” 5 July 1985. 
739 According to article 236 of the EEC treaty, “the government of any Member State or the Commission may 
submit to the Council proposals for the revision of this Treaty. If the Council, after consulting the Assembly and, 
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Council for the purpose of determining in common agreement the amendments to be made to this Treaty.” See 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC treaty), accessed 22 December 2015, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Axy0023. 
740 “Informal Record of Milan European Council, 28/29 June,” 5 July 1985, 
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Community.744 He reproached her for not being interested in the question at all and she hit 
back by saying that Germany had not applied all the treaties and reminded him that his 
government had just recently invoked the Luxembourg Compromise over farm prices.745 
After lunch, Craxi said that the German text would form the basis for “a conference”, either of 
the European Council or foreign ministers. Thatcher argued that the process of invoking 
article 236 had not been followed because the views of the European Parliament were also 
required. Craxi responded by saying that their opinions were “well known” but suggested that 
if there was a procedural requirement for consultations then the Foreign Affairs Council could 
convene the IGC at a later date.746 At this point Delors stated that he believed it was within 
the rights of Craxi to convene an IGC by majority vote because he was holding the presidency 
of the European Council.747 Craxi then went further to suggest that Political Cooperation 
could even be included in an IGC as well. This statement elicited a vigorous response from 
Thatcher in defence of unanimous decision making.748  
After this exchange, Craxi proceeded to call a vote in the first time of the history of 
the European Council which resulted in seven votes for an IGC, with the UK, Denmark and 
Greece voting against such a conference.749 The vote for an IGC under article 236 did not, 
however, establish the IGC as a fact straight away. Michael Butler, the British permanent 
representative to the EC, and Roland Dumas, the French foreign minister, were still working 
on a consensus agreement.750 When the Prime Minister and her advisors reconvened it was 
agreed that a further push for finding policies to be agreed here and now should be made.751 In 
effect, this was a last-ditch attempt to prevent an IGC. This proposal was written up but got 
delayed in the process of being translated into French and German.752 The initial English 
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version received positive feedback from Belgium.753 However, an hour earlier the presidency 
had tabled their own draft that called for holding an IGC, which would deal with amendments 
to the EEC treaty and PoCo. Thatcher did present her proposal for reaching an 
intergovernmental agreement here in Milan without convening an IGC. However, by that time 
the proposal to hold an IGC was overwhelmingly supported by the other heads of government 
and the discussion turned to what should be included in such a conference.754  
The British records of the Milan European Council quoted the recollections of Niels 
Ersbøll, the Secretary General of the European Council. His role was to provide 
administrative support and to facilitate the organisation of the summit. His views should 
therefore be seen as a neutral assessment of what happened: 
“Ersbøll commented that in retrospect, the vote on an IGC had been the 
turning point. This had given the Italian presidency the only institutional 
decision which they wanted to get out of Milan. Andreotti had realised quite 
late in the day (certainly no earlier than the evening of 28 June) that Article 
236 provided a means of isolating the UK, Denmark and Greece. The 
Benelux had been happy to collaborate because of their anger at the success 
of the British press campaign in which they were labelled as hopeless idealists. 
The French and Germans had remained fatally ambivalent, actively 
discussing a package of decisions while at the same time concerned to 
ensure that they were not sold as a British triumph.”755 
 
It is striking to see how Ersbøll pinpointed Italian activism as the most important 
factor that resulted in the vote to hold IGC. It is also interesting to see that he believed it was 
important to the French and the Germans that the outcome of the Milan European Council 
should not be seen as British victory. In the same way as Italian lobbying for an IGC was 
important, and their discovery sometime late at night on 28 June 1985 that they could force 
the issue under article 236 of the EEC treaty, so too was French and German apparent 
indecisiveness.756 When by holding a vote, Kohl and Mitterrand were asked whether they 
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supported European integration through an IGC or not, they nevertheless had to stand by their 
words of intending to advance the cause of a “European Union”. After all, that was the most 
significant difference between the paper which Thatcher had wanted to present, and the 
version Germany and France had brought forward. Moreover, the decision to agree to an IGC 
was aided by the fact that such a conference could be sold to the wider public as a success and 
would provide a forum to further develop the policies that each country wanted to pursue. 
The one agreement that somehow got drowned out by the entire uproar over an IGC 
and how to implement PoCo was that the European Council endorsed the White Paper on the 
European Market, which Lord Arthur Cockfield had presented on 15 June.757 This White 
Paper drew up a list of 298 non-tariff barriers (NTB) for which the European Commission 
suggested a time table of how and when they should be reduced.758 To reduce physical 
barriers to trade, the White Paper suggested abolishing border checks on individuals, getting 
rid of lorry quotas, sharing statistical data of border crossings, harmonising plant and animal 
health standards and a common management of import quotas from outside the EC.759 The 
paper argued that technical barriers to trade should be abolished in line with the principle that 
“if a product is lawfully manufactured and marketed in one member state, there is no reason 
why it should not be sold freely throughout the Community”.760 Finally, the White Paper 
argued that “harmonization of indirect taxation has always been regarded as an essential and 
integral part of achieving a true Common Market”.761 The reasoning behind this argument 
was that since border posts in trade were mainly there to collect VAT and excise duties, then 
abolishing such checks also meant that indirect taxes had to be harmonised.762 The contents of 
this White Paper were agreed upon at the Milan European Council without much controversy. 
The White Paper and its lead author, Lord Arthur Cockfield, would come to prominence in 
 
757 One day earlier the Benelux countries, France and Germany had signed the Schengen agreement that aimed to 
abolish border checks.  
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the second half of the 1980s, when the measures suggested in the paper were implemented 
under the Single Market Programme of the European Commission, with 1992 as the symbolic 
date when the Single Market would finally truly come into existence.763 
In the press conference after the Milan European Council, Thatcher said that “I have 
taken the view that if we, as Heads of Government cannot decide, why should another 
conference, which consists of people far less than Heads of Government elsewhere, how 
should they be able to decide? Nevertheless, the other view prevailed and we must go to that 
Intergovernmental Conference”.764 Thatcher’s own notes for the press conference called 
holding an IGC a “distraction”.765 Her notes argue that at Milan “we have made some 
progress,  though we unhappily got bogged down in what I think was an irrelevance and 
perhaps a recipe for Community paralysis”. Thatcher argued that it was wrong for the Milan 
European Council to focus on “questions of procedure” about whether or not to hold an IGC. 
She believed it would have been far better to focus on specific points of policy. However, 
Thatcher lauded the progress made with the Single Market and on technological cooperation. 
Her briefing asked whether this summit made Europe “a more credible political economic 
force in the world?”. Thatcher crossed this text out and commented in her handwriting that an 
IGC was “sadly the only decision taken”.766 Before taking questions she departed entirely 
from her brief and argued: 
“We British have occasion to be very, very European. We have been part 
of Europe over the centuries. We believe that Europe could play a far larger, 
more significant, more influential part in the affairs of the world than she is 
playing now. It was our objective to achieve that. It has been put off to 
another conference. We wanted to achieve it now, but we shall steadily 
continue with our objectives: to make Europe more influential, to make 
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Europe more prosperous, to make Europe more important technologically, 
to make Europe have a higher standard of living and create more jobs”.767 
 
This quote shows that she could agree to the substance of what was debated in Milan 
but not the legal form in which it would be implemented. The fact that Thatcher crossed out 
the words arguing the Milan European Council made the EC a “credible political economic 
force in the world” can be seen as symbolic of the failure of her efforts to lead the EC into a 
formalisation of PoCo. Her ambitions for PoCo were overtaken by the decision to hold an 
IGC. Thatcher did not immediately refuse to a participate in the IGC but merely said she 
believed it was not necessary. Robin Renwick remembered how during an informal meeting 
before the press conference, he “urged her not tell the journalists that we would not agree to 
any treaty change”.768 He argued “it was just possible that we could negotiate changes that 
would be acceptable to us”.769 After the Milan summit, Geoffrey Howe told Thatcher that the 
position of UK was “fully protected” by a provision in the EEC treaty stipulating that any 
amendment had to be agreed on unanimously.770  
The outcome of the Milan European Council prompted a fair amount of soul 
searching in the FCO about how the British PoCo paper could be overtaken by the German-
French initiative for a “Treaty of European Union” and why an IGC was convened. Michael 
Butler believed that the IGC was a “pyrrhic victory” for Italy.771 Robin Renwick argued that 
the “Italians went bald-headed for a vote [on an IGC], with no time for a proper reflection”.772 
Robin Renwick wrote in his account of his time in the FCO that he believed the decision to 
call a vote was an “ambush”.773 Lord Bridges, the British ambassador to Italy, reported 
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directly after the summit that the “the Italians are unrepentant, indeed gung-ho about the 
result of the Milan European Council”.774 Renato Ruggiero had told him that the UK 
government had been “over-confident” in the run-up to Milan and mistakenly “tended to push 
aside as empty words phrases in earlier declarations committing member states to European 
Union, words which had a real meaning for some members”.775 In addition, Ruggiero had said 
that the British Budget Question had left unresolved issues.776 The British ambassador to 
France, John Fretwell, believed that Mitterrand had faced a “dilemma” between either having 
to accept “a practical set of ideas, which were capable of producing results but which had the 
disadvantage of being labelled British” or an IGC to change the EEC treaty, which the Italian 
and German governments wanted.777 Mitterrand chose the latter, which for him had the 
advantage of partnering with Kohl and to show that France and Germany were still the “motor 
of Europe”.778  
Julian Bullard invited Horst Teltschik to the ambassador’s residence and “put him in 
the chair where he had sat at breakfast on Tuesday 25 June” – where he was sitting when the 
two had identified a large amount of agreement between both countries’ positions and Bullard 
had been under the impression that “all that lies between us are the words treaty and union”779 
– and asked him to explain the German actions in the run-up to the Milan European 
Council.780 Horst Teltschik argued that Germany had wanted to discuss the PoCo draft, which 
Thatcher had given to Kohl at Chequers, with the UK, France, Italy and the Benelux countries 
and had intended to distribute a revised version afterwards. However, Teltschik claimed that 
the UK had refused to enter into talks and France had imposed a condition of secrecy on the 
talks that were going on bilaterally between Paris and Bonn. Moreover, Teltschik told Bullard 
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that until the morning on 25 June 1985, it had still not been clear whether the talks with the 
French government were going to yield any results.781 Teltschik’s account showed that even 
though he blamed France for a lack of transparency, the German government were willing to 
put their consultations with France ahead of those with the UK. 
The picture that emerged of the preparations for the Milan European Council, was 
one of failed attempts at multilateral diplomacy – especially on the part of the UK and 
Germany. When the German negotiators finally had French support, they then wanted to get 
Italy to present the treaty, without mentioning German or French authorship. However, Italy 
refused to do so on 26 June 1985. Teltschik said that by then they had run out of time and the 
UK was informed a little bit ahead of the other countries, because the German paper was 
largely based on the original British version.782 Bullard concluded from his talk with Horst 
Teltschik that the paper “was not intended as a last-minute surprise” but had become one 
because too much time was lost attempting to involve the Italian and French governments.783 
Bullard’s own account of the events showed that he believed Teltschik, when he said that 
Germany had wanted to consult with the UK but had simply run out of time. Yet despite all 
the talk of last-minute surprises, the simple fact that the Thatcher did not attempt to make the 
same charm offensive to Mitterrand as she did to Kohl goes some way to explain why the 
Franco-German talks came as such a surprise to her. They should not have. As chapter two 
has explained, Thatcher’s meeting with Kohl showed that they both saw European integration 
in a very different way. Therefore, the focus on Kohl and the seeming inability of Mitterrand 
and Thatcher to work together on the subject of European integration contributed to the 
failure of the British PoCo initiative. Seen from this angle, Thatcher’s PoCo paper was not a 
true effort at trilateral leadership but rather an attempt at breaking into the Franco-German 
relationship, which if it was intended as such failed singularly. 
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In conclusion, this chapter analysed how the UK government planned to lead the EC 
into the codification of PoCo by presenting a paper that proposed formalising this hitherto 
informal practice. Thatcher accepted to present this paper herself and it was seen by officials 
but was not supposed to be discussed by them until she had presented it herself to the 
European Council. I have argued that presenting the paper as a high-level intervention, 
without the involvement of officials, robbed the FCO of the chance to broker compromises 
and by doing so made building alliances that would secure a commitment to these proposals 
impossible. After receiving the British PoCo paper, the German government began to secretly 
work on their own paper in consultation with France. The resulting German-French paper was 
based on the British proposals but went beyond them in expressing an institutional ambition 
with the title “Treaty of European Union” as well as by wanting to give the EC institutions 
more powers. Moreover, whereas the British paper was proposed as an intergovernmental 
agreement, the German-French proposals were supposed to be given the status of a formal 
treaty. These two conflicting papers were important because tabling such a paper was a way 
of displaying leadership in the European Council. The ownership of ideas, or “paternity” as 
the Germans called it, was significant because it lent credibility and was a powerful tool in 
shaping the negotiation agenda.  
The primary sources in the different archives consulted for this research show that 
when the Germans initiated talks on presenting their own paper to the Milan European 
Council, they found the French a very difficult partner, because neither commitment nor 
precise policy proposals were forthcoming. At the same time, these consultations showed that 
there was a measure of trust between the governments of Germany and France that facilitated 
these secret meetings, which was lacking between Britain and either country – partly because 
of the British budget dispute, differing political views or personality clashes between the 
different leaders. Eventually, the German government simply ran out of time in their attempt 
to turn the British paper into a multilateral “Treaty of European Union”. The plan to let the 
Italian presidency table the paper failed, and Germany was left holding the baby. Kohl 
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unexpectedly revealed the existence of the paper to the Bundestag, which had been until then 
a secret. A flurry of diplomatic activity followed to smooth things over with the other EC 
countries. The fact that there was no time for consultations with the UK government and since 
Italy refused to present the proposals turned the PoCo paper from a multilateral initiative into 
a German-French draft paper. During the Milan European Council, the clash of the two papers 
came to a head. On the first day a majority of heads of government supported finding an 
agreement without the need for treaty change. Italian activism, with Italy in the role as chair, 
played a role in making sure an IGC was not abandoned, despite initial lack of support. The 
Italian government tabled a vote on holding an IGC, which presented all heads of government 
with a choice: would they follow through on their statements that they wanted more European 
integration and commit to an IGC to negotiate changes to the EEC treaty? When presented 
with such a choice, seven heads of government voted in favour of holding an IGC – but the 
UK, Greece and Denmark voted against such a conference. On 29 June 1985, for the first time 
in the history of the EC, the European Council agreed by majority vote that an IGC would be 
convened to change the EEC treaty.  
The moment when an IGC was agreed was a significant milestone on the path to the 
Single European Act. For the UK, the Milan European Council was the moment when 
Thatcher’s ambition to lead the EC into the codification of PoCo was overtaken by a German-
French proposal. Thatcher had accepted to present the PoCo paper as her own initiative to the 
European Council. The reason why the British PoCo paper – and with it Thatcher’s ambition 
to lead the EC into the codification of PoCo – could be overtaken by a German-French paper 
lay partly in the strategy that the UK government pursued in presenting the PoCo paper and 
partly in the role that the German-French relationship played in the European Community. 
Germany and France did not consult the UK because the British government had shared the 
PoCo paper on the condition of secrecy and had expressly forbidden diplomatic consultations. 
Thatcher, Howe and the officials in the UK government were taken aback by the suddenness 
with which Germany revealed the counterproposals to the British PoCo paper. It was the form 
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in which the German-French paper was presented, not its substance – with which they 
happened largely to agree – which irked British officials most. However, the way that the 
German-French paper was made public happened by accident and not by design. Germany 
had wanted to make this a multilateral initiative but when Kohl came under political pressure, 
because of domestic politics, he unilaterally revealed the existence of the proposal for a 
“Treaty of European Union”. The consultations with the UK thereby ended up as collateral 
damage. Subsequently, Germany tried hard to mend the broken diplomatic fences and restore 
the good bilateral relationship between both countries.  
The Milan European Council caused an important shift in the UK’s policy making 
towards the EC. To lead the EC into the formalisation of PoCo but at the same time refuse an 
IGC and to change the EEC treaty, was no longer an option. The strategy to propose the 
formalisation of PoCo and thereby deflect calls to change the EEC treaty had failed. Even 
though Thatcher’s ambition to lead the EC into a formalisation of PoCo had not succeeded, 
she was committed to keep the UK government as a full negotiation partner in the IGC. 
Therefore, although the strategy that the UK had pursued did not succeed, the actual content 
of the British PoCo paper lived to fight another day. The ambition to lead the EC into the 
codification of PoCo, and the refusal to hold an IGC, were both abandoned in favour of a 
cautious engagement in the IGC. In practice, this meant that the UK government was 
involved in the negotiations of the IGC but without tabling its own proposals, which will be 
the focus of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4. Intergovernmental Conference: “we enter this exercise 
without commitment” 
After Margaret Thatcher was outvoted in the European Council in Milan, on the 
subject of holding an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), it was not clear what she would 
do next. Would the UK government participate in an IGC? Thatcher had been consistent in 
refusing to negotiate a change to the EEC treaty. This chapter argues that Thatcher agreed to 
exploratory negotiations in the IGC but withheld her commitment until the final outcome of 
the talks in the form of the Single European Act (SEA) had become clear. As such, it took 
three months for the IGC to negotiate the clauses of the SEA, lasting from 9 September to 1 
December 1985.784 The IGC took place on a foreign minister level.785 Consequently, Geoffrey 
Howe, not Thatcher, represented the UK government in the IGC. Thatcher’s reluctance to 
commit to the IGC meant for Howe and the FCO officials that they had to negotiate without 
knowing whether Thatcher was eventually going to back their efforts or not. The heads of 
government of the nine EC countries agreed to change the EEC treaty with the SEA at the 
European Council in Luxembourg on 2-3 December 1985. 
This chapter traces chronologically how the British policy towards the IGC evolved. 
Firstly, the UK began negotiating under the formula of engaging without commitment. 
Secondly, the negotiations were informed by consultations with other Whitehall departments 
by the Cabinet Office. Thirdly, as the IGC evolved Howe’s “questioning approach” was 
broadened to involve preventing the possible emergence of a Franco-German understanding 
on the outcome of the IGC. Fourthly, Nigel Lawson departed from Howe’s “questioning 
approach” by arguing much more directly that all discussion of monetary integration should 
be dropped, for which he believed he had Germany’s backing. Fifthly, in the final phase of 
the IGC, all unresolved points were handed over to the heads of government at the European 
 
784 Although a direct comparison cannot be made, the IGC to negotiate the EEC treaty met for the first time on 
26 June 1956 and the treaty was signed almost nine months later on 25 March 1957. 
785  The IGC was modelled after the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), where all the EC foreign ministers met, 
because the delegates were all foreign ministers. TNA FCO98/2382, telegram no. 2741, M. Butler to FCO, 
“Foreign Affairs Council 22 July 1985, follow-up to European Council: Institutions,” 22 July 1985. 
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Council on 2-3 December 1985. Only then did Thatcher commit the UK government to the 
outcome of the IGC. Once the SEA was agreed, it was presented to the media and the House 
of Commons with the emphasis on the part that extended the Single Market. Thatcher argued 
that the extension of the Single Market justified treaty change and majority voting. 
The literature on the relationship between the UK and the EC saw the way in which 
the UK government approached the IGC in the light of the prominence of the Single Market 
and argued that the UK was to a degree successful in advocating for market liberalisation.786 
There is a consensus in the literature that a successful conclusion of the IGC was made 
possible by Thatcher’s decision not to boycott the IGC and because the UK government 
negotiated constructively in the IGC.787 Ludlow argued that this cooperative way to negotiate 
in the IGC should be seen as more important than the clash of opinions on the question of 
holding such a conference in Milan.788 Moravcsik, Parsons and Stephen Wall argued that 
during the IGC the UK government accepted majority voting to implement the Single 
Market.789 Buller, George, Gifford and Moravcsik emphasised that the outcome of the IGC 
was very close to what the UK government had originally intended, largely because it 
extended the Single Market.790 Stephen George even thought that a “Franco-German-British 
axis” was emerging, with the issues of the Single Market, technology and EPC as the key 
drivers.791 However, Buller believed that the new “reactive” approach of the UK government 
 
786 Buller, National Statecraft and European Integration, 103; George, An Awkward Partner, 183–85; Gifford, 
The Making of Eurosceptic Britain, 93–94; Wall, A Stranger in Europe, 48, 66; Young, This Blessed Plot, 334; 
Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 364 ff.; Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act’, 41–44; Young, 
This Blessed Plot, 334. 
787 Buller, National Statecraft and European Integration, 103; George, An Awkward Partner, 183; N. Piers 
Ludlow, ‘La Politique Européenne de Thatcher (1979-1990). L’itinéraire d’un Libéralisatueur Frustré?’, in 
Milieux Économiques et Intégration Européenne Au XXe Siècle : La Relance Des Années Quatre-Vingt, ed. 
Michel Dumoulin, Sylvain Schirmann, and Eric Bussière (Paris: Institut de la gestion publique et du 
développement économique, 2007), http://books.openedition.org/igpde/4728; Moore, Margaret Thatcher, 2015, 
402; Young, This Blessed Plot, 332–34; Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999, 140; Wall, A Stranger 
in Europe, 48, 57, 65–67; Wall, The Official History of Britain and the European Community, Volume III, 308–
32. 
788 Ludlow, ‘La Politique Européenne de Thatcher (1979-1990). L’itinéraire d’un Libéralisatueur Frustré?’, 15. 
789 Parsons, ‘Revisiting the Single European Act (and the Common Wisdom on Globalization)’, 721–22; 
Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act’, 41; Wall, A Stranger in Europe, 51–52, 65–67. 
790 Buller, National Statecraft and European Integration, 103; George, An Awkward Partner, 183–85; Gifford, 
The Making of Eurosceptic Britain, 93–94; Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 319–26, 364–68; Moravcsik, 
‘Negotiating the Single European Act’, 41–44. 
791 George, An Awkward Partner, 183–85. 
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only succeeded because France and Germany did not join forces to advance any alternative 
plans, other than extending the Single Market and formalising EPC.792 
This chapter argues that the existing literature has not sufficiently appreciated the 
importance of the conditionality of Thatcher’s agreement to allow the FCO to negotiate in the 
IGC. Robin Renwick and Stephen Wall, who both were officials in the FCO with 
responsibility for European integration, remember a private meeting in which they were given 
leave for exploratory negotiations but were told by Thatcher to “please bear in mind that 
when you come back, I may disavow you”.793 This tension between not having Prime 
Ministerial guidance on the IGC negotiations presented Geoffrey Howe and the FCO officials 
with challenges for the conference. Howe had to find a way of negotiating an agreement, 
without binding himself fully to the outcome of the conference. Therefore, this chapter argues 
that Thatcher’s conditional commitment was the reason behind Howe’s “questioning 
approach”. In the IGC, the UK government did not table any new proposals but confined their 
efforts to discussing those that were already on the table, or what others brought forward. 
Therefore, the conditionality of the UK government’s commitment explains why Howe 
negotiated in the IGC in such a cautious manner. Howe wanted to keep the UK engaged in the 
IGC, prevent a separate Franco-German agreement and nudge the negotiations in a direction 
that Thatcher could accept.  
A difficult issue for the UK government was the issue of Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). Jacques Delors, the president of the European Commission, was advocating 
writing a commitment to EMU into any revisions of the EEC treaty. Howe wanted to split the 
discussion of EMU from the rest of the topics in the IGC and remit it to the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), where all the finance ministers sat. This approach 
backfired when Lawson took a much more confrontational line in ECOFIN than Howe was 
 
792 Buller, National Statecraft and European Integration, 103–4, 117. 
793 See Appendix one and four. Renwick, A Journey with Margaret Thatcher, 103; Wall, The Official History of 
Britain and the European Community, Volume III, 311. 
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taking in the IGC. Lawson’s outright refusal to include EMU into the amended EEC treaty 
contributed to achieving the opposite outcome of what Howe had intended. Instead of 
relegating the debate about EMU to technical discussions in ECOFIN, the issue was kept 
alive and ended up being discussed by the heads of government in the European Council. 
Essentially, Howe and Lawson agreed with each other that they did not want to see a 
reference to EMU in the revised EEC treaty. It was their difference in negotiating style rather 
than substance, which anyway happened in two separate settings (Howe in the IGC and 
Lawson in ECOFIN), coupled with Delors’ activism that succeeded in keeping the issue on 
the agenda.  
In the Luxembourg European Council, Thatcher was forced to come off the fence on 
the subject of treaty change, which she did when all her conditions were met. Thatcher was 
presented with a choice of either accepting the package that Howe had negotiated or rejecting 
her entire European policy since the resolution of the British Budget Question (BBQ) in June 
1984. Doing so could have meant jeopardising her entire policy programme outlined in 
“Europe – the Future”, the plan to codify Political Cooperation (PoCo), liberalising the Single 
Market and thus making the EC more market-oriented as well as more outward looking. 
When the issue of EMU was discussed by the heads of governments, Kohl eventually said he 
was not against a nominal mention of EMU, which isolated Thatcher. Eventually, a symbolic 
reference in the preamble was also agreed to by Thatcher. Thatcher’s acceptance of the 
outcome of the Luxembourg European Council gives us a window into the aspects of 
European integration that Thatcher agreed with, which is necessary to complement the 
broader picture of how her views towards European integration changed over time. 
4. 1. Negotiating in the IGC: Geoffrey Howe’s “questioning approach” 
The IGC was prepared by a diplomatic working group chaired by Jean Dondelinger 
who was then the foreign minister of Luxembourg. The delegates to the “Dondelinger group” 
were nominated by national governments but were mostly permanent representatives, i.e. 
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ambassadors to the EC of member countries. Dondelinger emphasised that these preparatory 
meetings were different from the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER).794 
The European Commission participated fully in the debates, prepared proposals and 
suggested compromises. The other ministerial councils discussed the IGC only when a 
minister raised a point of interest to their area, such as the Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council (ECOFIN). The European Parliament had no legal basis for being directly involved 
in the negotiations but was briefed regularly. Before 21 October 1985, the ideas put forward 
in the preparatory group of the IGC were very broad, were based on the issues that had been 
discussed in the Dooge Committee and had not yet been worked out in detail. Dondelinger 
had set a deadline of 15 October for the submission of proposals. Emile Noël, the Secretary 
General of the European Commission, proposed that the result of the IGC should be framed 
as a “single act” because it was the first substantial amendment of the EEC treaty and thus 
should re-state the original aims of the treaties in a way that was visible to the wider public. 
The suggestion drew critical comments from the British and French representatives, Michael 
Butler and Luc de La Barre de Nanteuil, who both argued that it was too early to discuss the 
form of the final agreement.795  
The list of topics at the first IGC meeting on 9 September bears a striking 
resemblance to the topics discussed in the Dooge Committee.796 The report of this 
conversation reads a little bit as if every minister had chosen an item that they liked most 
from the Dooge Committee report. Jacques Delors, the president of the European 
Commission, suggested a “single act”, which in his view meant implementing the Single 
Market, collaborating in research and technology, committing to more financial integration 
and providing “cohesion” funds, for poorer member countries. The Irish and the Greek 
representatives supported the call for more resources to be given to economically less 
 
794 TNA FCO98/2382, folio no. 8: telegram no. 2851, P. Goulden to FCO, “Preparatory group for the Inter-
governmental conference, Brussels 2/3 September,” 3 September 1985. 
795 Ibid. 
796 TNA FCO30/6174, folio no. 384, telegram no. 303, T. Bridges to FCO, “Inter-governmental conference, 
Luxembourg 9 September 1985,” 9 September 1985. 
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prosperous countries. The Italian representative argued for giving the EP more power to make 
the EC more democratic, limiting the Luxembourg Compromise, improving the way decisions 
were made in general as well as extending the competences of the community to education, 
culture, health and social security. Catherine Lalumière, the French representative, was more 
cautious and argued that the EP should receive “something extra”. She also agreed with the 
suggestion that the Single Market should be extended, technologies developed, and the 
question of cohesion be examined in the context of the effects of the Single Market. Hans-
Dietrich Genscher, the German delegate, argued that PoCo should include security policies, a 
“European legal area” should be established and cooperation should happen in areas of the 
environment, technology, Single Market, public procurement, culture and education.797  
Since the IGC was a ministerial conference, Geoffrey Howe would be negotiating for 
the UK government. Before the start of the IGC, Robin Renwick, Assistant Under-Secretary 
of State at the FCO (responsible for European integration), suggested to Howe that the he 
should adopt a “questioning attitude” in this conference.798 To some extent this tactic 
originated from reflections of what went wrong in the preparations for the Milan European 
Council.799 Robin Renwick argued that by showing an early copy of the PoCo paper to 
Helmut Kohl at Thatcher’s bilateral meeting with the German Chancellor, on 18 May 1985, 
the UK government had lost “an element of surprise and mobility” at the Milan European 
Council. Renwick recommended that in the IGC Howe should “stand back a bit from the 
debate and wait to see what real areas of agreement” emerged. At the same time, Howe 
should “steer the discussions in directions we could accept”, which would mean a 
“moderation of maximalist ideas”. Renwick was in effect saying that Thatcher’s personal 
 
797 Ibid. 
798 TNA FCO30/6174, folio no. 378, R. Renwick to L. Appleyard, “European Community: Intergovernmental 
conference,” 3 September 1985. 
799 FCO30/6171, folio no. 300, R. Renwick to L. Appleyard, “European Community,” 5 July 1985. 
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high-level initiative in Milan had failed and that a more reactive approach had become 
necessary in the IGC.800 
To some extent, Howe’s policy was shaped by his perception of what Thatcher might 
or might not be able to accept. Howe suggested to Thatcher that he wanted to “wait and see” 
what proposals were being tabled in the IGC and what concessions other countries were 
prepared to make.801 By doing so, Howe wanted to bring other countries to propose feasible 
policies of their own and avoid other governments being able to “shelter behind us” in the 
IGC. Geoffrey Howe’s impression was that the suggestions for treaty amendments were all 
“extremely vague” and he believed that there would be “considerable confusion” until 
specific proposals were on the table. Howe suggested that the UK government should be 
“empirical”, proposals should be judged by whether or not they furthered the objective of the 
Single Market, which was what he called a “questioning approach”. However, he did not 
believe PoCo should be brought within the EC treaty framework. Charles Powell replied by 
saying that Thatcher had read Howe’s suggestion and had “noted this without comment”.802 
This exchange of letters shows that Thatcher was willing to let these negotiations go ahead on 
an exploratory basis but had by September 1985 not yet signed up to them, nor to changing 
the EEC treaty.  
The first chapter of this dissertation introduced the institutions through which foreign 
policy was devised and explained how important Michael Butler was to the diplomacy of the 
UK in the EC. When Michael Butler prepared for retirement he wrote his valedictory 
despatch and a report on the IGC.803 Valedictory despatches have traditionally been a space 
 
800 Ibid. 
801 TNA PREM19/1480, G. Howe to M. Thatcher, “European Community: Inter-Governmental Conference,” 13 
September 1985; FCO30/6175, folio no. 397, G. Howe to M. Thatcher, “European Community: Inter-
governmental Conference, 13 September 1985. 
802 TNA FCO30/6175, folio no. 398, C. Powell to C. Budd, “European Community: Inter-governmental 
Conference,” 15 September 1985. 
803 TNA PREM19/1480, M. Butler to G. Howe, 10 October 1985, “Inter-governmental conference, report by Sir 
Michael Butler,” 17 October 1985. When Sir Michael’s valedictory despatch was circulated in the FCO it had 
attached to it the “timetable for completing the internal market by 1992”, which Arthur Cockfield at the 
European Commission had drawn up. TNA FCO30/6177, handwritten note: “enclosure to Sir M Butler’s 
valedictory despatch”, n.d. 
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where retiring ambassadors who had spent a career committed to the civil service traditions of 
what Peter Hennessy called “secrecy, neutrality and probity” could offer candid assessment 
on personalities, politics and the FCO at large.804 When Michael Butler retired, he reflected 
on how important the EC was to stand united against the Soviet Union, bind Germany to the 
West and compete economically with Japan and the USA.805 However, he argued that the 
need to work together stood in stark contrast with the perception of “the man in the street”, 
who believed that the “European ideal had lost impetus”.806 Butler argued that for the UK 
government the challenge ahead was to find a way of negotiating in the IGC that would make 
the outcome of this conference acceptable to the House of Commons.807  
The report Michael Butler prepared for his “farewell call” on the Prime Minister said 
that the “questioning approach we have adopted has served us well” in the IGC.808 Butler 
reported that in the IGC “we have been able to stimulate the French and Germans into firm 
opposition to the maximalist proposals from the Commission and others. We can continue 
this line in the Conference”.809 Butler argued that France and Germany wanted much the same 
from the IGC as the UK government, except that France was open to amending the treaties 
and that Germany wanted to give the EP more power. Moreover, there was broad support for 
a “limited extension of majority voting related to specific Internal Market objectives”.810 
Butler warned that even though such ideas could mean changing the EEC treaty, Thatcher 
should not oppose this outright: 
“it is in our interests to maintain uncertainty about our intentions. But we 
need to work with French and German officials and the presidency in the 
coming weeks in order to continue to ‘shrink’ the package which is likely to 
be on the table and get it as close as possible to something we might be able 
to accept. Otherwise the French and Germans will probably reconcile their 
 
804 Hennessy, Whitehall, 344 ff. 
805 TNA FCO30/6177, M. Butler to G. Howe, 10 October 1985, 2, 9. 
806 Ibid., 4. 
807 Ibid., 6. 
808 TNA PREM19/1480, “Inter-governmental conference, report by Sir Michael Butler,” 17 October 1985. 
809 Ibid. With these proposals Butler meant majority voting, giving the EP more power and transferring more 
money to poorer member state through a “cohesion” mechanism. 
810 Ibid. 
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differences in a way which is unattractive to us and sell the result to the 
presidency before the European Council”.811 
 
Butler’s comments show that the negotiators were using the argument that Thatcher 
had withheld her commitment to treaty change as a bargaining chip to extract concessions in 
the IGC. This quote is also interesting because it shows a latent worry that France and 
Germany could decide matters of EC-wide importance bilaterally. Butler suggested that the 
UK delegation in the IGC should continue to argue that the Prime Minister would judge the 
“package of proposals” that emerged from the IGC.812 When Margaret Thatcher met Michael 
Butler, they talked about what majority voting would mean, which treaty articles should be 
changed and what the UK approach to the IGC should be.813 Charles Powell’s summary of the 
meeting recounted: 
 “The Prime Minister’s conclusion from the meeting was that for the time 
being we should continue to keep our cards close to our chest and go on 
grinding down the unrealistic aims of other member states and of the 
Commission. She recognises that, nearer the time of the European Council, 
officials may need to become more closely involved in drafting elements of a 
package which might be acceptable at the European Council. But it must be 
made clear that we enter this exercise without commitment and that the 
main purpose is to prevent others from drafting conclusion which would 
be unacceptable from our point of view. Officials should therefore continue 
to make clear that they do not know what the Prime Minister would or 
would not be able to accept …”.814 
 
The part of this quote which says that Thatcher “entered the exercise without 
commitment” is significant because it indicates that the detached approach Thatcher took to 
the IGC suited her personally. She had not wanted the IGC when it was debated during the 
Milan European Council. As recounted in the previous chapter, Thatcher was outvoted in the 
Milan European Council on the question of whether or not an IGC should be held. Now that it 
 
811 Emphasis added. Ibid.  
812 Ibid. 
813 TNA FCO30/6177, folio no. 492, C. Powell to C. Budd, “European Community Intergovernmental 
Conference,” 29 October 1985. 
814 Emphasis added. Ibid.  
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was launched, her level of support was lukewarm at best. The outcome of the meeting 
between Thatcher and Butler confirmed the policy of exploratory negotiations and allowed 
the FCO to continue negotiating in the IGC. Therefore, the diplomats should continue to 
direct the talks in the IGC towards policies that Thatcher could accept if she wanted to. 
However, Thatcher still withheld her commitment in principle until the exact articles of the 
potential changes to the EEC treaty had become clear. 
A few days after Thatcher met Michael Butler, Charles Powell saw a list of potential 
amendments to the EEC treaty that the FCO was proposing to accept. Powell told David 
Williamson, the head of the European Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, he was “alarmed” by 
how many articles were being earmarked for amendment, adding that Thatcher was unaware 
that the FCO was prepared to accept changes to so much of the EEC treaty.815 Powell warned 
that “I should be careful about getting too far down this road, at least without a further 
discussion”.816 Powell asked Williamson if he should show this paper to Thatcher. 
Williamson replied that it would be better not to do so because it would be discussed in the 
Cabinet sub-committee on European questions of the Defence and Overseas Policy 
Committee (OD(E)) and that Geoffrey Howe would then report the conclusions to 
Thatcher.817 Williamson reiterated to Powell that the IGC discussions were happening under 
the formula of no commitment on the part of the UK government to amending the EEC 
treaty.818 Howe therefore was hemmed in by Thatcher’s conditional commitment to 
negotiating in the IGC and an expectation that not many treaty articles would be changed 
 
815 TNA PREM19/1480, C. Powell to D. Williamson, “Inter-governmental conference,” 4 November 1985. 
816 Ibid. 
817 TNA PREM19/1480, D. Williamson to C. Powell, “European Community: Intergovernmental Conference,” 8 
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A, Cabinet Office on Thursday 14 November 1985 at 3.00 pm,” 14 November 1985; CAB134/4900, 
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because the scope of proposals in the IGC would be reduced gradually as the conference went 
on.  
4. 1. 1.  Whitehall consultations: cautious assessments “ad referendum to ministers” 
The role of the Cabinet, its committees and the Cabinet Office have been introduced 
in the first chapter. The European Secretariat at the Cabinet Office was the central 
coordinating office for European policies in Whitehall. It was the office where all the threads 
converged, where interdepartmental issues were negotiated and where Whitehall 
recommendations to ministers and the Prime Minister were agreed upon. It was also the office 
that worked closest with UKRep and with the FCO, a collaboration that Butler termed the 
“triumvirate” of European policy making. The FCO was in the lead on the negotiations at the 
IGC and was the face of the UK government in the diplomatic negotiations. To inform and 
prepare the diplomatic negotiations in the IGC, the Cabinet Office conducted a series of 
Consultations with Whitehall departments. The different Whitehall departments submitted 
their responses to a call for consultations by the Cabinet Office and sent high-ranking officials 
to discuss them in the European Questions Steering Group (EQS), which has also been 
introduced in the first chapter.  
The consultations between 16 October 1985 and the end of November were 
significant because the Whitehall departments were beginning to work on policy proposals, 
based on the ideas that were emerging from the IGC.819 David Williamson told a group of 
representatives from different Whitehall departments that “the outlines of a possible package” 
were materialising and that the UK government had to be ready to “influence the shape of the 
package”.820 Williamson invited all departments to consider “sticking points” with regards to 
the present proposals, find points where concessions could be made and suggest what would 
 
819 The government of Luxembourg, which was holding the rotating European Council presidency, had set a 
deadline of 15 October 1985 for new proposals to be tabled at the IGC. TNA FCO30/6176, “Note of an ad hoc 
Meeting held at 3.45 pm on Wednesday 16 October in the Cabinet Office chaired by Mr D Williamson, 
Intergovernmental Conference, ” n.d.; TNA CAB/193/458, “Ad hoc meeting on the Inter-governmental 
conference: 3:45 pm, Wednesday 16 October, Conference room D, Chairman’s brief, 15 October 1985. 
820 Ibid. 
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be in the UK’s interest in terms of taking decisions more effectively in the EC institutions.821 
These suggestions then flowed into the negotiation briefs, which the Cabinet Office and the 
FCO prepared for the third IGC meeting on 11 November 1985.822  
As the responses from Whitehall trickled in, it became clear that the tenor of the 
Whitehall assessments was very cautious. Except for one, all departments gave negative 
assessments of the proposals that were being discussed in the IGC. The only positive 
assessment came from the Department of Transport, which responded by broadly welcoming 
majority voting in the Council of Ministers.823 The other responses to William’s call for views 
all focused on risks and dangers. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) argued that 
majority voting would not bring major gains and unanimity should be retained in areas that 
were “most sensitive”, such as insurance, health and safety, consumer protection and 
intellectual property.824 The DTI argued that especially on liberalising the insurance market 
Britain found itself quite often in a minority together with the Netherlands, in fighting illiberal 
regulations. Therefore, the DTI was worried that majority voting might result in increased 
burdens on companies operating both inside and outside the EC.  
The Treasury argued that unanimity should be retained for anything related to direct 
and indirect taxes, public purchasing and banking supervision.825 The Treasury worried about 
“illiberal directives” but argued that if there was a safeguard against such directives then the 
Treasury could accept majority voting on article 57 (on self-employed traders). An issue that 
would become important later on in the IGC was human, plant and animal health. The 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) wrote to David Williamson, arguing that 
plant and animal health safeguards were of paramount importance and that therefore no such 
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provisions as were suggested in the European Commission’s White Paper could be decided by 
majority voting.826 The letter suggested that the UK government had at great expense 
eradicated diseases, which still existed on the continent, and which if they came back could 
harm the export of livestock to countries outside the EC.827 Along similar lines, the 
Department of Employment argued that when it came to health and safety regulations for 
employees then majority voting was “highly undesirable”.828  
A second significant worry was the issue of the free movement of people. The Home 
Office wrote to Williamson to say that any form of “Europe without frontiers” was 
“unacceptable”.829 The Home Office asked Williamson to resist any treaty change that would 
affect the UK government’s ability to make policies on immigration, control borders and keep 
terrorists out. The Home Office suspected that the European Commission might use article 
100 of the EEC treaty (on approximation of laws for the Single Market) to “introduce by the 
back door” unacceptable directives on workers from third countries or visa policies.830 
Finally, the minister for arts argued that culture should not be regarded as an inexpensive 
concession to treaty change and that incorporating culture in the changed treaty should be 
resisted.831  
Very importantly, the DTI added one caveat to their assessment, arguing that their 
view was “ad referendum to our ministers”, which meant it could be changed by ministers.832 
More than anything else this phrase of “ad referendum to ministers” explains the cautious, if 
not negative tone of the early Whitehall assessments. Therefore, the manner in which these 
views developed further was going to be informed by the political discourse. The initial 
sceptical responses from the Whitehall departments were so discouraging that they prompted 
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Geoffrey Howe to ask for a study to examine if it was possible to “disguise” or “cloak treaty 
amendments” and present them as a “protocol”.833 The result of this study showed that even if 
a protocol was used to amend the treaty it would have to spell out that it was in fact amending 
the EEC treaty.834  
These departmental suggestions were worked into the negotiating position of the UK 
government in the IGC. The European Secretariat at the Cabinet Office wrote a draft paper 
that outlined a detailed negotiating position, on which departments could again comment 
before it was discussed in the Cabinet sub-committee on European questions of the Defence 
and Overseas Policy Committee (OD(E)), on 20 November 1985.835 The paper argued that it 
was in the interest of the UK government to conclude the IGC before the UK assumed the 
rotating European Council presidency in 1986.836 It would of course be for ministers to decide 
whether they wanted to accept or reject the “final package”.837 On the basis of this paper, the 
European Community Department (Internal), in collaboration with the European Secretariat at 
the Cabinet Office, prepared the steering briefs for the negotiations in the IGC.838 This 
steering brief would guide Howe and the FCO officials in their negotiations in the IGC. 
4. 1. 2. Negotiating dynamics in the IGC: “flushing out the French and the Germans” 
In October 1985, David Hannay took over the job as head of UKRep from Michael 
Butler. He was very experienced in European integration diplomacy. As a young official he 
became First Secretary at the observer mission of the UK to the EEC, after the failed first 
entry negotiations from 1961 to 1963.839 He subsequently stayed in that position during the 
entry negotiations from 1970 to 1973. When he replaced Michael Butler as head of UKRep, 
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Hannay remembered how in October 1985 he was “pitchforked” into the IGC and went from 
the plane straight into the negotiation room.840 From there, Hannay reported that even though 
the UK had not put forward a single proposal, “our questioning approach coupled with French 
scepticism and German caution is increasingly setting the tone”.841 Hannay concluded that 
“reality is slowly seeping into this exercise”.842 John Fretwell, the British ambassador to 
France, was shown Butler’s valedictory despatch and was instructed by Robin Renwick that 
the British government was pursuing a “questioning approach…without commitment” in the 
IGC.843 Crucially, Fretwell was told that “our instructions are to continue to make clear that 
we do not know what the Prime Minister would or would not be able to accept”.844 Renwick 
warned Fretwell that Thatcher would “be likely to react very negatively” to “some Franco-
German fait accompli”.845  
An important question to settle was the definition of the Single Market. This issue 
was of consequence for the debate on the scope of legislation to extend the Single Market. On 
5 November 1985, Geoffrey Howe sent a personal telegram to David Hannay to inform him 
that Jürgen Trumpf, a high-ranking official in the German foreign ministry, told him in 
confidence that Germany and France had agreed on a definition of the Single Market as “a 
united market without frontiers”.846 This definition was based on a French proposal. Its 
centrepiece was the provision for majority voting on implementing the Single Market, 
specifically on articles 100 and 57(2), which would mean that the “approximation” of laws for 
the Single Market (article 100 of the EEC treaty) and the “activities as self-employed 
persons” (article 57(2) of the EEC treaty) would be decided by majority voting.847 Germany 
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and France disagreed on whether any form of taxation should be covered by the new rules on 
majority voting to achieve the Single Market. Germany insisted on unanimity on tax matters, 
but France wanted to include “indirect taxation” (article 99 of the EEC treaty). Such a holistic 
definition of the Single Market was broader than the UK government would have liked 
because it was not clear what this would mean for issues such as the free movement of people 
and human, plant or animal health.  
At the IGC on 11 November, Lord Bridges the British ambassador to Italy, argued 
that the existing divisions between “maximalists” and “minimalists” had become “more 
muted”.848 Bridges argued that “Italy, Ireland, Benelux and the Commission” fitted the 
description of “maximalists” because they supported strengthening the powers of the 
European Parliament and the European Commission and wanted to expand the scope of the 
EEC treaty.849 David Hannay reflected that the “maximalists”, in his view Italy and the 
Benelux countries, were “mercifully ill-coordinated” because they failed to agree on a 
common proposal about the EP.850 Hannay believed that the negotiation strategy of the UK 
government was effective because it coincided with the French and German tactics. Hannay’s 
assessment of the IGC so far argued: 
 “The French (consistently and elegantly) and the Germans (clumsily and 
erratically) have been working to scale down any possible outcome. Their 
views and our own are increasingly in the same target area … Our tactic of 
constructive cooperation, while fully reserving our position on treaty 
amendment, has worked so far pretty well. We have had to forego the 
option of tabling texts ourselves, and thus directly shaping the outcome, 
and we have had to take some hard words from the press for dragging our feet. 
But we have flushed the French and the Germans out from their 
traditional posture of sheltering behind our objections to Commission 
proposals. Banquo’s ghost, in the form of the need to get our eventual 
consent to any treaty change, has been ever present and has helped us to 
achieve considerable indirect influence on the texts as they evolved”.851  
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On a diplomatic level, Germany, France and the UK increasingly found that they 
were pulling in the same direction. Proposals in the areas of technological cooperation, 
“cohesion” and the environment were converging on a “codification” of the current informal 
community practices.852 Moreover, there was a consensus beginning to emerge in the IGC 
around the notion that the European Parliament would be given more powers through a 
“cooperation” process that was yet to be defined. Moreover, the European Commission would 
be given more executive capabilities but the “last word” would remain with the Council.853 
According to Hannay, Delors’ suggestions for monetary integration went “down like a lead 
balloon in Bonn” and because of that did not yet have to be opposed by the UK.854 Hannay 
argued that no agreement was yet in sight on the definition of the Single Market. However, 
France and Germany were supporting a position close to the one of the UK by resisting the 
inclusion of taxation, the free movement of people or health and safety into any new Single 
Market regulations.855  
In summary, Geoffrey Howe was instrumental in the UK’s policy making towards 
the IGC. He devised an approach of how to negotiate in an uncertain environment, where 
Margaret Thatcher’s views were not yet known. This was a deliberate tactic, as Thatcher 
explained to Michael Butler when he retired as head of UKRep. Moreover, it reflected her 
ambivalence towards the process of an IGC. What guidance there was came from Charles 
Powell, without much evidence of his clearing this with Thatcher. There is even evidence that 
Powell and Williamson deliberately shielded Thatcher from seeing earlier negotiation 
positions, at least until she had received the considered opinion of OD(E). Most probably this 
was in keeping with the overall strategy of maintaining that Thatcher’s views were not yet 
known and did not mean that they were going behind her back. According to Hannay, the new 
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head of UKRep, the tactic of the UK in the IGC was to “flush out the French and the 
Germans”, expose their true positions and subtly steer the negotiations in a direction the UK 
government could accept.856 Hannay believed that because of the UK government’s 
negotiating approach, France and Germany would not be able to “shelter” behind British 
opposition to any of the proposals in the IGC. Moreover, looming French elections and an 
early conclusion to the talks would mean that fewer divisive proposals could be introduced. 
However, Hannay also warned that not keeping up with the IGC negotiations could damage 
the standing of the UK as a “core member” of the EC.857 Therefore, in the IGC France, 
Germany and the UK argued together for an agreement that could realistically be finalised at 
the Luxembourg European Council, on 2-3 December 1985. The one issue where the UK was 
at risk of becoming isolated was monetary integration, an issue to which the next section shall 
now turn. 
4. 2. Economic and Monetary Union: “technically unnecessary and risky” 
The question of whether or not to include the aspiration of Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) in the revised EEC treaty was related to the debate on whether or not to join the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The ERM was a mechanism to stabilise 
floating exchange rates in a currency band, nicknamed “the snake in a tunnel”. The UK was a 
member of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the Pound Sterling was in the 
European Currency Unit (ECU).858 The question when or under what circumstances the UK 
would join the ERM remained open. Thatcher’s established position was that her government 
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would join when the “time is right”.859 According to their memoirs, Geoffrey Howe and Nigel 
Lawson both felt that 1985 was the year that linked the end of Thatcher’s tenure as Prime 
Minister with the government’s European policy and the question of when to join the ERM.860 
Both Lawson and Howe recounted in their autobiographies how on 13 November 1985 they 
both attempted and failed to persuade Thatcher to accept joining the ERM.861 Lawson argued 
that had Thatcher accepted to join the ERM, then the subject would have primarily been 
economic and would not have acquired the political dimension that split the Conservative 
party during the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s.862 Even though Howe and 
Lawson agreed on joining the ERM, their views on whether the SEA endorsed a treaty 
commitment to EMU differed. Howe argued that keeping the EMU reference “vague” in the 
SEA was a negotiation success.863 Lawson however, believed that the earlier commitment to 
EMU from 1972 had lost its political significance, which was why he disagreed with Delors’ 
suggestion to write a commitment to EMU into the SEA.864 Therefore, Lawson counselled 
Thatcher strongly against accepting any mention of EMU in the SEA.865  
This section argues that the discussion on EMU, in connection with the British policy 
making towards the SEA, showed an important difference between how the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, approached the question of European monetary integration and the 
way that Geoffrey Howe and the FCO negotiated in the IGC. The Treasury did not want to 
include a reference to EMU. Already during the last phase of the settlement of the BBQ, the 
Treasury expressed an ambition to Thatcher that they wished to be in charge of all discussions 
on EMU and taxes in an EC context.866 Geoffrey Howe wanted to remit the discussion on 
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EMU into the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), which had the advantage 
of keeping any discussion of Delors’ proposals to write a commitment to EMU into the SEA 
out of the discussions in the IGC.867 However, whereas the FCO’s policy towards the IGC 
was consistent, one can detect a shift in how Lawson approached the question of including 
EMU in the SEA. On 12 June 1985, Lawson suggested to Thatcher that he was against the 
UK government opposing further financial integration in public but said he wanted to resist 
them quietly in ECOFIN.868 Such a policy was in line with Howe’s “questioning approach” in 
the IGC. Five months later, Lawson was much more outspoken in demanding that EMS 
should be excluded from the discussions on treaty amendment in the IGC. Lawson’s outright 
refusal to include EMU in the SEA and his suggestion to Thatcher to argue the same achieved 
the opposite of the original aim. Instead of letting the issue fizzle out, it contributed to 
galvanising support for including a commitment to EMU in a revised treaty. 
The question of including a commitment to the EMU in the revised EEC treaty had 
been repeatedly raised by Jacques Delors but had, at the insistence of the UK during the 
Milan European Council, been relegated to ECOFIN.869 On 14 November 1985, Nigel 
Lawson wrote a memo to Margaret Thatcher arguing that if the UK became isolated with the 
insistence on excluding EMU from the IGC, then he suggested to concede to a “minimal 
mention of the EMS” in the changed EEC treaty as long as this did not compel the UK to join 
the ERM.870 Thatcher wrote in her hand at the top of the letter that she agreed with pursuing 
this line of argument.871 Charles Powell annotated Lawson’s letter by hand, saying that he 
believed that a refusal to include EMS in the treaty would be supported by Germany.872 
According to Powell, Thatcher had accepted Lawson’s recommendation of a “minimal 
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mention” as backup option if the issue could not be kept out of the revised EEC treaty 
altogether.873 However, Powell noted that “the Chancellor subsequently saw the Prime 
Minister this evening and said that he wished to change his advice following a conversation 
with Stoltenberg, the German finance minister. It was clear to him that the Germans had now 
decided against any amendment of the monetary provisions of the [EEC] Treaty”.874  
Lawson was briefed by Treasury officials that he should “if possible to persuade the 
[ECOFIN] Council that no amendments should be made to the monetary provisions of the 
[EEC] Treaty”.875 Lawson was briefed to tell Gerhard Stoltenberg before the ECOFIN 
Council that the UK had “objections to any EMU reference [in the SEA]” and wanted to 
“keep the issue evidently under Finance ministers’ control”.876 Lawson’s advisor 
recommended that “the only safe course [of action] will be to have a text virtually agreed by 
this time of the December [European] Council”.877 In ECOFIN, Stoltenberg backed Lawson’s 
position by arguing that “the Commission’s proposals [of EMU in the IGC] would jeopardise 
the conduct of external and internal policy [of the EC]”.878 David Hannay, the head of 
UKRep, reported that Nigel Lawson had argued in ECOFIN that amending the EEC treaty to 
develop EMS further was “technically unnecessary and risky”.879 Jacques Delors reportedly 
“expressed surprise at the rejection by [Germany and the UK] of a fairly modest text”.880 
Delors argued that “it altered nothing. The EMU was already implicitly in the [EEC] 
Treaty”.881 The French Finance minister and the successor of Jacques Delors, Pierre 
Bérégovoy, supported Delors by saying that he considered “a monetary dimension was an 
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essential ingredient in the changes to the community which [were] now under discussion”.882 
The result was an ECOFIN meeting, which in the words of Hannay was “divided down [the] 
middle” on the subject of EMU.883   
The Cabinet sub-committee on European questions of the Defence and Overseas 
Policy Committee (OD(E)) was told that the ECOFIN meeting on 18 November 1985 had 
been “split”.884 The UK, Germany, Ireland and Denmark were arguing against including 
EMU in the SEA, whereas France and the European Commission “attached political 
importance” to committing to EMU with the SEA.885 In OD(E), ministers argued that “for as 
long as this remained [Germany’s] position we could let them take the lead on the matter”.886 
The OD(E) briefing for Malcolm Rifkind explained that Lawson and Stoltenberg had 
bilaterally coordinated their positions to refuse including EMU in the SEA.887 Moreover, 
Delors was reportedly “angry” with Lawson for roundly dismissing his EMU proposal.888 
Rifkind “agree[d] with [the] Chancellor [of the Exchequer and argued] that while we have 
support we should continue to oppose [inserting a reference to EMU into the SEA]”.889 
However, he added that the UK needed a “fallback position on [the] lines of [the] 
Chancellor’s minute of November to Prime Minister”, which as mentioned above argued for 
“notional mention” of EMU in the SEA.890 In the FCO, Stephen Wall argued that Lawson’s 
refusal to discuss EMU in the IGC could only work with German backing, which was by no 
means assured, especially since Wall expected Mitterrand to strongly urge Kohl to accept 
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EMU.891 In essence, Wall recommended that in the IGC the UK should keep Lawson’s 
original fallback position of allowing a nominal mention of EMU on the table, arguing that 
such a reference was in line with the UK commitment for “progress” on the issue of EMU 
that was mentioned in the report of the Dooge Committee.892 This approach had the advantage 
that the UK would not become isolated on the issue of EMU and could avoid being held 
responsible if the European Council did not reach an agreement.893  
Jacques Delors made sure that the issue of EMU was not allowed to be dropped in 
the IGC. He tabled a draft to insert the aim of EMU into the definition of the Single 
Market.894 Hannay reported that because of German opposition to EMU, the UK had not yet 
had to directly oppose Delors in the IGC.895 According to French sources, Delors had angrily 
threatened to withdraw all papers of the European Commission if EMU was not included in 
the discussions of the IGC.896 Delors was not alone in wanting to keep EMU on the agenda. 
The French government supported EMU, arguing that liberalising the Single Market and 
pursuing monetary integration had to happen alongside each other.897 Moreover, Élisabeth 
Guigou, Mitterrand’s European policy advisor, believed that Kohl and Delors had privately 
agreed on keeping the issue of EMU on the agenda of the IGC.898 At a dinner with Delors on 
24 November 1985, Howe got the impression that Delors was unhappy with Lawson’s 
outright refusal to discuss EMU.899 Robin Renwick was aware that Delors was thinking of 
bringing up the issue of EMU at the Luxembourg European Council, on 2-3 December 
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1985.900 Nigel Lawson told Thatcher that he believed Kohl would stand with her in opposing 
EMU at the Luxembourg European Council.901 Moreover, Lawson argued that even if Kohl 
did not come through in support of her position, it would be best “not to get caught up in this 
whole exercise” of EMU.902 Geoffrey Howe echoed this sentiment by telling the assembled 
Cabinet that “Herr Kohl was at present taking a firm line against the Commission’s proposals 
on monetary issues”.903 However, the briefing for Rifkind and the OD(E) minutes show that 
the FCO was aware of the possibility that Germany might make concessions on this issue of 
EMU.904  
Lawson’s actions and recommendations to Thatcher were based on the assumption 
that if Germany and the UK opposed EMU it could not be inserted into the EEC treaty. What 
was not considered was that there might be a divergence in views between Kohl and 
Stoltenberg. Lawson spoke mainly to Stoltenberg in or around ECOFIN, which must have 
informed his thinking. The divergence between Thatcher, Howe and Lawson came in part 
from who they talked to and the forum in which these discussions were held. In essence, they 
all pursued the same aim, which was to avoid or minimise the reference to EMU in the SEA. 
If that was not possible, they wanted to keep any reference in the SEA to a broad statement. 
Therefore, the difference between Thatcher, Howe and Lawson was not a difference in policy 
but more one in negotiation style. They all wanted to refer the issue to ECOFIN to keep it out 
of the IGC. Lawson was just a little bit more direct in saying so. Had the issue of EMU been 
contained in ECOFIN this would probably never have come into the open. However, Delors 
kept the issue successfully alive in the IGC and was supported by France in doing so. To 
Élisabeth Guigou, the refusal by the British and the German finance ministers to discuss EMU 
 
900 Ibid. 
901 TNA PREM19/1752, N. Lawson to M. Thatcher, “European Council: Amendment to monetary provisions of 
the Treaty of Rome,” 28 November 1985. 
902 Ibid. 
903 TNA CAB128/81/34, “Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 28 
November 1985 at 10.30 am,” 28 November 1985, 5-6. 
904 TNA CAB148/248, “OD(E)(85) 8th Meeting,” 20 November 1985, 5-6; FCO30/6178, document 540, S. Wall 
to M. Rifkind, “OD(E): 20 November,” 19 November 1985; “OD(E) 20 November: Intergovernmental 
conference,” n.d. 
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“demonstrated starkly” the differing “conceptions of Europe” between the French view and 
the “Anglo-Saxon” view, whereby Europe would become “a large free trade area, with the 
common policies reduced to a strict minimum (no CAP harmonisations)”.905  
Even though Margaret Thatcher was not personally in the IGC, she discussed some 
of these subjects in bilateral high-level meetings with her fellow heads of government. 
Thatcher held a bilateral meeting with François Mitterrand on 18 November and one with 
Helmut Kohl on 27 November 1985.906 Both of these meetings happened in the framework of 
regular bilateral consultations. The issue of EMU was becoming increasingly important in 
these meetings. During these high-level summits, Thatcher and her counterparts did nothing 
more than to restate their established positions. The reason why not much detailed ground was 
covered in these bilateral meetings was because these discussions covered a wide range of 
topics. For instance, Mitterrand and Thatcher discussed the Channel tunnel, China, East-West 
relations and the IGC.907 The IGC and EMU were only mentioned in passing, without 
entering into any great detail. According to a summary prepared by Charles Powell, 
Thatcher’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, she told Mitterrand that "like the Germans, 
we did not see any need to amend the monetary provisions of the [EEC] treaty”.908 Mitterrand 
replied that he “noted the German and UK position on this”.909 Roland Dumas, the French 
foreign minister, added that “the German position had recently moved closer to France”.910 
According to both the British and the French sources, Thatcher dismissed this notion by 
 
905 “la question du système monétaire Européen fait apparaître l’opposition entre notre propre conception de 
l’EUROPE et une conception anglo-saxonne où l’EUROPE devaient une grande zone libre échange avec des 
politiques communes réduites au strict minimum (pas d’harmonisation de la politique agricole commune). Par 
leur refus de discuter du S.M.E., les ministres des Finances Anglais et Allemand ont totalement mis en évidence 
cette oppositions.” (my translation) AN, Mitterrand papers, AG/5(4)/FC/25, E. Guigou to F. Mitterrand, “ Note 
pour le président de la République, Objet : Conférence intergouvernementale, system monétaire,” 19 
November1985. 
906 A meeting was also planned with Bettino Craxi for 29-30 October 1985 but was postponed because of the 
Anglo-Irish agreement until 12 March 1986. TNA FCO33/8037, folio no. 54a, C. Powell to L. Appleyard, 
“bilateral summit with the Italian government,” 2 September 1985, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/201371. 
907 TNA FCO33/7944, folio 105, C. Powell to C. Budd, “Anglo-French summit,” 18 November 1985; 
attachment: “Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and President Mitterrand on the occasion of the 
Anglo-French summit at 10 Downing Street on Monday 18 November 1985 at 0930 hours,” 27 November 1985. 
908 Ibid., 7. 
909 Ibid. 
910 Ibid., 8 
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saying that “the German position changes at each meeting” but that she believed the 
Bundesbank would never agree to such policies.911  
Perhaps the most significant moment during the bilateral Thatcher-Mitterrand 
meeting was when both leaders explained their policy towards the IGC to each other. Both 
Thatcher as well as Mitterrand expressed themselves as remaining detached from the IGC and 
said they were waiting for their officials to finish negotiating before they would take a 
position.912 According to Powell, Thatcher “said that she had not been following 
developments over the Intergovernmental Conference very closely”.913 Thatcher added that 
“her intention was to wait and see what was on the table at Luxembourg before reaching any 
conclusions”.914 In similar vein, “President Mitterrand said that he did not know exactly the 
positions taken by French officials”.915 According to the French minutes, Thatcher also told 
Mitterrand that she would decide how to handle the European Council once she was in 
Luxembourg but that it was important to keep the process simple and short.916 Thatcher 
warned Mitterrand that if it was not possible to come to an agreement on the open issues and 
avoid any “misunderstandings”, then she would “behave at Luxembourg like an unguided 
missile”.917 This quote is not in the British records, nor is there anything similar. However, 
Thatcher remembered after the meeting that Mitterrand had told her “I wish you all success at 
Luxembourg”.918 These comments show that both Mitterrand and Thatcher perceived the 
upcoming European Council in Luxembourg in terms of the past one in Milan. Thatcher told 
 
911 “German views tended to change from meeting to meeting” Ibid.; “la position allemande change à cheque 
reunion” (my translation) AN, Mitterrand papers, AG/5(4)/FC/25, “Compte rendu de l’entretien entre le 
Président de la République et Madame Thatcher 18 novembre 1985,” 20 November 1985, 6.  
912 TNA FCO33/7944, folio 105, C. Powell to C. Budd, “Anglo-French summit,” 18 November 1985; 
attachment: “Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and President Mitterrand on the occasion of the 
Anglo-French summit at 10 Downing Street on Monday 18 November 1985 at 0930 hours,” 27 November 1985. 
913 Ibid., 6. 
914 Ibid. 
915 Ibid., 8. 
916 AN, Mitterrand papers, AG/5(4)/FC/25, “Compte rendu de l’entretien entre le Président de la République et 
Madame Thatcher 18 novembre 1985,” 20 November 1985, 8. 
917 “malentendus … je me comporterai à Luxembourg comme un missile non guidé” (my translation) Ibid., 4. 
918 TNA FCO33/7944, folio 105, C. Powell to C. Budd, “Anglo-French summit,” 18 November 1985; 
attachment: “Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and President Mitterrand on the occasion of the 
Anglo-French summit at 10 Downing Street on Monday 18 November 1985 at 0930 hours,” 27 November 1985, 
9. 
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Mitterrand how much thought she had put into the preparations for the Milan European 
Council.919 According to the French sources, Thatcher added that once she had arrived in 
Milan all her preparations had been “overthrown” and the Italian Prime Minister Bettino 
Craxi was acting as “the worst president I ever saw”.920 This statement would suggest that 
there still was a rankling feeling of dissatisfaction about how the Milan summit had ended. 
Helmut Kohl’s briefing for his bilateral meeting with Margaret Thatcher, on 27 
November 1985, suggested that after Milan Thatcher had become “especially touchy”.921 
According to the German sources, Thatcher had said clearly that she wanted to be included in 
all discussions and not be presented with another German-French proposal.922 Horst 
Teltschik, Kohl’s foreign policy advisor, told him that Thatcher saw him as an “ally” in 
resisting Delors’ EMU proposals.923 This meeting with Kohl could have been an opportunity 
to clarify differing positions on EMU. However, since Kohl had said to Delors that he would 
examine the case for EMU again, Kohl’s briefing advocated that he should let Thatcher know 
that his position on EMU was evolving.924 According to a summary of the meeting by Charles 
Powell, Kohl did not divulge this information to Thatcher.925 The meeting lasted for one and a 
half hours. The first half of the meeting was spent talking about East-West relations, 
particularly the first meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev on 19-20 
November 1985, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty and British as well as German 
participation in SDI research.926 Thatcher told Kohl that she “understood that that the views of 
Britain and German officials [in the IGC] were quite close. In particular, we agreed that there 
 
919 Ibid., 6; AN, Mitterrand papers, AG/5(4)/FC/25, “Compte rendu de l’entretien entre le Président de la 
République et Madame Thatcher 18 novembre 1985,” 20 November 1985, 2. 
920 “renversé”, “le plus mauvais president que j’ai vu” (my translations) Ibid. 
921 "besonders empfindlich" (my translation) BArch, B136/29986, H. Teltschik to H. Kohl, "Deutsch-Britische 
Konsultationen am Mittwoch, dem 27 November 1985 in London," 25 November 1985, fol. 221. 
922 Ibid. 
923 “Verbündeten” (my translation) Ibid., fol. 223. 
924 Ibid. 
925 TNA PREM19/1507, C. Powell to C. Budd, “Prime Minister’s meeting with the Federal German Chancellor,” 
27 November 1985; attachment: “Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Federal German 
Chancellor at 10 Downing Street on Wednesday 27 November 1985 at 0930 hours,” 27 November 1985. 
926 Ibid. 
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was no reason to amend the [EEC] treaty on monetary matters”.927 Thatcher continued by 
saying “she knew that Monsieur Delors took a different view but we would not be swayed by 
that”.928 Kohl replied, “on this point the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom were more 
or less in agreement”.929 He had made it clear to Delors that the “essential” conditions for 
amending “monetary matters in the treaty” were “convergence of economic policies” and 
“free movement of capital”.930 According to Powell’s summary, Kohl argued that these were 
“two points which Delors could not dispute”.931 The two heads of government also repeated 
their familiar positions, arguing they both wanted to develop the Single Market but were 
disagreeing on the European Parliament.932  
On the day after Thatcher’s meeting with Kohl, Nigel Lawson wrote to the Prime 
Minister to tell her that her meeting with Kohl “confirmed that the Germans, like us, are 
totally opposed to any amendment to the monetary provisions of the Treaty of Rome”.933 
Lawson recommended to Thatcher that it would be best “not to get caught up in this whole 
exercise”.934 Thatcher underlined a lot of text in Lawson’s letter and brought a copy of it to 
the Luxembourg European Council, which shows that the Chancellor’s suggestions were 
important  to her. Was Lawson right, did the meeting show that Kohl was against a reference 
to EMU? Or did Kohl say that he was contemplating EMU but did not express himself 
clearly? Whether Kohl did not say that he was considering a reference to EMS in the revised 
treaty or whether Thatcher did not want to hear the message is not entirely clear. Neither is it 
clear why she preferred Lawson’s advice on the issue over Howe’s, or why she did not 
instruct Lawson to follow Howe’s more cooperative line. What is clear from analysing the 
archival sources is that Kohl was prepared to change the EEC treaty and was contemplating a 
 
927 Ibid., 4. 
928 Ibid. 
929 Ibid. 5. 
930 Ibid. 
931 Ibid. 
932 Ibid. 
933 TNA PREM19/1752, N. Lawson to M. Thatcher, "European Council: Amendment to monetary provisions of 
the Treaty of Rome,” 28 November 1985. 
934 Ibid. 
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reference to EMU. Thatcher on the other hand was still at the stage of reflecting on the 
fundamental issue of the principle of treaty change.  
In summary, the British policy of remitting EMU to ECOFIN and Lawson’s attempt 
to drop the subject entirely failed when the issue was discussed by the heads of government at 
the Luxembourg European Council, on 2-3 December 1985. Robin Renwick’s warning to 
OD(E) against taking a minority position on EMU was increasingly looking like a realistic 
scenario.935 The reason why the UK was becoming isolated on the issue of EMU was because 
in his advice to Thatcher and in ECOFIN, Nigel Lawson was pursuing a harder line than 
Howe in the IGC. Lawson could do so because Howe had advocated moving the discussion of 
EMU into ECOFIN and thus effectively handed over the issue to Lawson, who was 
representing the UK in that council. The consequence was a mismatch between the 
“questioning approach” followed by Howe and Lawson’s more confrontational line of 
negotiation. This divergence was not lost upon Britain’s negotiating partners. Élisabeth 
Guigou argued that it was rumoured in Brussels that Lawson’s position was isolated and that 
his views neither reflected the views of the FCO nor those of Thatcher’s advisors.936 
Eventually, Lawson’s attempt to dispose of the issue by refusing to discuss EMU in the IGC 
backfired. With France’s support, Delors succeeded in keeping the issue alive until Kohl 
came out in favour of including a reference to EMU in the SEA at the Luxembourg European 
Council. The next section will analyse the European Council in Luxembourg, on 2-3 
December 1985, which was the summit where the SEA was agreed. 
4. 3. End of IGC and agreement to SEA: “a gruelling marathon” 
The final stage of the IGC was the Luxembourg European Council, from 2-3 
December 1985. In these two days Margaret Thatcher’s policy of waiting to see what the 
outcome of the IGC would be was replaced with her working point-by-point through all the 
 
935 TNA FCO30/6178, folio no. 545, R. Renwick to M. Rifkind, “Inter-governmental conference: OD(E),” 18 
November 1985. 
936 Ibid. 
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items that were still open, i.e. on which the diplomats in the IGC could not find an agreement. 
The most important unanswered question was whether or not Thatcher would be able to 
accept what was agreed in the IGC and would come to an agreement with the other heads of 
government on the points that were still unresolved. The IGC concluded with a list of open 
issues, which were to be discussed by what the EC foreign ministers called a conclave, before 
being submitted formally to the European Council. The Luxembourg European Council was 
described by R. Oliver Miles, the British ambassador to Luxembourg, as “a gruelling 
marathon”.937 The combined length of the meeting was 27 hours and was together with the 
conclave of foreign ministers the longest European Council on record. Even Thatcher, with 
her famous stamina and penchant for working through the night afterwards reflected to David 
Hannay that “it was a fairly trying occasion but I think we came out of it in good shape”.938 
To Oliver Miles she said that “I fear that late evening meetings are part of the ritual of 
European Councils”.939 Thatcher and Howe negotiated their way point by point through the 
list of “key points” and obtained an outcome by which “all our key objectives were 
secured”.940 All in all, Thatcher rated the meeting as “a job well done”.941 This section looks 
at how the Luxembourg European Council played out, focusing on the policy making of the 
UK government towards the conference, the position of Margaret Thatcher and her 
contribution to the SEA. 
The run up to the Luxembourg European Council involved the narrowing down of 
proposals to bring them into a shape that could be discussed and agreed to by the heads of 
government. The foreign ministers held a conclave over the weekend before the European 
Council to thrash out the last remaining points. A gloomy account by David Hannay showed 
 
937 TNA PREM19/1752, telegram no. 508, R. Miles to FCO, “European Council, Luxembourg 2/3 December 
1985,” 4 December 1985. 
938 TNA PREM19/1752, M. Thatcher to D. Hannay, 9 December 1985. 
939 TNA PREM19/1752, M. Thatcher to R. Miles, 9 December 1985. 
940 TNA PREM19/1752, telegram no. 508, R. Miles to FCO, “European Council, Luxembourg 2/3 December 
1985,” 4 December 1985. 
941 TNA PREM19/1752, M. Thatcher to R. Miles, 9 December 1985. 
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that this was an acrimonious process with an uncertain outcome.942 Hannay wrote in a 
telegram after the conclave that there were “significant differences of position”, especially on 
the Single Market.943 Ultimately, nobody knew if the IGC could succeed or not. The subject 
of PoCo was an exception. It was so uncontroversial that an agreement on a final text was 
already reached in the conclave of foreign ministers.944 In this conclave, Howe continued his 
tactic of a “questioning approach” by asking clarifying questions, such as replacing the words 
“measures” with “directives” on the issue of the proposed article 100(a), which dealt with 
“approximation” of laws to implement the Single Market.945 Clarifying such terms narrowed 
the scope of the agreement to make it more specific and in this case only applicable to formal 
directives. Only on social policy, where Denmark also had an existing reservation, did Howe 
formally request that unanimous voting should be retained.946 On the issues of EMS, tax, 
technology and the implementing powers of the European Commission, both Germany and 
the UK expressed reservations.947 Élisabeth Guigou summarised the state of affairs before the 
European Council as “[the French] want to reinforce the European Currency Unit, which the 
Germans refuse, they want a reference to the European Union and to [a] Monetary [Union], 
which Mrs Thatcher refuses”.948 However, Guigou argued that during the conclave the foreign 
ministers all softened their positions and simply indicated what the sticking points were for 
their countries, which would give their heads of government more elbow room to find 
compromises.949  
 
942 TNA FCO30/1979, folio no. 562, telegram no. 4103, D. Hannay to FCO, “IGC: Brussels 25/26 November, 
summary,” 26 November 1985. 
943 This was a setback in the discussions, which brought a series of opt outs back. Moreover, Andreotti tried 
unsuccessfully to bring the free movement of people back into the definition of the Single Market.  
TNA FCO30/6179, folio no. 562, telegram no. 4103, D. Hannay to FCO, “IGC: Brussels 25/26 November, 
summary,” 26 November 1985; folio no. 563, telegram no. 4089, D. Hannay to FCO, “IGC: Brussels, 26 
November 1985 – discussion over lunch,” 26 November 1985. 
944 Ibid. 
945 TNA PREM19/1752, “Conference of the governments of the member states, presidency report to the 
European Council,” 2 December 1985, 6. 
946 Ibid., 14. 
947 Ibid., 8, 11-12,  
948 “Nous voulons renforcer l’ECU, ce qui refusent les Allemands, cux ci veulent une référence à l’Union 
Européenne et monétaire, ce que refuse Mme Thatcher.” (my translation) AN, Mitterrand papers, 
AG/5(4)/FC/25, E. Guigou to F. Mitterrand, “Note pour le président de la République, Objet: votre entretien 
avec M Delors, vendredi à 10h30,” 28 November 1985. 
949 Ibid. 
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Unlike at the Milan European Council, no neat handwritten summary covering the 
entire European Council survived. Whereas the records covering the Milan European Council 
analysed in great detail why the summit failed, the records on the summit in Luxembourg 
focused on the outcome of the talks and the agreements reached. Stephen Wall said after the 
summit that “there is no way that we can write a detailed account of the negotiations”.950 
Perhaps the lack of informal records is also due to the fact that the summit was an uphill 
struggle of nearly 30 hours, which resulted in a compromise text that was achieved in an 
incredibly difficult process.951 Once Otto von Bismarck’s proverbial sausage was made, 
nobody wanted to detail ad nauseam how exactly the ingredients had come together.952 The 
archival sources explain the outcome of the European Council but dwell less on the points of 
disagreement. Moreover, neither the French nor the German archives contain copies of readily 
accessible informal records that detail who said what, when and to whom. The records that 
exist of this European Council focus on describing the agreement once it was made. The 
Cabinet Office and ECD(I) compiled “a compendium of the main reports covering the key 
issues so that we have them as a ready work of reference for the future”.953 These were 
fragments of informal summaries, notes, telegrams and minutes that officials thought to be 
most important which were compiled in lieu of a coherent summary. 
The spine of this “compendium” was a briefing that the European Secretariat at the 
Cabinet Office prepared with an overview of the extent to which the presidency conclusions 
reflected the interests of the UK government.954 This briefing was largely a juxtaposition of 
the “key points” that Thatcher had been given when she went into the European Council, with 
 
950 TNA FCO30/6527, folio no. 3, S. Wall to All Desk Officers in ECD(I), “Inter-governmental Conference: 
Follow-Up,” 30 December 1985. 
951 Hannay, Britain’s Quest for a Role, 128–33. 
952 Although the quote is probably apocryphal, Otto von Bismarck is said to have remarked that laws were like 
sausages and that it was better not to see how either was made. 
953 Ibid. 
954 The government holding the rotating presidency of the European Council wrote the conclusions, which 
appeared in the Bulletin of the European Communities. TNA FCO30/6180, folio no. 642, M. Mercer to M. Jay, 
“European Council: IGC,” 9 December 1985; FCO30/6527, folio no. 3, S. Wall to All Desk Officers in ECD(I), 
“Inter-governmental Conference: Follow-Up,” 30 December 1985. 
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the presidency conclusions that emerged after 27 hours of discussion.955 Moreover, this 
briefing and Thatcher’s “key points” reflected the discussions of UK policy towards the IGC 
in the Cabinet sub-committee OD(E) and the full Cabinet.956 In the aftermath of the 
Luxembourg European Council, this briefing document continued to be developed and 
redrafted by Stephen Wall at the ECD(I) in the FCO and Michael Jay at the Cabinet Office.957 
In this process, the document morphed from a simple overview of what had been achieved to 
a fully-fledged analysis of the position of the UK in the IGC and at the Luxembourg 
European Council. This document intended to answer the question whether or not the “UK’s 
major interests in the IGC [were] met in the presidency’s conclusions”?.958 This document is 
therefore of considerable importance when analysing which of the “key points” that Thatcher 
had been given beforehand were successfully negotiated and which fell by the wayside as 
concessions. The following account of Thatcher’s negotiations in the Luxembourg European 
Council is based on triangulating this document with the original negotiating aims that 
Thatcher was given, which she was told she would have to secure in order to bring the IGC to 
a successful conclusion, and the official presidency conclusions. 
On the Friday before the European Council, Charles Powell wrote a précis of all the 
briefing material to Margaret Thatcher.959 His main argument was that either there would be 
“modest agreement in principle to amend the [EEC] treaty in a number of rather minor 
 
955 PREM19/1752, S. Wall to C. Powell, “European Council,” 2 December 1985, appendix a: “key points for the 
European Council,” n.d. 
956 TNA CAB148/248, “OD(E)(85) 8th Meeting, Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee Sub-
Committee on European Questions, Minutes of a Meeting held in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office, 
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and Overseas Policy Committee Sub-Committee on European Questions, Intergovernmental Conference,” 15 
November 1985; CAB128/81/34, “Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on 
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957 TNA FCO30/6527, folio no. 2, S. Wall to M. Jay, “IGC: Conclusions and analysis,” 24 December 1985; 
appendix, “Luxembourg European Council: Extent to which UK’s major interests in the IGC are met in the 
presidency’s conclusions,” n.d. 
958 TNA FCO30/6180, folio no. 642, M. Mercer to M. Jay, “European Council: IGC,” 9 December 1985; 
FCO30/6527, folio no. 2, S. Wall to M. Jay, “IGC: Conclusions and analysis,” 24 December 1985; appendix, 
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959 TNA PREM19/1752, C. Powell to M. Thatcher, “European Council,” 29 November 1985. 
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respects” or the different positions would prove to be irreconcilable and the IGC would have 
to continue for “several more months”. Powell suggested that Thatcher’s starting point should 
be her statement to the House of Commons after the Milan summit, in which the Prime 
Minister outlined that she wanted to extend the Single Market, formalise PoCo and involve 
the “European assembly” more. Therefore, even though an IGC and treaty amendment had 
been “unnecessary”, and that “it would have been far simpler to make the various 
improvements without treaty amendment”, these were the policies that she had been 
suggesting all along. Powell argued that in order to reach an agreement that was acceptable to 
the UK government, Thatcher would have to secure the following points: firstly, she would 
have to limit majority voting only to cover article 100 (on approximation of laws for the 
Single Market ) and possibly article 57(2) (on self-employed traders) of the EEC treaty. By 
doing so she would have to make sure that the Single Market did not affect immigration 
control and that unanimity would be maintained on issues of taxation, employee rights, 
human, plant and animal health. Powell argued that if all these aims could be attained, then 
Thatcher could recommend changing the EEC treaty to the House of Commons by arguing 
that at the Luxembourg European Council the Prime Minister had achieved what she had set 
out to do six months earlier in Milan.960  
To prepare Thatcher for the Luxembourg European Council, Stephen Wall gave 
Charles Powell a list of “key points”.961 This list summarised the issues on which the foreign 
ministers and diplomats had not yet been able to reach an agreement during the IGC and 
suggested a negotiating line to Thatcher. Firstly, the Single Market would have to be defined 
as a “market” not as an “area”.962 Secondly, on the powers to be given to the “assembly” and 
the European Commission, the Council should always have the last word. Thirdly, the PoCo 
text could be agreed on. Fourthly, all new treaty articles on technology and the environment 
 
960 Ibid. 
961 PREM19/1752, S. Wall to C. Powell, “European Council,” 2 December 1985, appendix a: “key points for the 
European Council,” n.d. 
962 Ibid. 
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should be subject to unanimity if they looked significant. Fifthly, all questions of monetary, 
social and employment policy should be excluded from the current discussion on treaty 
amendment.963 Lastly, Thatcher would have to decide if she wanted to accept the “Act of 
European Union” which France had tabled, but which in the UK might “raise unnecessary 
suspicions”.964 Powell suggested to Thatcher she should accept it because defining the term 
“European Union” in the SEA would have the advantage of laying to rest the entire debate on 
the term “[European] union”.965 
The list of “key points” consisted of the issues on which the IGC had not yet reached 
an agreement. Moreover, the list reflected the objections from different Whitehall 
departments, which were consulted by the Cabinet Office in the process described above. The 
“key points” on this list were important to the British government, which was confirmed by 
the ministers assembled in the Cabinet sub-committee of OD(E).966 They argued that these 
issues covered “major interests” and were “objectives” that the UK government needed to 
secure from the Luxembourg European Council.967 The discussions in the full Cabinet 
emphasised how “important” it was to the government “not to forfeit the advantage that 
accrued from being an island” and that therefore “protection for [the UK’s] regimes” of 
“human, animal and plant health” had to be sought at the Luxembourg European Council.968 
The implicit question in the list of “key points” was, would it be possible to find an agreement 
on the issues on which Geoffrey Howe had not been able to secure a compromise? Moreover, 
would Thatcher be able to secure concessions where Howe and his negotiating team had not 
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appendix, “Luxembourg European Council: Extent to which UK’s major interests in the IGC are met in the 
presidency’s conclusions,” n.d. 
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yet succeeded? Would Thatcher win these concessions and by doing so be able to persuade 
any sceptics in the Cabinet, Whitehall and the House of Commons? As explained above, the 
Cabinet believed that if Thatcher could secure all the “key points” that were still outstanding 
in the IGC then she could be reasonably certain that she would have the backing of her 
Cabinet for the SEA.  
When the European Council opened, Luxembourg, the country holding the rotating 
presidency of the European Council, suggested that the agreement reached at this European 
Council should be accepted as the “final decision” on all the issues that were being discussed 
in the IGC.969 Afterwards, the foreign ministers should only finalise the legal texts but not 
reopen substantive discussions.970 After the conclave of foreign ministers, a series of 
disagreements and official reserves were still open. On the Single Market, the only 
disagreement was whether to call it an “area” or a “market”, with the difference between these 
two terms being mainly of a broad or narrow definition of a market and the legal 
consequences thereof.971 Article 100, on harmonisation, would be “the cornerstone for the 
implementation of the Single Market”.972 The presidency proposed adding a clause to that 
article to implement the Single Market by qualified majority voting.973 In this discussion the 
UK as well as Ireland raised issues of human, animal and plant health and Germany as well as 
Denmark wanted to be allowed to maintain higher standards. The presidency report argued 
that if there was a large list of exemptions then the Single Market would be weakened to the 
point of “destroying the credibility” of the aim to create the Single Market in the first place.974 
No solution was as yet in sight but Germany suggested in the conclave that a commitment to 
the principle of high standards could potentially solve this debate.975 Further disagreements 
 
969 TNA PREM19/1752, “Conference of the Governments of the member states, presidency report to the 
European Council,” 2 December 1985, 4. 
970 Ibid. 
971 Ibid., “annex 1,” n.d., 5. 
972 Ibid., 6. 
973 Ibid. 
974 Ibid., 7. 
975 Ibid., 6. 
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remained on whether or not to include taxes and EMS, how much “cohesion” money should 
be spent, how to reconcile the different proposals on the European Parliament, how to bring 
technological cooperation into the treaty and which of the other proposals on issues such as 
the environment or fighting cancer should be included in the SEA.976 The text on PoCo was 
largely unopposed and discussions soon focused on the precise wording of the legal text.977 
On the institutional questions, the Luxembourg presidency was positively disposed towards 
giving the European Parliament more “legislative” power and the Council more 
“implementing” responsibilities.978 The presidency also was positively disposed towards 
monetary integration and harmonising taxes.979  
Thatcher secured four agreements on her list of “key points” in which she managed 
to keep issues or practices of cooperation out of the revised EEC treaty and on an 
intergovernmental level. Firstly, Thatcher succeeded in limiting the use of majority voting 
under article 100, so that it would not apply to taxation, free movement of people, or labour 
law. Secondly, Thatcher won the point that article 99, on taxation, would not be subject to 
majority voting. Thirdly, Thatcher won the point that collaboration on issues such as drugs, 
terrorism and immigration would stay on an intergovernmental level, i.e. in the form that she 
had suggested in her original PoCo paper. A fourth negotiation success for northern European 
countries was to limit the extent to which the SEA would commit countries to equalising 
standards of living with transfers from richer to poorer countries in accordance with the 
existing Social and Regional Fund regulations. Despite much pressure from Greece, a 
mention of converging living standards was avoided, and no resource transfer was agreed. 
The final text of the SEA linked cohesion policies to the Single Market but also introduced 
the European Regional Development Fund into the treaty. 
 
976 Apart from proposals on the environment and social policies, proposals were put forward on the ECJ, culture, 
human rights, development, energy and animal protection. Ibid., 5., 8, 10, 12-5. 
977 Ibid., “annex 2,” 26 November 1985. 
978 Ibid., “annex 1,” n.d., 2. 
979 Ibid., 5, 8. 
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On the contentious issue of the European Parliament, Margaret Thatcher and all 
those who wanted to preserve the existing balance of power amongst the EC institutions 
secured a text that resulted in very few changes. The final text introduced a “cooperation” 
mechanism under which the Council had to consult the European Parliament but retained the 
right to make a final decision. In addition, the parliament would be required to agree to new 
member states joining the EC. Crucially, it looked at the time as if no significant new powers 
would be transferred to the EP from national parliaments and the balance of power between 
institutions remained as before. The resulting text in the SEA was far from the “co-decision” 
model that had been discussed during the IGC and had been favoured by the Italian 
government. The Italian delegation was so disappointed with this result that they made the 
agreement of the Italian government contingent on approval by the European Parliament.  
The first concession that Thatcher had to make was on the thorny issue of defining 
the Single Market as a “market” or an “area”. On this issue no agreement could be found 
during the IGC. The fundamental difference was between those who wanted to limit majority 
voting to free trade and those who argued that the EC was more than free trade and that the 
definition of the Single Market should take account of such a broader view. An unsigned 
document in the FCO recorded on “possible solutions to key problems” and suggested that an 
“area” could be accepted if the qualifying remark “as provided by the treaty” was added.980 
This was exactly the formula that was used in the end for the presidency conclusions and the 
SEA. This was a clever solution to the fundamental question of how wide or narrow a market 
should be defined, which had implications on the extent to which majority voting would apply 
to different regulations. This small instance of finding a clever solution in a drafting process 
shows how important an effective diplomatic team was to achieving results in such 
negotiations.  
 
980 TNA FCO30/6179, folio no. 595, “possible solutions to key problems,” n.d. 
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The second concession was on human, animal and plant health, where majority 
voting would apply, and no special exception would be made for the UK. However, the 
amended treaty did not rule out an EC member acting independently, which according to legal 
advice was sufficient protection. National law would apply until it was overturned by the 
ECJ. The third and related concession was on the “measures” that would be introduced by 
majority voting. Thatcher had wanted to split this into “directives” and “regulations”, with 
majority voting applying only to the former in order to make sure that it would only apply to 
the framework of the Single Market. Such a narrow definition of “measures” did not make its 
way into the final treaty. Measures to implement the Single Market would remain only 
broadly defined. However, the European Commission committed itself through a statement on 
record that they would prefer using directives to harmonise laws.981 Moreover, the UK and 
Germany won their points on the importance of national health standards and food hygiene. 
This issue was an important point on which both countries agreed in principle and both 
managed to insert their preferred formula into the final text. 
As mentioned above, one of the most contentious issues in the negotiation of the 
SEA was EMU. According to her memoirs, Margaret Thatcher went into the Luxembourg 
European Council believing that Kohl was on her side on the issue of EMU.982 At their 
bilateral meeting on 27 November 1985, Thatcher and Kohl had agreed that they would keep 
the issue out of the revised treaty. Lawson and Stoltenberg followed the same policy in 
ECOFIN. David Williamson, the head of the European Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, 
believed that the Anglo-German agreement to keep EMU out of the revised treaty “would no 
doubt run into flack” from other delegations.983 When it reached the plenary debate, fire was 
indeed opened on this agreement. Jacques Delors – who had been lobbying for the inclusion 
of the goal of EMU into the revised EEC treaty from the beginning of the IGC – threatened to 
 
981 TNA FCO30/6527, folio no. 2, S. Wall to M. Jay, “IGC: Conclusions and analysis,” 24 December 1985, 
appendix, “Luxembourg European Council: Extent to which UK’s major interests in the IGC are met in the 
presidency’s conclusions,” n.d., 3. 
982 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 555. 
983 TNA FCO30/6179, folio no. 576, M. Jay, “File note, IGC,” 3 December 1985. 
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publicly disassociate himself from the entire conference if EMU was not included in the 
SEA.984 During the Luxembourg European Council, Kohl reneged on his assurance to 
Thatcher to fight to keep EMU out of the amended EEC treaty. Kohl changing his mind 
meant for Thatcher that she had to choose if she wanted to be isolated in refusing to include 
EMU or settle for a symbolic reference in the preamble.  
On social policy, Thatcher held firm against agreeing to majority voting because she 
feared that this would increase the regulatory burden on small companies. David Hannay 
recalled how this debate caused Giulio Andreotti to remark that he never wanted to be 
employed by a company that Thatcher ran.985 This intervention caused a row and necessitated 
a break to allow for apologies.986 Thatcher held out to the end and entered a reserve on the 
issue. She wanted to avoid majority voting on this issue. The final text only partly vindicated 
Thatcher. A separate paragraph was inserted in the final text that committed EC member 
countries to avoid social legislation that would harm small companies. However, the decision 
for “minimum standards” would be taken by qualified majority voting, would be based on a 
proposal from the European Commission in collaboration with the European Parliament and 
would include consultations with the European Economic and Social committee.987 The 
agreed text also strengthened the legal basis for research and technology as well as 
environmental legislation. On the subject of technology, the British aim of securing 
unanimous decision making in the financing of the different research programmes was met. A 
reference to the “market dimension” was inserted and it was agreed that EC programmes 
imposed no limits on the freedom of action for national research and development 
programmes. On the issue of the environment, no additional powers were transferred to the 
 
984 TNA FCO30/61780, folio no. 621, telegram no. 4465, D. Hannay to FCO, “IGC: Brussels 16/17 December, 
Concluding statements,” 17 December 1985; TNA FCO30/61780, folio no. 620, telegram no. 4460, D. Hannay 
to FCO, “IGC: Brussels 16/17 December,” 17 December 1985. 
985 Hannay, Britain’s Quest for a Role, 130. 
986 Ibid. 
987 The European Economic and Social committee is an advisory body, founded in 1957, which is made up of 
representatives from industry and labour unions. See European Economic and Social Committee, ‘European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC)’, accessed 16 June 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/european-economic-social-committee_en. 
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EC and there would be no coordination on environmental issues at international organisations. 
However, there was no hard and fast guarantee that article 100 would not be used to introduce 
directives that had an effect on environmental legislation. Finally, the agreed text introduced a 
court of first instance to reduce the case load for the ECJ. 
On the whole, the UK government could achieve its aims in areas that were within 
the consensus of what other countries also wanted. Cases in point were the formalisation of 
PoCo and the extension of the Internal Market to form the Single Market, which included 
services and meant reducing non-tariff barriers to trade, until the non-binding deadline of 
1992. The UK government negotiated less successfully in areas where it was isolated, such as 
on the issue of human, plant and animal health, or EMU. Therefore, the Luxembourg 
European Council vindicated the negotiating strategy of a “questioning approach” that 
Geoffrey Howe had devised. During the European Council, Thatcher came to realise that she 
had to concede on the legal form of the agreement if she wanted to secure the substantive 
policy outcomes that she wanted. Hence, Thatcher accepted to change the EEC treaty with the 
SEA as the price she had to pay to achieve the outcome that she believed to be in the interest 
of the UK and the EC as a whole, particularly codifying PoCo and extending the Single 
Market. Oliver Miles, the British ambassador to Luxembourg, reflected that the UK 
government had played a constructive role in the entire process even though “our own role … 
was never an easy one” because the UK never wanted treaty change in the first place.988 
However, Miles also believed that there was a “consensus” among the French, German and 
UK governments that the collapse of the negotiations in the IGC would have had a 
detrimental effect on the EC as a whole, which helped to reach a final agreement at the 
Luxembourg European Council.989  
 
988 TNA PREM19/1752, telegram no. 508, R. Miles to FCO, “European Council, Luxembourg 2/3 December 
1985,” 4 December 1985. 
989 Ibid. 
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An important part of the agreement reached at Luxembourg was the commitment not 
to reopen the negotiations once the heads of government had reached an agreement. Normally 
the presidency conclusions of a European Council were the officially agreed wording and 
were written up by the government holding the rotating European Council presidency. It was 
customary not to pick these conclusions apart, even though they did not always represent a 
country’s views to the full extent.990 For instance, the Italian delegate at the IGC preparatory 
group attempted to question the presidency conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council 
but was widely criticised for doing so.991 The chief of staff to Roland Dumas, Marc Perrin de 
Brichambaut, argued that the presidency conclusions of the European Council “faithfully 
reflect the results of the summit at Luxembourg and the content of the agreements” on the 
SEA.992Although the presidency conclusions nearly always understated the bargaining 
involved they were a balanced interpretation of the compromise that had been reached in the 
European Council.993 Therefore, at the Luxembourg European Council it was agreed that the 
compromise reached at this summit would be the final word on the agreement about the 
SEA.994  
Most importantly however, it was UK government policy to resist any reopening of 
the texts that had been agreed at the European Council in Luxembourg.995 If anything, this 
was perhaps the overriding sentiment after the conference. Nothing that was agreed should be 
reopened because if it was the whole agreement might fall. What had been achieved had been 
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hard fought over. Although the result was not perfect, it reflected the best that could be done. 
Collin Budd told Charles Powell that “since we won all our key points in the European 
Council, it is essential for us that the texts should not be changed”.996 Geoffrey Howe reported 
to the assembled Cabinet that “the United Kingdom had maintained its position close to that 
of France and the Federal Republic of Germany; this had headed off attempts by Italy in 
particular, to reopen or add to the texts which had been agreed by the heads of government on 
2-3 December”.997 This impression was not lost on other EC countries. Jacques Viot, the 
French ambassador to the UK, argued that “our British partners have welcomed the results of 
the Luxembourg European Council with evident satisfaction. They consider this meeting to 
have been a real success”.998 Viot argued that the UK government had had three objectives 
after the Milan European Council, which were all met in Luxembourg: firstly, “achieve a 
minimum package in December … particularly on the Internal Market”.999 Secondly, “put an 
end” to the IGC and the “ambitions for institutional reform”.1000 Thirdly, focus the 
negotiations on “free trade” but stay within the provisions of the EEC treaty.1001 The 
ambassador argued that for the UK the “satisfaction is so much greater” because to achieve 
these aims, Thatcher had only to make slight concessions on treaty change and on accepting a 
text on EMU that described the already existing commitments.1002  
After the SEA was agreed, Thatcher’s presentation of the agreement emphasised the 
Single Market as its main outcome and deemphasised PoCo. In the press conference after the 
Luxembourg European Council, Thatcher not even once mentioned the PoCo agreement, 
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which she had championed personally in Milan. Thatcher presented the agreement as a story 
of freeing up the Single Market to increase trade. Thatcher argued that the British 
government’s overriding aim was to liberalise the Single Market for British companies, 
especially for services. Michael Brunson, a journalist for ITN, asked Thatcher in an interview 
if the SEA was not “lessening the sovereignty of Westminster and the right of Britain to make 
its own laws”?1003 Thatcher’s reply is interesting because it acknowledged that powers were 
taken away from Westminster and would now be decided on a European level by majority 
voting: 
“Yes, but you know, in some things a qualified majority was adversely 
affecting us. People, because they would not vote unanimously, were 
stopping us for example in setting up in insurance in Europe. We are good at 
it. … They were stopping some of our young people with qualifications 
practising in Europe. We did not think that was fair, so we have gone to 
qualified majority on those things. On other things, you are quite right. We 
had to stand out and say that if there was qualified majority, our special 
interests were protected. For example, as you know, we have to keep out 
rabies, brucellosis, Colorado beetle and a number of special health things in 
both animals and plants, and we have managed to keep those out by special 
provision. So, you are right. It cuts both ways and you have to watch and 
see that your interests are not adversely affected, but you can in fact set 
up trade and business. There is one thing, you know, this thing called the 
Luxembourg Compromise which says that even if the majority agrees, if 
you have a special interest you can invoke that Compromise and really 
stop it from going through, and that remains”.1004 
 
It is evident from this quote how Thatcher used the trade and the health narrative as 
powerful tools to show that she had fought for the national interest of opening up trade and 
had fought to keep dangerous illnesses away from the British Isles. What makes this reply 
interesting is that the example which Thatcher named as “special provision” to majority 
voting, what in the negotiations was called “human, plant and animal health”, was in fact 
subject to majority voting. The deal reached on this issue was simply that other countries, 
upon insistence of the UK, could keep their deviating national laws unless they were 
 
1003 Interview by Michael Brunson (ITN) with Margaret Thatcher on 4 December 1985, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106188. 
1004 Emphasis added. Margaret Thatcher, quoted in Ibid.  
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overturned by the ECJ. The assembled Cabinet had decided that this was sufficient a 
safeguard. For the UK government it was important to be able to pass health and safety 
legislation “without prior authorisation by the [European] Commission” and that only the ECJ 
could rule that such laws were trade barriers.1005 Moreover, Thatcher argues that the 
Luxembourg Compromise would remain in place and presented it as amounting to a veto, 
which strictly speaking was not correct. Presenting the Luxembourg Compromise in such 
terms omitted to explain that it was in fact a convention that had never been formalised in the 
EEC treaty.1006  
Geoffrey Howe told the assembled Cabinet that “the conclusions [of the IGC] were 
very satisfactory. The United Kingdom had secured all its main objectives”.1007 There 
remained a few outstanding reserves, points of qualification as well as legal and linguistic 
checks to be done. On cohesion, Greece, Ireland and Italy kept a reserve. Italy also kept a 
reserve on the European Parliament. The UK kept a reserve on majority voting on health and 
safety, arguing that such regulations should not become a burden to smaller companies, which 
was formally lifted on 27 January 1986, upon the insertion of a clause to that effect. The UK 
government also successfully resisted French and German attempts to call the agreement an 
“Act of European Union”.1008 In a short-term alliance with Italy, who thought the SEA did not 
go far enough to be called an “act of European Union”, the UK thus contributed to giving the 
SEA its name. Luxembourg, holding the presidency of the European Council, suggested to 
call the agreement a “single act”.1009 Geoffrey Howe reported to the Cabinet that “the results 
of the Intergovernmental Conference would be included in a European Act, the United 
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Kingdom having ensured the rejection of the proposal to entitle this a Treaty of European 
Union”.1010 The name of the SEA was something Thatcher felt was important. Charles Powell 
said that that Thatcher had told him “it is one thing to accept language on European Union in 
a statement by the European Council but another to embody it in a Treaty text which has to be 
got through the House of Commons”.1011 Powell continued, “I should warn you however that 
the Prime Minister will not accept ‘Act of European Union’, though would I think go along 
with ‘European Act’. This has the advantage of being meaningless”.1012 This statement re-
stated Thatcher’s long-standing aversion to the term “European Union”. However, these 
words also show her respect for the EEC Treaty, which equally are a constant theme in her 
views on European integration.  
When Thatcher presented the agreement that had been reached at the Luxembourg 
European Council to the House of Commons she argued that it represented an achievement of 
the aims that she had already pursued at the Milan European Council, in June 1985.1013 
Thatcher argued that the decision to change the EEC treaty was a procedural concession that 
amounted to “some tidying up of the treaty to reflect the community’s development”. As in 
the press conference, Thatcher emphasised that on issues of taxes, employment laws and 
border controls, unanimity would be retained. However, national freedom of action was 
retained on human, animal and plant health. Thatcher argued that these safeguards would 
protect the ability of the House of Commons to take decisions on issues such as terrorism, 
immigration as well as questions of human, animal and plant health. The Luxembourg 
Compromise would remain “unaffected”. The arrangements on giving the “European 
assembly” more say would not result in any “transfer of power” away from the House of 
Commons. Moreover, the PoCo draft that the UK had presented at the Milan European 
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Council, on 28-9 June 1985, would be included. However, unlike in June 1985, in Thatcher’s 
presentation of the SEA to the House of Commons, PoCo was no longer her primary focus. 
Thatcher presented the acceptance of treaty change and the greater use of majority voting as 
the two mechanisms by which the Single Market would be established, which was the 
fulfilment of a long-standing objective of her government.1014 
In the debate that followed, Neil Kinnock, the leader of the opposition, criticised 
Thatcher for “performing a U-turn and agreeing to procedures for amending the [EEC] 
treaty”.1015 He quoted Thatcher’s own statement after the Milan European Council, where she 
said that “I saw nothing before us that would require an amendment to the [EEC] treaty”.1016 
Whilst Kinnock was right that Thatcher had changed her mind on the issue of treaty change, 
he accepted the premise of her argument that this was a procedural necessity to achieve the 
Single Market. Accepting this argument allowed Thatcher to claim in her rebuttal that the 
detailed provisions that were worked out in the IGC safeguarded the national interests and 
that the parts on monetary integration were “merely describ[ing]” the status quo.1017 Jonathan 
Aitken asked Thatcher why she accepted treaty change even though she had previously said 
this was not necessary. Thatcher replied that that even though a change of treaty was a 
procedural question she believed that “if one belongs to a Community, one has to take into 
account other people's views”.1018 Therefore, the argument Thatcher put to the House of 
Commons was one of respecting and expanding the UK’s existing commitments to the EC, 
which would result in benefits for the UK as well as the entire EC. 
In conclusion, based on the evidence analysed for this research it is clear that in the 
IGC alternative ideas of how best to reinvigorate the process of European integration 
confronted each other. These were ideas about the balance between the economic, political 
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and social aspects of the EC as well as to what extent the EC was an inward or outward 
looking community. The Dooge Committee had been a trial run of this process. The IGC went 
through essentially the same questions as this committee. The crucial difference was that in 
the IGC foreign ministers were negotiating possible changes to the EEC treaty. In this 
process, what Michael Butler called a “plethora of proposals” had to be reduced to a set of 
treaty changes that all ten EC countries could agree to.1019 This posed fundamental questions 
on the basic conception of the EC, whether a market included rules on social issues, taxes and 
converging monetary policies. Moreover, if there was a free flow of goods, was there a need 
to keep border checks on health standards? Should poorer members receive financial 
payments? In the process of making such rules, should there be majority voting, could there 
be a veto, and should the European Parliament not be involved more? These issues involved 
difficult trade-offs that were hard to reconcile within a country, let alone in a community of 
what from 1986 would be twelve countries. All of these issues had at their heart the question 
of the balance of decision making between EC institutions and member states. The outcome 
of the IGC was a compromise on exactly such questions. The result of the IGC, which was 
agreed in the European Council on 3 December 1985, was an agreement that focused on the 
notion of liberalising the Single Market, which would be implemented along the lines of a 
White Paper by the European Commission. This would be done by majority voting to prevent 
lengthy disagreements about individual directives. Therefore, majority voting aimed to 
contribute to the greater good of creating a large Single Market for the entire European 
Community. Moreover, the outward-looking political dimension of the EC was strengthened 
with the codification of foreign Policy coordination (PoCo) in the SEA.  
For British diplomats, the IGC began with the challenge that diplomats did not know 
exactly what Thatcher wanted to get out of the IGC, nor what she was likely to accept. They 
were further hemmed in by cautious assessments that came out of consultations with 
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Whitehall. Geoffrey Howe placed a reserve on the outcome of the IGC, arguing that only 
when the scope of the entire package had become clear could Margaret Thatcher decide 
whether or not she could commit her government to the outcome of the IGC. Thatcher’s 
withholding of her commitment to the ongoing negotiations presented Geoffrey Howe and the 
diplomats at the FCO with the challenge of negotiating an outcome without knowing what 
Thatcher would or would not be able to accept. Geoffrey Howe managed this challenge with 
what he called a “questioning approach”. Thereby, the UK government presented no new 
proposals of its own. Instead, the focus of the British diplomats was on the proposals that 
were already on the table. The agreement that emerged from the IGC vindicated Geoffrey 
Howe’s “questioning approach”. It achieved the two principal aims it was designed for. 
Firstly, it exposed the real position of other negotiating partners, while at the same time 
keeping the UK delegation as an interested partner in the negotiations, even though the UK 
presented no new initiatives. Secondly, this approach helped to focus minds at the negotiation 
table on reducing the “plethora of proposals” to a set of limited treaty changes. The reason 
why Howe’s “questioning approach” worked however, was because a consensus congealed 
around the two issues of codifying PoCo and extending the Single Market. All countries were 
able to agree on these two objectives and all countries were willing to compromise on the 
question of how to implement these two objectives.  
The attempt to get the thorny issue of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
remitted to the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) was not successful. Howe 
had intended to take the issue of EMU out of the IGC and let the finance ministers discuss the 
technicalities. Yet Nigel Lawson’s much more confrontational approach in ECOFIN, arguing 
against including EMU in the IGC discussions, contributed to achieving the opposite of what 
it was designed to do. The difference between Howe and Lawson’s approach was over style, 
not the substance of the policy of keeping a commitment to EMU out of the revised EEC 
treaty. Jacques Delors, with the support of François Mitterrand, succeeded in keeping the 
issue of EMU on the agenda of the IGC by arguing that liberalising the Single Market and 
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advancing the cause of monetary integration were inextricably linked. Margaret Thatcher 
disagreed with this view and refused to include a reference to EMU in the SEA. She believed 
that Helmut Kohl shared her view. However, Kohl did not give Thatcher the level of support 
in the European Council that Stoltenberg had given Lawson in ECOFIN. By not backing 
Thatcher on this issue, Kohl backtracked from his previous assurances to Thatcher on the 
subject. At the same time, Kohl’s softer stance prepared the path for a compromise which 
included a commitment to EMU in the preamble of the SEA, but not in the actual text of the 
amendments of the EEC treaty. The case of EMU usefully highlights how Howe’s 
constructive approach was not the only option available but was perhaps a more effective way 
to engage in the IGC than Lawson’s more confrontational approach in ECOFIN. 
The approach of the UK government towards the IGC reflected a fundamental shift 
in Thatcher’s policy making towards the EC that happened after the Milan European Council. 
Until the Milan European Council, in June 1985, she had attempted to lead the EC into the 
codification of PoCo with the proposal of a standalone intergovernmental agreement. This 
approach failed when Germany and France presented their own bilaterally agreed proposal 
and when Italy tabled a vote on an IGC. Margaret Thatcher was thus forced to accept treaty 
change but the issues she had championed lived to fight another day in the IGC. During the 
IGC and at the Luxembourg European Council, the UK government tabled no new proposals. 
Hence, Thatcher gave up her ambition to lead in the EC into the codification of PoCo. 
Instead, she did the opposite of what she had done in the preparation for the Milan European 
Council. Thereby, Thatcher did not initially commit herself to the IGC, as she had done by 
leading the charge on PoCo but let the FCO conduct exploratory negotiations to determine if 
an agreement could be found that was satisfactory to the UK. In this process Geoffrey Howe’s 
“questioning approach” worked to show what other countries would agree to. However, 
Howe’s approach relied on the assumption that the position of the UK was in reality very 
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close to France and Germany, which was an aspect that Howe repeatedly stressed in 
Cabinet.1020  
At the European Council in Luxembourg, Thatcher essentially had to decide between 
accepting the package that was on the table or rejecting her entire European policy since the 
resolution of the BBQ in June 1984. Her entire policy programme of “Europe – the Future”, 
her plan to formalise PoCo, to liberalise the Single Market and thus making the EC more 
market-oriented and more outward looking would potentially have come to nothing. Thatcher 
accepted the package that emerged from the IGC because it contained the policies for which 
she had been fighting over the past eighteen months. The PoCo paper had become a section of 
the SEA and the Single Market would be created, which were the two constant themes in 
Thatcher’s European policy since June 1984. Thatcher’s success at the Luxembourg European 
Council rested to a large extent on the fact that she was able to stand back and let her 
diplomats do the work during the IGC on the basis of the priorities that she had established. 
What had initially begun as a concession to exploratory negotiations, which posed a challenge 
to Howe and the FCO diplomats because they did not know what Thatcher would accept, had 
emerged as a strength because Thatcher sealed an agreement at the Luxembourg European 
Council that contained all the policies she had been fighting for. What made this success 
possible was Thatcher’s abandonment of her refusal to change the EEC treaty. Her success in 
reaching an agreement on the SEA rested in her ability to change tack from wanting to lead 
the charge to codify PoCo in an intergovernmental agreement but then conceding to engage 
cautiously in negotiations that promised similar outcomes, but which were formalised as 
amendments to the EEC treaty.  
Because the SEA consisted of objectives that Thatcher had been advocating 
repeatedly and consistently, she was vindicated on the substance of what was agreed – 
 
1020 TNA CAB128/81/34, “Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 28 
November 1985 at 10.30 am,” 28 November 1985, 5; CAB128/81/37, “Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet 
held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 19 December 1985 at 10.30 am,” 5 December 1985, 5.  
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although it happened in a different legal form from what she had originally proposed. In a 
sense, leading the charge on the codification of PoCo and the Single Market had worked in 
putting these issues on the agenda of the European Council. However, in the way in which 
she attempted to lead – by accepting to introduce the PoCo paper herself to the European 
Council, ruling out multilateral consultations by officials, refusing to contemplate changing 
the EEC treaty and not accepting any of the language of European integration – doomed her 
leadership bid from the start. Moreover, Thatcher did not put forward a vision for the 
European Community of tomorrow. She looked at the EC as it stood in 1984-5. The changes 
she proposed to how the EC worked were either altered practices that fell within the existing 
EEC treaty, or were conceived as intergovernmental agreements that fell outside the EC treaty 
framework. Her refusal to change the EEC treaty not only showed a respect for the treaty 
framework of the EC but also was an adherence on her part to the status quo. Therefore, 
despite proposing major initiatives, she conceived of European integration in static rather than 
in dynamic terms. The SEA consisted of both: a static dimension that addressed the current 
challenges that the EC was facing and a vision for a more integrated Europe. By seeing the 
SEA in terms of her own initiatives, Thatcher temporarily reconciled these two considerations 
– until they would reappear again with the Bruges speech in 1988.  
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Conclusions 
“That great character and statesman Ernest Bevin was asked what the aim of 
his foreign policy really was. His reply: ‘to go down to Victoria Station, get a 
railway ticket and go where the hell I like without a passport or anything else.’ 
That emphasis on breaking down barriers, on taking measures which benefit 
directly our ordinary citizens must be our priority in Europe.” 1021 
Margaret Thatcher (1984) 
“And let me be quite clear. Britain does not dream of some cosy, isolated 
existence on the fringes of the European Community. Our destiny is in Europe, 
as part of the Community.” 1022 
Margaret Thatcher (1988) 
 
The Single European Act (SEA) was Margaret Thatcher’s European moment. By 
negotiating and agreeing to the SEA, Thatcher contributed lastingly to the building of the 
European Community (EC). Nevertheless, the SEA was not the outcome Thatcher had 
originally envisaged. Thatcher proposed to lead the EC into the formalisation of European 
Political Cooperation (PoCo), the hitherto informal way of coordinating foreign policies on a 
European level. Thatcher’s PoCo initiative was meant to be an intergovernmental agreement 
between sovereign states, outside the EC treaty structure. However, Thatcher’s bid to lead the 
EC into the codification of PoCo and thereby make the Community more outward looking 
and more intergovernmental failed. Helmut Kohl, together with François Mitterrand and 
Bettino Craxi, suggested turning Thatcher’s ideas into a formal treaty to found what they 
called a “European Union”. Writing a formal treaty, to be ratified by parliament, and to call 
this the beginning of “European Union” went beyond what Thatcher wanted to achieve with 
her PoCo paper. She wanted to codify existing procedures and not introduce new ones.  
The debate about whether the policies that were being discussed should take the form 
of a standalone intergovernmental agreement or amend the EEC treaty was very important. 
Changing the EEC treaty meant holding an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that could 
 
1021 THCR5/1/5/284, Speech by Margaret Thatcher at Franco-British Council dinner, 30 November 1984, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105804. 
1022 Speech by Margaret Thatcher to the College of Europe in Bruges, 20 September 1988, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332. 
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reopen the entire founding treaty of the EC for potential renegotiation. In short, this was a 
question of either a piecemeal addition to how business was conducted in the Community or 
potentially a wholesale reform of the entire EC. This debate encapsulated the differences in 
views between Thatcher and most of her counterparts in the EC. Therefore, it is significant 
that even though Thatcher was outvoted on holding an IGC to amend the EEC treaty, she 
committed the UK government to taking part in the negotiations in the IGC. During the IGC, 
Thatcher withheld her consent until the shape of the final agreement had become clear.  
Once it became clear that the content of the SEA included the policies that Thatcher 
had advocated, she accepted to change the EEC treaty as concession on the form of the new 
agreement in order to achieve the substance of the policies she desired. The resulting 
agreement, the SEA, turned the Common Market into the Single Market by abolishing non-
tariff barriers to trade, on the basis of a detailed programme that was worked out by the 
European Commission. The PoCo paper, which Thatcher introduced, became one of the 
chapters of the SEA. Moreover, the SEA involved the European Parliament more in the 
process of making European laws, gave the European Commission more executive power and 
further gave the European Court of Justice a court of first instance. Finally, the SEA 
broadened the remit of the EC treaties with a commitment to “economic and social cohesion” 
as well as monetary, social, environmental and technical cooperation.  
Findings and argument 
My research traced the policy making of the UK government towards the SEA, over 
a period of 18 months from June 1984 to December 1985. I have analysed the policy making 
of the UK government towards the SEA in the high-level diplomatic forums that negotiated 
the SEA. My methodology is a historical analysis based on archival sources. I have expanded 
this approach into a multi-archival and multilingual study to broaden the source base and add 
context to my study of the UK and the SEA. Moreover, I have harnessed the computing 
powers of the new digital catalogue at the UK National Archives with a systematic, verifiable 
 229 
and repeatable search of archival records, which is explained in Appendix Two. By 
conducting a multi-archival analysis of the SEA, drawing on a wealth of newly declassified 
sources, this dissertation sheds new light on the role of the British government in the 
diplomatic negotiations towards the SEA. Using the SEA as a lens allows me to assess the 
European policy making of the UK government in 1984-5 and to offer an interpretation as to 
what these events reveal about Margaret Thatcher’s views towards European integration. 
The literature on the UK and the EC has extensively covered the first two 
unsuccessful applications of Britain to join the EEC. In doing so, this literature has 
convincingly shown how since 1961 Harold Macmillan had put the UK lastingly on a path of 
membership of the EEC/EC/EU. Even though the first two applications to join the EEC 
failed, in 1963 and 1967 respectively, Edward Heath eventually secured membership for the 
UK in the EEC in 1973. The established view of Margaret Thatcher in the literature is that she 
began her career with views that were broadly in line with the Conservative policy of 
membership, at a time when the Labour Party was internally split and its leadership advocated 
staying out of the EEC, and ended her career with very sceptical views towards the EU. The 
SEA has been identified as the agreement that Thatcher accepted in order to implement the 
Single Market, but then she began to argue that agreeing to the SEA had been a mistake. In 
essence, the literature has identified the SEA as an important milestone, but has not engaged 
in a detailed study of the archival records that have led to this agreement. Omitting to do so 
has created a gap in the literature, which this Ph.D. dissertation has hopefully filled. Margaret 
Thatcher’s apparent change of views about the SEA is the puzzle that this research has 
studied and on which my dissertation offers a new assessment.  
My research suggests that the Single Market, the focus of most of the literature to 
date, is only part of the story of Thatcher’s motives in signing the SEA. The Single Market 
was, of course, the most tangible result of the SEA – and Thatcher’s advocacy of it also 
chimes with interpretations of her domestic economic programme – but looking only at the 
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outcome risks obscuring the importance of the build-up. If Margaret Thatcher had had her 
way, the process of the SEA would have been different. My analysis of the archival sources 
reveals that the Single Market was an important factor, and eventually became the overriding 
justification by Thatcher and the UK government for accepting the SEA. However, this 
research also revealed that the focus on the Single Market came to prominence only once the 
agreement for the SEA was in place. Crucially, the Single Market was only one part of the 
SEA. For Thatcher, especially in the first half of 1985, the issue of the Single Market was 
overshadowed by her ambition to lead the EC into an agreement that formalised PoCo. In the 
first half of 1985, the Single Market as an issue ran alongside the discussions of coordinating 
the foreign policies of EC countries. Back then, the overriding question for the UK 
government was whether or not the PoCo agreement should be a part of the EEC treaty, or 
form a separate intergovernmental agreement. Thatcher and the UK government were against 
changing the EEC treaty for fear that renegotiating the founding treaty of the EEC could risk 
reopening past compromises and could possibly take European integration in a more 
supranational direction. Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand at first also expressed 
themselves against holding an IGC to change the EEC treaty. However, when they were asked 
to vote on the issue at the Milan European Council in June 1985, they voted in favour of an 
IGC. Amid all these disagreements about the form of treaty amendment, turning the Internal 
Market into the Single Market was a relatively uncontroversial issue, on which some kind of 
agreement was never in doubt. 
From a British perspective, the real story underpinning the making of the SEA was 
Thatcher’s ambition to lead the EC into the codification of the hitherto informal practice of 
PoCo. After the British Budget Question (BBQ) was resolved in June 1984, which had held 
up the business of the EC for five years, Thatcher presented a policy paper entitled “Europe – 
the Future”. This paper was meant as a way to take part in a discussion on how to reform the 
EC and make it fit for the challenges of the 1980s, which included increased economic 
competition from Japan and the USA as well as the end of détente. The first chapter of this 
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dissertation showed how Thatcher’s government engaged constructively in the debate on how 
to reform the institutions of the EC in the Dooge Committee. In spring 1985, Thatcher invited 
Helmut Kohl to a private meeting at Chequers to convince him to support her in the 
presentation of an initiative to codify PoCo, which she planned to present to the European 
Council. Chapter two showed the extent to which Thatcher perceived Kohl to be a key figure 
in the politics of the EC. This bilateral meeting exposed the differences in views on the 
question of European integration between the two heads of government. Thatcher wanted a 
standalone agreement to codify PoCo whereas Kohl wanted a formal treaty on “European 
Union”, which he used as a broad term to base German foreign policy in a European context. 
Kohl wanted to give the institutions of the EC, especially the EP, more powers but Thatcher 
wanted to keep the status quo. 
The third chapter explained how at the Milan European Council, on 28-9 June 1985, 
Thatcher was prepared to present the PoCo paper as a personal high-level initiative, with the 
backing of Kohl and Mitterrand, and to lead the EC into the codification of PoCo. It was 
personal because Thatcher agreed to present it herself to the other heads of government and 
high-level because only the heads of governments and a few selected foreign office officials 
were allowed to see it. Based on the recommendation from Geoffrey Howe, which Thatcher 
approved, foreign ministers and diplomats were instructed not to alter the PoCo initiative, 
until Thatcher had herself presented it to her counterparts. At the same time, Kohl and 
Mitterrand convened a series of secret meetings of trusted officials who amended Thatcher’s 
paper to broaden its institutional ambitions and to give it the title “European Union”. At the 
Milan summit, the clash between these two rivalling papers came to a head and Thatcher’s 
PoCo initiative was overtaken by a vote to call an IGC to negotiate changing the EEC treaty.  
The fourth chapter showed how the resulting IGC at first looked in many ways like a 
rerun of the Dooge Committee. Very importantly, Thatcher withheld her commitment to the 
IGC negotiations until the final outcome of the conference had become clear but allowed 
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Howe to negotiate on an exploratory basis. It was at the end of the IGC, when Thatcher saw 
that her PoCo initiative and extending the Single Market were both part of the agreement and 
she had secured safeguards on the issue of human, animal and plant health, when she took the 
decision to agree to the SEA. The initiatives she had championed, mainly PoCo and the 
Single Market, were all there. Thatcher made a concession on more majority voting to achieve 
the Single Market and gave up her insistence on not reopening the EEC treaty. All these 
considerations convinced her to agree to changing the EEC treaty and to commit the UK 
government to accepting the SEA. Thatcher’s acceptance of the outcome of the IGC at the 
European Council in Luxembourg, on 3 December 1985, helped to pave the way for 
amending the founding treaty of the EEC with the SEA. 
Most of the literature on Thatcher’s attitudes towards European integration has either 
seen Thatcher’s policy as a puzzle, perhaps a trick, or has charted a trajectory of her growing 
Euroscepticism. My research shows that extending PoCo and liberalising the Single Market 
were her overriding motivations to agree to the SEA. They were in line with her well-
documented policy preferences of liberalising markets and strengthening the West in the Cold 
War. With her PoCo initiative, Thatcher wanted the EC to play a role in world affairs by 
aiding member states to coordinate their views on international events. Internally, Thatcher 
wanted a liberalised market to be at the heart of the EC. It helped of course that both in terms 
of wider foreign policy and liberalising the Single Market, she knew that Britain would be in 
a strong position to play a leading role. She therefore played to her own strengths, as one of 
the longest-serving Prime Ministers in the EC with strong international connections, and 
sought to make use of Britain’s standing in the world as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council. Leading on the issue of PoCo in the EC would help to bring about a more 
outward-looking EC and could have given Britain a significant role in shaping the processes 
of PoCo. If one looks at her PoCo initiative in the context of her established views of the 
world, then advocating a more coherent voice of the EC in world affairs appears almost to be 
a logical conclusion. Moreover, by agreeing to present the PoCo paper and by championing 
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an outward looking EC – as a Community with a more coherent foreign policy, in a Western 
framework – she accepted a view that put Britain at the heart of the EC. In that sense she 
followed in the footsteps of Harold Macmillan and Edward Heath. Therefore, looking at 
Thatcher’s attitudes towards European integration through the lens of the SEA shows that 
Thatcher perceived the role of Britain to be a leading member of the EC.  
Where Thatcher’s ambition to lead the EC into the formalisation of foreign policy 
coordination fell short was in her understanding of the diplomatic negotiation forums of the 
EC. She had little patience for the painstaking drafting and redrafting of texts in a multilateral 
setting. Sharing drafts widely and building a consensus were famously not her style of 
governing. Therefore, to present the PoCo paper as a personal high-level initiative left unused 
the resources of diplomats, who could have negotiated agreements in advance, and of the 
European Commission as broker of compromises. Holding multilateral consultations might 
have succeeded in convincing the other EC countries and the European Commission of 
Thatcher’s PoCo initiative. However, involving diplomats from other EC countries would 
probably have changed the PoCo paper and broadened its scope. Conceivably, Howe’s 
suggestion for a personal high-level initiative might also have been designed to let Thatcher 
declare how much she wanted to engage in the European integration. Seen from this angle, 
Howe might not have wanted any changes to the paper because Thatcher would perhaps not 
have agreed to them. To present the PoCo paper as a personal, high-level initiative by the 
Prime Minister saved him having to ask her if she approved any of these changes. Yet it is 
clear that she approved the initiative, presented it to Kohl as her own, and planned to present 
it herself to the European Council in Milan. She thus accepted the PoCo paper as her own and 
planned to present it as her own initiative.  
Once the vote to hold an IGC exposed the shortcomings of Thatcher’s PoCo 
initiative, her ambition to lead the EC multilaterally into the codification of PoCo ended. 
Subsequently, her approach changed from a high-level intervention, with minimum 
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involvement of officials, to a broad but cautious level of engagement, driven by Geoffrey 
Howe and the FCO officials. Initially, it was not clear to Howe and the diplomats what 
Thatcher would be able to accept. Yet this change of approach, coupled with Thatcher’s 
ability to stand back during the IGC to let Howe and the FCO officials negotiate, resulted in 
the SEA in its final form. Market liberalisation became in the later stages of negotiating the 
SEA the guiding principle and a public rationale for the British involvement in the IGC and 
commitment to the SEA. This all suggests that Thatcher’s European policies were most 
effective when the UK government was constructively engaged in the process of European 
integration, such as during the Dooge Committee or the IGC. However, it was less successful 
when Thatcher attempted to confront or lead on the basis of presenting a personal high-level 
initiative to the European Council. Therefore, much of the success in Thatcher’s negotiations 
towards the SEA can be attributed to Geoffrey Howe and the FCO in their ability to bridge 
gaps and negotiate effectively in a multilateral setting. 
Missed opportunities in Thatcher’s bid to lead the EC into foreign policy coordination 
The literature has identified the SEA as an important moment in Britain’s relations 
with the EC. However, how Britain negotiated towards the SEA has not yet been examined 
with a detailed multi-archival analysis, which is a gap my research fills. In the story of how 
the SEA came about, the Milan European Council, on 28-9 June 1985, was a watershed, both 
for the UK and the EC. For the EC it was the first time an IGC was convened with the 
objective of negotiating major changes to the EEC treaty. Since this IGC was not called by 
consensus, but by a vote in the European Council, Denmark, Greece and the UK took part in 
an IGC even though their heads of government had expressed themselves against holding 
such a conference. Setting up an IGC was not preordained. Indeed, on the first day of the 
European Council, most heads of government either rejected the idea or expressed reluctance. 
Bettino Craxi, the Italian Prime Minister who was chairing the summit, kept the issue on the 
agenda by a combination of determination and clever use of the agenda setting powers of the 
chair. On the second day, with the support of European Commission president Jacques 
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Delors, Craxi argued that all conditions for a vote under article 236 of the EEC treaty had 
been met. Margaret Thatcher disagreed, arguing that the EP had not yet been consulted. 
Delors replied that the EP’s views were well known and argued that a vote could very well go 
ahead. Craxi then proceeded to hold a vote on whether or not to hold an IGC. Thatcher, 
together with the Danish and Greek Prime Ministers, found herself outvoted. With this vote, 
Kohl and Mitterrand were forced to abandon their conditional statements on holding an IGC 
and had to decide whether they wanted to either stand by their pro-European rhetoric and vote 
for an IGC, or vote against it and risk damaging their credibility as publicly committed 
“Europeans”. They chose to affirm their pro-European credentials by voting for an IGC.  
For the UK government, the Milan European Council also marked a turning point. In 
Milan, Thatcher’s strategy of leading the EC into the codification of foreign policy was 
overtaken by a German-French initiative, which borrowed heavily from Thatcher’s paper but 
aimed to further strengthen the EC institutions, give the agreement treaty status and the title 
“Treaty of European Union”. In terms of its contents, Thatcher could not realistically turn 
around and oppose what Kohl and Mitterrand were proposing. However, her policy of 
avoiding changing the EEC treaty had failed and a change of strategy was needed. In altering 
her approach, Thatcher opted not to oppose an IGC but elected to engage without 
commitment and only decide if she wanted to support changing the EEC treaty once the 
results of the IGC had become clear. Even though an IGC could be convened by majority 
vote, changing the EEC treaty required unanimous consent from all EC members. Therefore, 
the German-French initiative and the Milan summit marked the end of a year in which 
Thatcher attempted to proactively and constructively influence the direction of the EC with 
personal high-level initiatives. For Margaret Thatcher, Milan was the moment when she was 
forced to abandon her strategy to lead and began to engage cautiously and reactively in the 
IGC. This change meant that Thatcher ceased to put forward her own proposals about how the 
EC could be improved, as she had done in Fontainebleau in 1984 and again in Milan with her 
PoCo paper. Instead, the FCO no longer presented new initiatives in the IGC and only 
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negotiated alterations to existing ones. Thatcher reserved her agreement to the outcome of the 
IGC until the shape of the final package had become clear, during the Luxembourg European 
Council, on 3 December 1985. For Thatcher this policy shift was rooted in the failure to lead 
the EC into the codification of PoCo at Milan.  
Three missed opportunities can be identified on the road to the SEA. Analysing the 
act in terms of missed opportunities shows that the PoCo paper was not intended to put the 
UK on a conflicting path with the other EC members; on the contrary – accepting to put 
forward plans for the codification of PoCo shows that Thatcher saw the UK as a leading 
member of the EC. Moreover, looking at the SEA in terms of missed opportunities shows that 
the act was not from the outset meant to be an agreement that would be dominated by the 
Single Market, as is often argued in the literature, but was a battle of ideas and visions for the 
future of the EC. The first missed opportunity in how the UK negotiated towards the SEA was 
not to recognise that other countries saw an IGC not as threat but as an opportunity. The FCO 
assumed that Germany and France would not be drawn into an IGC, which turned out to be 
wrong. At the heart of this missed opportunity to gain support for the British initiative, was a 
failure to broaden the scope of the PoCo paper and make it more reflective of what was 
discussed in the Dooge Committee. Moreover, to focus almost exclusively on Germany and 
France was a mistake. Smaller member states, or the European Commission, could have 
usefully helped to find compromises or creative new ideas for possible ways forward. Giving 
Germany such a preeminent position in Britain’s diplomacy towards the EC points towards a 
more fundamental shift in how the UK conducted diplomacy as a member of the EC in the 
1980s. In the 1960s and 1970s, France, de Gaulle and Pompidou had been central to Britain’s 
European diplomacy. Equally significant were smaller countries who were from the outset 
sympathetic to Britain’s membership to the EEC, such as the Netherlands. The focus on 
Germany reflected a change in how the UK conducted foreign policy in the EC and a 
recognition of Germany’s strong economy, which after Willy Brandt was replaced by Helmut 
Schmidt progressively translated into a more active role on the world stage. 
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The second missed opportunity was the visit of Helmut Kohl to Chequers on 18 May 
1985. Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher both wanted to win the other over for their own 
plans, but both failed to do so. Yet they were hampered by their famously difficult 
relationship, characterised by differences in personality, language and world view. Thatcher 
wanted to share her PoCo paper in confidence and win Kohl’s support at the European 
Council. Kohl promised to be in touch with comments but was more interested in developing 
aspects that would fit into the broader theme of “European Union”. Having failed to convince 
Thatcher, Kohl met Mitterrand and they agreed to work on a shared paper, which drew 
heavily on the PoCo paper that Thatcher had proposed. The German-French paper was written 
in secret consultations, led by Horst Teltschik and Jacques Attali. Italy was approached with 
the suggestion to present it as a presidency proposal but declined. The UK was to be kept 
informed, which never happened. Eventually, simply too much time was lost trying to find a 
compromise. When Kohl came under pressure in the Bundestag for not doing enough to 
advance European integration, he revealed the existence of the German-French paper without 
prior warning to anyone. The result was anger, both in Paris and London. The result of all 
these diplomatic efforts was that two conflicting papers were presented to the Milan European 
Council. The two papers were very similar in the sense that they both wanted to codify the 
existing informal foreign policy coordination practices. However, they were very different in 
their outlook for the future. Even though the German-French paper was based on the British 
PoCo proposals, it was much more ambitious in planning to give the EC institutions more 
powers and in wanting to create a “Treaty of European Union”. The German-French paper 
has an institutional dimension that the British paper lacked.  
The third missed opportunity was to reconcile both these papers at the meeting of 
foreign ministers in Stresa, on 8-9 June 1985. Geoffrey Howe shared the British PoCo paper 
with his colleagues but warned them that these ideas were not for discussion by officials. 
Howe suggested that Margaret Thatcher wanted to present this paper herself to the European 
Council in its current form. To present the PoCo paper at Stresa without allowing any input 
 238 
from ministers or officials lost it the element of surprise. The proposal was known but could 
not be interacted with. Not permitting diplomats to discuss the paper meant that no support 
could be built around its key ideas. The outcome was neither a shared initiative nor a surprise. 
Therefore, not involving officials was a mistake that left many of the resources of persuasion 
that were available to diplomatic officials unused. The meeting of foreign ministers in Stresa 
could have been an opportunity to build support in favour of the British PoCo paper. Calling 
the PoCo paper a treaty could have been a worthwhile concession in exchange for political 
backing.  
Neither the British nor the German-French approach to these negotiations eventually 
helped to bridge the divide that opened up at the Milan European Council. The rift that 
appeared at this meeting masked the extent to which Thatcher had been willing to accept the 
existing EEC treaty and her willingness to lead the EC into codifying existing foreign policy 
coordination mechanisms. It is an important finding of this dissertation that with the SEA, 
Thatcher displayed commitment to EC membership and even a willingness to lead in the EC. 
The failure of the PoCo initiative can be explained by the fact that when it came to winning 
support for her policies in the EC, she could not to do so because she was arguing from a 
relatively isolated position. Therefore, a change of course became necessary. It was 
Thatcher’s ability to change tack and her willingness to stay engaged in the ongoing 
discussions, despite all the disagreements, which made a successful participation of the UK in 
the IGC possible. Even though the commitment to treaty change was not yet there, the 
willingness to engage in talks in the IGC alone was a significant step towards an agreement to 
change the EEC treaty, paving the way for the SEA. 
Agreeing to the SEA: trickery or compromise? 
The question of what the British policy making towards the SEA was, and what this 
says about Thatcher’s attitudes towards European integration has guided this research: how 
could she negotiate an agreement but afterwards criticise it – to the point of implying that she 
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regretted it? As the literature review has shown, this conundrum has often been explained by 
suggesting that Thatcher was “tricked”, “duped” or even “misled” when she negotiated the 
SEA. My Ph.D. dissertation shows that no such trickery took place, but that Thatcher agreed 
to the SEA as part of a series of compromises. Many of these compromises were reached in 
the IGC to negotiate the SEA, which took place over a period of three months and was 
attended by foreign ministers and officials. The Prime Ministers and presidents of the EC 
finalised this process of finding compromises and brought the agreement over the finishing 
line during the European Council, in Luxembourg on 2-3 December 1985. The beginning of 
the IGC looked in many ways like the Dooge Committee due to an emphasis on gathering 
ideas about how to reform the EC. Many of the papers and ideas presented in the IGC drew 
on the work of the Dooge Committee. The main proposals for the IGC suggested 
implementing the Single Market, collaborating more on research, technology and the 
environment, providing “cohesion” funds for poorer member states, coordinating foreign and 
security policies and committing the EC to monetary as well as fiscal integration. The 
European Commission had already floated the idea of calling the treaty amendment that 
would emerge from the IGC a “single act”, as a way to symbolically re-state the original aims 
of the EC.  
For Geoffrey Howe and the FCO officials, one of the principal challenges in the IGC 
was to reach an agreement on a package without knowing whether or not Thatcher would 
eventually accept the outcome. Geoffrey Howe devised what he called a “questioning 
approach”, which managed this uncertainty by focusing on whittling down the proposals that 
were already on the table to what he thought was acceptable to Thatcher. For this approach, 
the Luxembourg European Council was a moment of truth. Would Margaret Thatcher accept 
the package that had been negotiated in the IGC, or would she reject months of careful 
negotiations? The FCO gave Thatcher a list of “key points” that the IGC had so far not been 
able to resolve. This list closely followed the priorities that the Cabinet sub-committee on 
European questions of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (OD(E)) had defined as 
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the UK government’s policy aims for the IGC. This list was informed by Whitehall 
consultations on the issues that were being discussed in the IGC. The list of “key points” 
formed the negotiation brief that Thatcher took with her to the European Council in 
Luxembourg. The question implicit in this list was, would Thatcher be able to negotiate a 
compromise on the remaining outstanding points of the IGC and would she be able to accept 
the resulting compromise? Crucially, these negotiations forced Thatcher to clarify her own 
views on the detailed aspects of European integration which were discussed in the IGC and 
came to form the SEA.  
Thatcher successfully negotiated the majority of the outstanding issues on her list of 
“key points”, on the basis of what had been prepared in the IGC. Chapter four explained how 
the IGC and the Luxembourg European Council resulted in a series of compromises. Firstly, 
the Single Market was defined as an “area”, but limited in scope to “as provided by the 
treaty”. This debate was important because it was a clash between two different views of a 
market, one involving social legislation and the other emphasising deregulation. The result 
was a definition of the Single Market that encompassed more social and environmental 
aspects, but only as far as the EEC treaty allowed. For Thatcher, this agreement was not really 
a victory, but it was a compromise in the sense that she agreed to a wider scope of the Single 
Market as long as this was limited to the extent defined in the EEC treaty. In essence, it was a 
reaffirmation of the status quo in the form of the EEC treaty. This compromise showed how 
Thatcher viewed European integration in static rather than dynamic terms.  
The second compromise was on the issue of human, animal and plant health. 
Thatcher had argued against majority voting on the issue but could not carry the point. 
Instead, she was given assurances that the treaty amendments of the SEA would not preclude 
an EC member government enacting its own health and safety laws, as long as they were not 
overturned by the ECJ. The points that Thatcher could secure successfully were issues of 
taxation, free movement of people and labour laws, on which all decisions would continue to 
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be made unanimously, i.e. not by majority vote. Moreover, collaborations on issues such as 
drugs, terrorism and immigration would remain at an intergovernmental level and would not 
fall under the remit of the SEA. Finally, no substantive “cohesion” transfer of resources 
would happen from richer to poorer countries, an issue which had been strongly advocated by 
Greece. In all these points, the final agreement was very close to the position that Thatcher 
and the British government had originally advocated. Thatcher succeeded in keeping these 
points out of the SEA and thereby managed to narrow the scope of the SEA. Therefore, her 
achievements are just as apparent in the issues that were left out of the SEA as in the clauses 
of the act itself. However, a commitment to “economic and social cohesion” was maintained 
in the SEA, which forms part of the legacy of the act in paving the way for the introduction of 
cohesion policies during the implementation of the SEA. 
The third compromise concerned the institutional arrangements of the SEA, which 
had been one of the principal disagreements between Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl as 
well as one of the main differences between the rivalling papers that were presented at the 
Milan European Council. The result in the SEA was not the “co-decision” model that had 
been advocated by Italy during the IGC. Instead, the result was in institutional terms a victory 
for the intergovernmentalist view of the EC because the European Council, and with it the 
heads of government, were keeping the last word on any major decision in the EC. The 
European Parliament would be consulted more by the Council, in what was called a 
“cooperation” process. However, even though these measures looked modest at the time, the 
European Parliament turned out to be able to use them effectively and expand them 
significantly during the 1990s, which forms part of the perhaps unexpected legacy of the 
SEA. Moreover, the European Commission would be given more executive powers, which 
however could again be taken away by the Council. Lastly, despite conceding only limited 
new powers to the institutions of the EC, the SEA broadened the scope of the EC treaties by 
introducing a commitment to collaborate in research, technology and environmental 
programmes. The commitment to these issues in the SEA was however limited and, on the 
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urging of Margaret Thatcher, a reference to a “market dimension” was inserted. On social 
policy, Thatcher had to concede to majority voting, despite having a furious row on the issue 
with Giulio Andreotti. Thatcher could only secure a provision arguing that administrative 
burdens should not be placed on small companies.  
The issue of committing the EC to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was seen 
directly after the Luxembourg European Council as a compromise. The fourth chapter 
explained how Geoffrey Howe had wanted the entire discussion of EMU to be referred to 
ECOFIN, in order to keep the finance ministers in charge of the debate and keep the issue of 
monetary integration out of the EEC treaty. Despite Howe’s efforts, the discussion on EMU 
was kept alive in the IGC by the European Commission, with the support of France. It is 
tempting to argue that with hindsight this was a defeat for Thatcher. However, nobody could 
have known that the nominal mention of EMU in the preamble of the SEA would be the basis 
on which Jacques Delors could subsequently convince the European Council that the Single 
Market and monetary integration had to be implemented together.1023 Monetary integration 
after 1985 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 lie outside the scope of my research. However, 
in the context of this Ph.D. dissertation, it is important to recognise that monetary integration 
was one of the issues that hardened Thatcher’s views towards the EC in the second half of the 
1980s. Therefore, to fully appreciate how this fateful mention of monetary integration in the 
preamble of the SEA came about, and how Thatcher came to accept it, is an important part of 
an explanation why she later resented having signed the SEA.  
Helmut Kohl had originally told Thatcher that he was against introducing EMU into 
the SEA, but then hinted to Delors as well as Mitterrand that he was ready to re-examine the 
issue. However, Kohl’s assurances, the Bundesbank’s traditional scepticism towards the issue 
and Nigel Lawson’s confidence that Germany did not want EMU, all contributed to giving 
 
1023 Jacques Delors, ‘Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community’ (Brussels: 
European Commission, 1989), http://aei.pitt.edu/1007/. 
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Thatcher a sense of security that she had Kohl’s support in arguing against EMU. Eventually, 
during the Luxembourg European Council, Helmut Kohl altered his position and agreed to a 
mention of the issue in the preamble of the SEA. Kohl’s changed position presented Thatcher 
with a choice of whether or not she wanted to isolate herself on the issue by continuing her 
policy of refusing a mention of EMU in the SEA, or choose the path of cooperation by 
agreeing to a mention of the already existing practice of the EMS and a broader commitment 
to EMU in the preamble of the SEA. Such a solution had the added benefit that by bringing 
the issue within the remit of the SEA, any further development of the EMS would need 
unanimous support, which looked to Thatcher like a kind of insurance policy against anyone 
trying to achieve EMU by majority voting. By accepting a mention of EMU in the preamble 
of the SEA, Thatcher opted to continue Howe’s policy of constructive engagement and did 
not follow Lawson’s advice of a more confrontational approach.  
Lawson’s advice to Thatcher and his more confrontational line in ECOFIN, which 
deviated in style but not in policy substance from Howe’s overall approach to the negotiations 
in the IGC, plays an important role here. Nigel Lawson, having at first advocated accepting a 
nominal mention of monetary integration in the SEA, hardened his position against including 
any mention of EMU in the IGC, because he thought he had the support of the German 
finance minister. Consequently, Lawson advised Thatcher to reject any mention of EMU in 
the SEA. By doing so, Lawson departed from Howe’s “questioning approach” and opted for a 
straightforward confrontation with the European Commission which were advocating 
including a commitment to EMU in the SEA. Lawson’s more straightforward refusal to 
discuss EMU in the IGC looked rather more like a question of style than policy. However, his 
harder position in ECOFIN ended up isolating Thatcher in the discussion about EMU in the 
IGC. During the Luxembourg European Council, Kohl changed the German position to 
support a mention of monetary integration in the preamble, which together with Delors and 
Mitterrand’s support succeeded in bringing the subject of EMU within the remit of the SEA. 
The more confrontational line which Nigel Lawson pursued, usefully showed how a negative 
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negotiating line could backfire and as such resulted in making unplanned concessions once 
everyone was assembled around the European Council table.  
For Thatcher, the negotiation of the SEA was a success in the instances where she 
followed Howe’s “questioning approach” and built on the areas where support could be 
generated around shared interests. Such shared interests included extending the Single Market 
and introducing majority voting in order to lower non-tariff barriers to trade. Moreover, 
formalising the foreign policy coordinating mechanisms of the EC was also supported by a 
majority of EC countries. On the subject of PoCo, the final agreement was very similar to the 
paper that Thatcher had planned to present as her personal high-level initiative at the Milan 
European Council. Ultimately, Thatcher accepted the SEA for its content, despite its form as a 
formal amendment to the EEC treaty. Thatcher’s ambition to lead failed not because there 
was not enough support for formalising PoCo. It was her bid to lead the EC into the 
formalisation of PoCo and her view of a more intergovernmental, outward-looking EC which 
the other heads of government rejected. They wanted a political vision to complement the 
Single Market and PoCo, a renewed impetus to strengthen the institutions of the EC and to 
broaden their remit into the fields of monetary, environmental and social policies, in a form 
which Thatcher could or would not provide.  
For the British government, the success of the SEA lay in Thatcher’s change of 
approach after her failure to lead the EC into the codification of PoCo at the European 
Council in Milan. The success of engaging in the IGC rested on taking a constructive attitude 
and avoiding isolation. The author of this success was Geoffrey Howe, with his “questioning 
approach” to the IGC, by which he followed a policy that harnessed a large degree of overlap 
in interests between the UK, France and Germany. However, Thatcher’s change of approach, 
standing back after wanting to lead and letting events unfold, did much to commit the UK 
government to the outcome of the IGC. The reason why the PoCo agreement became to be 
seen as being less prominent in the SEA than at the Milan European Council can be found in 
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how Thatcher and the British government chose to present the SEA. The SEA was presented 
as a major achievement in freeing up the Single Market, both in the press conference after the 
Luxembourg European Council as well as in the House of Commons. Thatcher thus presented 
the agreement as a victory in market liberalisation, while not forgetting human, animal and 
plant safeguards. The foreign policy aspect which Thatcher had championed thereby faded 
into the background and the Single Market took centre stage. 
Implications for the historiography 
The research for this Ph.D. dissertation has narrowly focused on analysing how the 
UK negotiated towards the SEA from 1984 to 1985. The findings suggest implications for 
future research on the history of the UK in the EC. The UK was by 1984 a fully integrated 
member of the EC. The relationship of the UK and the EC could no longer realistically be 
seen in terms of “missing the bus” towards the continent, as most of the early literature had 
indicated. By analysing the diplomatic interactions on the subject of European integration, 
this dissertation suggests that by 1984-5 it was too simple to see Britain only in terms of the 
“awkward partner” that Stephen George observed.1024 Moreover, this research intersects with 
the literature on the “relaunch” of European integration in the 1980s and the biographies of 
Thatcher. My Ph.D. dissertation highlights the importance of contrasting views and visions in 
shaping the process of European integration. My account of how the UK engaged in the 
negotiations that led to the SEA goes beyond examining the SEA in terms of the existing 
theoretical fault lines, such as interstate bargaining versus the importance of “supranational 
entrepreneurs”.1025 Instead, by drawing on sources from multiple archives, this dissertation 
traced the evolution of Britain’s policies towards the SEA and analysed what this says about 
the role of Margaret Thatcher and her views on the subject of European integration. Doing so 
has allowed this dissertation to study what the policies of the UK government towards the 
 
1024 George, An Awkward Partner. 
1025 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe; Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act’; Sandholtz and 
Zysman, ‘1992: Recasting the European Bargain’. 
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SEA was, without the benefit of hindsight. As explained in the introduction, the focus of the 
UK government and Thatcher and the access to archival sources has imposed limits on what 
this dissertation could say about French and German policies. Moreover, there are limitations 
to piecing together Thatcher’s views based on archival sources and public statements. After 
all, her attitudes towards European integration were complex, changed over time and have 
remained enigmatic. 
The methodology used for this Ph.D. research could usefully be applied to the study 
of Britain and European integration in the second half of the 1980s and the negotiations 
leading up to the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, this methodology could be used to analyse the 
evolution of policy towards the SEA of the other nine EC countries as well as the European 
Commission. The findings of this Ph.D. dissertation are a useful puzzle piece not only for 
anyone who is interested in Thatcher’s European policy making but also for researchers who 
work on Thatcher and the end of the Cold War. The archival sources from the early 1990s are 
now slowly being declassified. The release of new archival sources will offer fresh insights 
and could usefully be contrasted with further multiarchival research. My research on the UK 
and the SEA speak to wider themes that could be of importance to future research and may 
contribute to a reassessment of the significance of the SEA. Thatcher’s policies towards the 
SEA were not the “basic failure of the British Europeanists to promote a fresh start” and were 
so much more than the “brief parenthesis of active engagement” that Poggiolini and Pravda 
have argued.1026 When telling the story of the Single Market, it is important to recognise that 
the focus on market liberalisation was neither preordained nor automatic. It is true that 
reinvigorating the European economies was an issue that commanded much agreement across 
the EC. Yet how this should be done, or in which form, was part of the debate in which the 
SEA served as the agreement that prepared the treaty framework of the EC for the 
 
1026 Poggiolini and Pravda, ‘Britain in Europe in the 1980s: East & West. Introduction,’ 16. 
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implementation of the White Paper of the European Commission, which became to be known 
as the “1992 programme” to create the Single Market.1027  
Scholars working on the implementation of the Single Market and EMU will 
hopefully find this dissertation interesting in terms of what it reveals about how these issues 
became part of the SEA. However, this dissertation intends to put the economic element of 
the SEA in context and explain how it was one but not the overriding motivation for Thatcher 
– even though it later became her main justification for agreeing to it. Moreover, this 
dissertation sheds new light on the European Political Cooperation element of the SEA, which 
has frequently been overshadowed by the Single Market. For instance, Guasconi has argued 
that the SEA “was not originally designed to deal with foreign policy issues”.1028 By situating 
the SEA as the moment when Thatcher attempted, and failed, to lead the EC into the 
formalisation of EC foreign policy coordination, this dissertation throws new light on the 
under-researched foreign policy aspect of the SEA. Therefore, for Thatcher foreign policy 
coordination was the dominant element of the SEA, one on which she was prepared to take 
the lead in the EC, whereas the Single Market was for most of the time an issue that ran 
alongside the political topics.  
Telling the story of the SEA offers a lens to interpret Thatcher’s views on European 
integration and the world. Unlike Winston Churchill, Margaret Thatcher was not a prolific 
writer. In this context it is significant that she chose to write three long-hand accounts during 
her time as Prime Minister: one about the Falklands War, a second one about the settlement of 
the BBQ and a third account on the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko.1029 Hence, Thatcher 
chose to write her own accounts on three broad subjects: the Falklands War, European 
integration and the Cold War. According to Andrew Riley, archivist of the Thatcher papers at 
the Churchill Archives Centre, these were the issues on which she wanted to “refute 
 
1027 Cockfield, ‘Completing the Internal Market’. 
1028 Guasconi, ‘The Single European Act, European Political Cooperation, and the End of the Cold War, 189 
1029 Conversation of the author with Andrew Riley on 7 May 2018. See Margaret Thatcher’s Falklands Memoir, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/1982retpap2.asp. 
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misinterpretations”.1030 Thatcher’s accounts of these events show that asserting national 
sovereignty, such as by defending the Falklands, and the West standing together in the Cold 
War were issues that were important to her. The Cold War aspect remained in the background 
of this dissertation but was nonetheless a significant underlying factor that motivated 
Thatcher to propose an agreement that would strengthen the unity of the EC and the West in 
terms of its shared foreign policy aims.  
Thatcher’s attempt to lead the EC into an intergovernmental agreement to codify 
PoCo was entirely in line with her larger aims to strengthen the role of Britain in the world 
and the West in the Cold War. Thatcher’s policy towards the SEA was consistent with her 
views on the nation state and the Cold War. Moreover, it was in line with the established 
Conservative policy of Britain playing a leading role as member of the EC, which Macmillan 
and Heath had bequeathed to her. The SEA was, therefore, not the outlier it has often been 
characterised as in the literature, but rather an important precursor to the years when 
Thatcher’s views on the EC hardened – a process in which her failure to win the support of 
her fellow heads of government to lead the EC into the codification of PoCo must have 
played a role. However, the fact that her PoCo proposal became enshrined in the EEC treaty 
with the SEA, and the Single Market was liberalised, meant that with the SEA she was 
successful in advancing the policies in Europe that she wanted to see. Therefore, the way that 
Thatcher negotiated the SEA shows that her views on European integration were set in the 
larger themes of Britain’s world role, in the context of the Cold War and as a leading member 
of the European Communities. 
In the way Thatcher negotiated and perceived the SEA, one can detect her limited 
understanding of how her counterparts in the EC saw European integration. Thatcher’s high-
level interventions had worked to force the issue of the BBQ on the agenda of the EC. 
 
1030 Ibid; See also Account by Margaret Thatcher of the European Council on 25-6 June 1984 in Fontainebleau, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/139100. 
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However, when the question was one about winning support for competing visions or 
proposals for the future of the EC, her approach failed to convince her counterparts in the 
European Council. Whilst it may have seemed effective politics to present the paper as a high-
level initiative, refusing to let diplomats try to reach a compromise meant that the paper could 
not garner the necessary support to be successful in a multilateral setting. What may have 
looked like compromise could have been the price for a policy that every EC country could 
accept. Yet it is conceivable that Thatcher did not want a compromise negotiated by the FCO. 
It is even conceivable that she did not want a compromise at all. What is clear is that she 
agreed to propose the codification of PoCo at the Milan European Council, for which she 
tried to win Kohl’s support in advance. For the British government the charm offensive 
towards Kohl was designed to build support for Thatcher’s PoCo paper. Both she and Howe 
were convinced that Kohl’s support was the key to convincing the rest of the European 
Council. Mitterrand, in contrast, was given much less time with Thatcher and was only given 
an advance copy of the PoCo paper, which either suggests Thatcher believed him to back her 
proposals or that she did not want to try to convince him to do so.  
The findings of this dissertation offer new lessons on the bilateral relationship 
between the UK and Germany as well as France. Thatcher and Kohl’s disagreement over the 
role of institutions and different larger visions, as well as famously different personalities, 
were important barriers to presenting a shared proposal. Unlike Thatcher, who wanted 
policies to be narrowly defined, Kohl worried less about open-ended commitments. He 
embraced the term “European Union” as an umbrella phrase for his approach that based 
German foreign policy in a European context. Kohl wanted to strengthen the shared elements 
of European foreign policy, including security aspects, give the EP more power and liberalise 
the Single Market further. Moreover, Kohl was not averse to changing the EEC treaty. 
Thatcher, however, ruled out changing the EEC treaty. She also wanted to extend the Single 
Market and coordinate foreign policy, but was careful not to include security aspects into 
PoCo, for fear of weakening NATO and displeasing the USA. The meeting between Kohl and 
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Thatcher highlighted their disagreements but also failed to build on the areas where both 
leaders saw common ground. Mitterrand was more ambiguous about his long-term aims and 
focused more on technological cooperation. The secretly-written German-French 
counterproposal to Thatcher’s initiative showed that Kohl found it easier, or more important, 
to work with France – despite Mitterrand’s intransigence – than with Thatcher.  
Thatcher’s European moment 
Margaret Thatcher’s attitudes towards European integration have been discussed at 
length in the existing literature. The SEA is usually presented as interlude before she began to 
voice her scepticism towards the EC. This dissertation has argued that the SEA was 
Thatcher’s European moment because she wanted to win the support of Germany and France 
to lead the European Community into an intergovernmental agreement to codify PoCo. The 
PoCo paper was written by the FCO and then accepted by Thatcher as her own initiative, 
which she presented to Helmut Kohl first and then to the European Council. Thatcher’s 
refusal to embed the PoCo initiative in the EEC treaty, or even to give it the status of a treaty, 
betrayed an intergovernmental view of the EC. However, her PoCo proposal did not imply a 
rejection of European integration altogether. Thatcher conceived of the PoCo paper as an 
agreement that should complement the EC as it stood in 1985. Thatcher committed her 
government to collaborating constructively in the EC institutions in order to achieve the 
change she wanted to see in the EC. To convince the other heads of government in the 
European Council to back her PoCo initiative was a learning process for Thatcher. She had 
previously succeeded in the dispute on the BBQ not by positive engagement but mainly 
through dogged insistence. When this dispute was resolved, Thatcher presented her views on 
how to reform the EC with a paper entitled “Europe – the Future” in which she outlined the 
manner in which the EC could be developed in an intergovernmental and market-led way. 
The PoCo paper took one aspect of “Europe – the Future” and developed it into a proposal for 
an intergovernmental agreement. 
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By attempting to convince Helmut Kohl and by presenting the PoCo paper directly to 
the European Council in Milan, with minimal involvement of officials, Thatcher herself took 
charge of European policies. Yet this was done inconsistently because Howe showed the 
paper to his counterparts in the EC but told them that it could not be altered, nor even 
discussed until Thatcher had herself presented the paper to the European Council. Suggesting 
such a course of action could have been a way for Howe to manage his relationship with 
Thatcher. However, in 1985 their relationship was still very good and had not yet become as 
difficult as it would from 1988 and after his resignation as foreign secretary in 1989. It is 
more likely that Thatcher had approved the paper as it was and did not want it to be altered 
until the heads of government had discussed it, for fear its focus could be diluted or its scope 
expanded. By keeping the PoCo paper at the highest political level, the PoCo proposal should 
have reached decision makers in its original form and been accepted there and then as 
intergovernmental agreement. This plan did not come to fruition. The European Council in 
Milan caused an end to Thatcher’s ambition to lead the EC into an intergovernmental 
agreement to codify PoCo by passing a vote to convene an IGC that aimed to negotiate 
changing the EEC treaty.  
When Thatcher’s PoCo plans failed in June 1985, she was not yet ready to give up 
on the detailed content of her proposal. What was needed was a change of approach. Thatcher 
was forced to recognise that even though she had been outdone on the formal aspect of her 
policy, there was a way to salvage the substantive content of what she had wanted to achieve. 
Accordingly, Thatcher adopted a new strategy: she stood back. The new strategy no longer 
put the Prime Minister at the centre, it no longer emphasised foreign policy coordination and 
no longer tried to exclude civil servants. Howe and the FCO officials would represent the UK 
government in the IGC. By virtue of necessity, the new strategy put the FCO in charge of 
negotiating a package and of staying constructively engaged in the IGC, without presenting 
any new policies. At the same time, Thatcher made her agreement to the IGC conditional on 
the shape of the overall package that would emerge after the negotiations had finished. It was 
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her ability to change her approach from wanting to lead in the EC, abandoning her earlier 
refusal to change the EEC treaty in the process – judging the new policies on the basis of their 
content – which made her agreement to the SEA possible. 
Margaret Thatcher’s views on European integration continued to evolve after the 
SEA was agreed and ratified. On 20 September 1988, Thatcher took a speech she was asked 
to give at the College of Europe in Bruges as the occasion to spell out her views about the 
direction the European integration project should take.1031 The backdrop to Thatcher’s Bruges 
speech were a series of speeches by Jacques Delors. He had told the European Parliament on 
6 July 1988 that 80% of economic and social laws would in the future be made on a European 
level.1032 On 8 September 1988, Delors had spoken to a Trade Union Congress conference in 
Bournemouth on the “social dimension” of the Single Market, explaining that Europe was 
going through a “peaceful revolution” and inviting the delegates to “join” the “architects [of] 
Europe”.1033 In the Bruges speech, Thatcher answered many of these claims by arguing that 
cooperating on policies in the EC meant in her view that member states should find areas 
where they could collaborate and that they should do so in an intergovernmental way. In 
Thatcher’s view, shared institutional competences should be limited to what was necessary to 
achieve such intergovernmental collaborations.1034 There was a very political dimension to the 
Bruges speech. She did not mention the word socialism once. Yet with the phrase “We have 
not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at 
a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels” she 
rebelled against what she must have seen as dirigiste attempts to introduce a shared social 
component into the European market.1035  Hence, Thatcher’s view of the EC emphasised the 
 
1031 D. Hannay to J. Kerr, “Invitation to the Prime Minister to address the inauguration of the new academic year 
at the College of Europe, Bruges,” 29 March 1988, https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111772. 
1032 Speech by Jacques Delors to the European Parliament on 6 July 1988, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/113689. 
1033 Speech by Jacques Delors to the Trades Union Congress on 8 September 1988, 
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1034 Speech by Margaret Thatcher to the College of Europe in Bruges, 20 September 1988, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332. 
1035 Ibid. 
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role of nation states, put the market economy at the centre, kept defence in the Western 
alliance and suggested collaboration on a “practical” level.1036 Thatcher’s Bruges speech was 
thereby just as much based on the approach that she had taken in attempting to lead the EC 
into the codification of PoCo as it was grounded in the policies that she had pursued in 
domestic politics as well as on the world stage.  
The argument that Margaret Thatcher was “tricked” into signing the SEA, as 
segments of the literature claim, cannot be substantiated with my research. This dissertation 
researched and presented the policy making and diplomacy of the UK towards the SEA and 
showed with evidence from the primary sources how the discussions were undertaken, 
presented the personalities involved and established that Thatcher acted in accordance with 
her recognised views when agreeing to sign the SEA. In the SEA negotiations, Thatcher went 
through a process of accepting that she had no choice but to change the EEC treaty in order to 
implement the policies on PoCo and the Single Market that she had championed. Therefore, 
Thatcher made a concession on the legal form of the agreement to attain the substantive 
policy goals that she wanted. However, what looked like a concession on form, changing the 
EEC treaty rather than signing an intergovernmental treaty, was in reality a much larger 
question. Taking the SEA as a lens to analyse Thatcher’s attitudes to European integration 
shows that the subject of changing the EEC treaty encapsulated a larger question of 
committing the UK further to a dynamic process of European integration. The dynamic aspect 
rested in the supranational element of the EC, with distinctive executive, legislative and 
judicative bodies, which was a polity in its own right and continued to evolve, as indeed it had 
done since 1950. The fact that Thatcher wanted an intergovernmental agreement on PoCo and 
neither a treaty nor an amendment of the EEC treaty shows how her conception of the EC was 
static, in the sense that she accepted the treaty framework and the institutions of the EC as 
they stood in 1985 but saw no need for the EC to be an evolving polity. Her acceptance to 
 
1036 Ibid. 
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change the EEC treaty looked like a pragmatic concession on form, rather than substance, 
because the SEA achieved the policies that Thatcher originally had advocated. However, 
consciously or otherwise, with the concession to change the EEC treaty, Thatcher also had to 
accept the conceptions of European integration that went with updating the founding treaty of 
the EEC.  
It was this dynamic aspect of European integration that she criticised when she 
addressed the College of Europe in Bruges in 1988. Her attitude to European integration, 
which has been described in the literature as turning negative, was in reality not changing. 
With the Bruges speech, she argued against the underlying concept of the SEA as a treaty 
amendment in a dynamic process of European integration, which problematically was an 
agreement that she had herself helped to bring about. Realising that she had always much 
preferred a static version of the EC, and perhaps also realising that she had departed from this 
by agreeing to change the EEC treaty with the SEA, she attempted to reformulate her views of 
an EC and emphasise the aspects that were static and intergovernmental. Only this time she 
phrased these views in terms that were akin to a vision. In this speech, Thatcher attempted to 
regain the initiative to lead in the EC, which she had sought and lost with the PoCo paper. At 
the same time as she was outlining her renewed European vision in Bruges, she also 
attempted to regain the initiative in her own Cabinet on the issue of European integration. 
None of these considerations speak against her acceptance of Britain as a leading country in 
the EC. Neither does any of this mean that she did not know what she was doing when she 
signed up to the SEA. What this means is that as events were unfolding, Thatcher felt that the 
debate on European integration both at home and abroad was slipping away from her. As a 
consequence, she attempted to regain control of events by outlining a reinvigorated and more 
sharply formulated European vision. 
The constant feature of Thatcher’s attitudes towards European integration was a 
static and intergovernmental view of the EC. Once the SEA was agreed, the way that 
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Thatcher thought about the act began to shift. In some ways she began to revert back to her 
refusal to change the EEC treaty, which had characterised her European policy making in 
spring 1985. An early sign of Thatcher’s changing views was that she began to argue in the 
House of Commons that majority voting had been limited to achieving the Single Market and 
that it would fall into disuse once the Single Market was achieved. In the House of Commons, 
Thatcher began to equate the SEA with the Single Market and majority voting. On 12 
December 1989, she argued that amending the EEC treaty with the SEA was “not necessary 
to achieve the Single Market; it could have been achieved without that”.1037 Thatcher said that 
the central feature of the SEA was that it extended the use of majority voting “for a limited 
purpose” to achieve the Single Market.1038 On 30 October 1990, following the Rome 
European Council, Thatcher argued that the agreement to majority voting was “for the 
specific objective of achieving the Single European Act only” but had been used to pass 
“more matters” on issues to which she believed the House of Commons was opposed.1039 
Later in the debate, she argued that majority voting “should cease when we have the single 
European market”.1040 Therefore, the way that Thatcher perceived the SEA gradually 
morphed into emphasising how it was limited to implementing the Single Market. Perhaps 
she was thinking of the 297 specific provisions in Cockfield’s White Paper on the Single 
Market.  
Thatcher was mistaken in her belief that majority voting would end when the Single 
Market had been established. The SEA itself framed majority voting more broadly than 
Thatcher claimed in this debate. Both the abolition of tariffs in the 1960s as well as the 
successive reduction of non-tariff barriers in the 1980s and 1990s, as part of the 1992 Single 
 
1037 Margaret Thatcher quoted in Hansard, HC Debate on 12 December 1989 vol 163 cc845-56, 
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1989/dec/12/european-council-strasbourg. 
1038 Ibid. 
1039 Margaret Thatcher quoted in Hansard, HC Debate on 30 October 1990 vol 178 cc869-92, 
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1990/oct/30/european-council-rome. 
1040 In this debate Margaret Thatcher also delivered a stinging rebuttal to Jacques Delors arguing for an extension 
of the powers of the European Commission. Thatcher argued that “The President of the Commission, Mr. 
Delors, said at a press conference the other day that he wanted the European Parliament to be the democratic 
body of the Community, he wanted the Commission to be the Executive and he wanted the Council of Ministers 
to be the Senate. No. No. No.” Ibid. 
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Market programme, showed that market regulation or deregulation is just as much a process 
as it is an event. It was this hardening of views on the part of Thatcher, aided by the imagined 
limitations of majority voting, which paved the way for a series of rifts, both in Cabinet and in 
the EC. Most of Britain’s partners in the EC also saw European integration as more of a 
process than as an event. Thatcher’s strident tone both nationally and internationally did 
nothing to ease any of the emerging tensions. This point was at the centre of a split in 
Cabinet, most visible in the disagreements between Thatcher and her long-time ally, Geoffrey 
Howe. This divergence of views between Thatcher and her longest-standing Cabinet 
colleague precipitated a split in Cabinet and would eventually contribute to the end of 
Thatcher’s time as Prime Minister.  
In October 1990, the UK government signed the Pound Sterling up to the ERM, 
under an unfavourable exchange rate. In addition, a new IGC was on the horizon – this time 
on the subject of EMU. Thatcher argued in the House of Commons that EMU meant to her 
“co-operation in Economic and monetary policy”, just as the SEA had defined it.1041 She 
emphasised that this economic cooperation was between “sovereign states”. Drawing her own 
lesson from the SEA, she recalled how the SEA negotiations had started with “very grandiose 
and rather vague designs” and then resulted in a “very much more modest document which 
we were able to sign up to”.1042 She argued that the discussion on EMU would become more 
realistic once member countries of the EC had looked at its detailed aspects. Therefore, to 
Thatcher the SEA served as the guiding principle for the subsequent discussions on European 
integration. It was to her a guide as to what was possible in an IGC and what could be 
achieved when Britain was positively engaged as a leading member of the EC. Because the 
SEA became the standard by which she judged European integration, and in effect became the 
new status quo of her views of the EC, her rejection of EMU and the Maastricht Treaty has to 
be seen in the context of how she negotiated the SEA. Therefore, the SEA became Thatcher’s 
 
1041 Ibid. 
1042 Ibid. 
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European moment, not because it remade Europe in Thatcher’s terms, but because it marked 
that singular yet monumental defining moment when she sought to play a leading role in the 
European Community.  
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Appendix 1: List of characters 
Name Position in 1985 or relation to research topic 
 
Acland, Antony FCO Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
 Head of Diplomatic Service 
Adonnino, Pietro MEP and Chairman of the Adonnino Committee 
Aitken, Jonathan Conservative MP for Thanet South 
Andriessen, Frans The European Commission’s representative in the Dooge 
 Committee (September 1984 to January 1985) 
Andreotti, Giulio Prime Minister of Italy (1976-9), Foreign Minister (1983-9) 
Appleyard, Leonard Principal Private Secretary to Geoffrey Howe 
Armstrong, Robert Cabinet Secretary 
Attali, Jacques Special advisor to French president François Mitterrand 
Baker, Kenneth Secretary of State for education and Science,  
 Minister for Information Technology 
Benn, Anthony Labour MP for Chesterfield 
Bernard, Daniel Foreign policy advisor of French Prime Minister 
Bérégovoy, Pierre French Finance Minister 
Bertele, Franz-Josef Head of Department no. 5: Legal Department  
 at German Foreign Ministry 
Best, Keith Conservative MP for Ynys Môn 
Bianco, Jean-Louis  Chief of Staff to French president François Mitterrand 
Bone, Roger Assistant Private Secretary to Geoffrey Howe (1982-4) 
Brittan, Leon Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
Braithwaite, Rodric FCO Deputy Under-Secretary of State  
 Head of Chancery at UKRep from 1975-1978 
 First head of EI (E) 1973-5 
Bretherton, Russel Under-Secretary at the Board of Trade,  
 UK delegate at the Messina conference in 1955 
Bridges, Lord Thomas UK ambassador to Italy 
Brunson, Michael Journalist for Independent Television New (ITN) 
Budd, Colin Richard Assistant Private Secretary to Geoffrey Howe (1984-7) 
Bullard, Julian UK ambassador to Germany 
Butler, Michael UK permanent representative to the EC (1979-85) 
 UK representative in preparatory group for IGC  
Butler, Robin Principal Private Secretary to Margaret Thatcher (1982-5) 
Carrington, Lord Peter British Foreign Secretary (1979-82) 
Carstens, Karl President of Germany (1979-84) 
Cheysson, Claude French Foreign Minister (1981-4) 
Cockfield, Arthur Secretary of State for Trade (1982-3),  
 European Commissioner (1985-9) 
Coles, A. John Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Thatcher (1981-4) 
Colombo, Emilio President of EP (1977-9), Italian Foreign Minister (1990-3) 
Cossiga, Francesco Prime Minister of Italy (1979-80) 
Couve de Murville, Maurice French Foreign Minister (1958-68) 
Craxi, Bettino Prime Minister of Italy (1983-7) 
Curien, Hubert French minister for Research and Technology 
De Gaulle, Charles President of France (1959-69) 
Deakins, Eric Labour MP for Walthamstow 
Dekker, Wisse CEO of Philips, Chairman of ERT 
Delors, Jacques President of the European Commission (1985-95) 
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Dondelinger, Jean Luxembourg permanent representative to EC (1970-84), 
 Secretary General of ministry of foreign affairs (1984), 
 Luxembourg representative in the Dooge Committee 
 Chair of official preparatory working group for IGC 
Dorrell, Stephen Conservative MP for Loughborough 
Dooge, James Chairman and Irish representative in the Dooge Committee 
Dumas, Roland French Minister for Europe and Foreign Minister (1984-6) 
Dykes, Hugh Conservative MP for Harrow East 
Eaton, Martin FCO Legal Counsellor  
Edwards, Nicholas Secretary of State for Wales 
Elles, Diana Conservative MEP for Thames Valley 
Ersbøll, Niels Secretary General of the European Council 
Fabius, Laurent Prime Minister of France (1984-6) 
Fairweather, Patrick FCO Head of European Community Department  
 (Internal) (1983-85) 
Faure, Maurice French representative in the Dooge Committee  
 Co-signatory of the EEC treaty in 1957 
Fergusson, Adam Special advisor on European Affairs to Geoffrey Howe 
Ferri, Mauro Italian representative in the Dooge Committee 
Fitzgerald, Garret  Prime Minister of Ireland (1981-7) 
Ford, Gerald 38th President of the United States (1974-7) 
Forth, Eric Conservative MP for Mid Worcestershire 
Fretwell, John UK ambassador to France 
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich German Foreign Minister (1982-92), leader of the Free 
 Democratic Party (FDP) and coalition partner of Kohl 
Gilmour, Sir Ian Lord Privy Seal (1979-81), Government spokesman on 
 Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons,  
 Conservative MP for Chesham and Amersham 
Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry French President (1974-81) 
Goodison, Allan UK ambassador to Ireland 
Goulden, John Counsellor and Head of Chancery UKRep 
Guigou, Élisabeth Diplomatic advisor to Mitterrand on European Affairs 
Hadley, David Under-Secretary MAFF 
Hallstein, Walter President of the European Commission (1958-67) 
Hannay, David Assistant Under-Secretary of State (responsible for 
 European integration, 1979-84) 
 UK permanent representative to the EC (1985-90) 
 UK representative in preparatory group for IGC 
 (successor to David Butler) 
Hartmann, Peter Head of European Policy at German Federal Chancellery 
Haunschild, Hans-Hilger Staatssekretär, i.e. holding the rank of a permanent 
 secretary in the German Ministry for Research and 
 Technology 
Heath Edward Prime Minister of the UK (1970-4),  
 Conservative MP for Old Bexley and Sidcup 
Henderson, Nicholas Ambassador to Poland, Germany, France and USA  
Herman, Fernand Belgian representative in the Dooge Committee 
Howe, Geoffrey British Chancellor of the Exchequer (1979-83) 
 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
 (1983-9) 
Howell, David Conservative MP for Guildford 
Hurd, Douglas Secretary of State for NI (1984-5) and HO (1985-9) 
Jackson, Robert Conservative MP for Wantage 
Jay, Michael Foreign affairs counsellor Cabinet Office 
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Jebb, Gladwyn UK permanent representative to UN (1950-4) 
 UK ambassador to France (1954-60) 
Jenkins, Roy President of the European Commission (1977-81) 
 SDP MP Glasgow Hillhead 
Johnston, Russel Liberal party MP for Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber, 
 spokesperson for foreign affairs of the Liberal Party 
Jopling, Michael Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
Kerr, John Principal Private Secretary to Chancellor of the Exchequer 
 (1981-4) 
Kiechle, Ignaz German minister for agriculture 
Kohl, Helmut Chancellor of West Germany (1982-98) 
Kudlich, Christian Head of Department no. 410: European Communities, 
 fundamental issues, institutions, institutions, enlargement 
 and budget at German Foreign Ministry 
La Barre de Nanteuil, Luc de French permanent representative to the EC 
 French representative in the preparatory group for IGC  
Lalumière, Catherine Minister for European Affairs at French Foreign Ministry 
Lambert, John Head of European Communities Branch  
 at department of Employment 
Latham, Michael Conservative MP for Rutland and Melton 
Lawson, Nigel UK Chancellor of the Exchequer (1983-9) 
Legras, Guy Head of European Department at French Foreign Ministry 
Loughhead, Peter  First secretary UKRep (1982-5) 
 Assistant Secretary DTI (1985-92) 
Lubbers, Ruud Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1982-94) 
Luce, Richard Minister for the Arts 
King, Tomas  Secretary of state for Employment (1983-5), 
 Secretary of state for NI (1985-9) 
Kinnock, Neil Leader of the Labour party and opposition (1983-92) 
Kissinger, Henry United States National Security Advisor (1969-75) 
 United States Secretary of State (1973-77) 
McNess, Anne FCO official in research department 
Major, John Prime Minister of the UK (1990-97) 
Marlow, Antony Conservative MP for Northampton North 
Martens, Wilfried Prime Minister of Belgium (1981-92) 
Mercer, M. Official in Cabinet Office 
Meyer-Landrut, Andreas Staatssekretär, i.e. holding the rank of a permanent 
 secretary in the German Foreign Ministry 
Miles, R. Oliver British ambassador to Luxembourg 
Mitterrand, François President of France (1981-95) 
Møller, Otto Danish representative in the Dooge Committee 
Morel, Pierre Political Director in French Foreign Ministry,  
 foreign policy advisor to François Mitterrand 
Mortimer, James Official in Her Majesty’s Treasury 
Mueller-Thuns, Waldemar Department head at German Ministry of Economics 
Nelson, Anthony Conservative MP for Chichester 
Nicholson, Robin Chief scientific advisor to the UK government 
Neuer, Walter Head of Department no. 211: European Integration, 
 Bilateral Relations to States of Western Europe and Turkey 
 at German Foreign Ministry 
Noël, Emile Secretary General of the European Commission 
O’Keefe, Jim Minister of State at the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs 
Papandreou, Andreas Prime Minister of Greece (1981-9) 
Papantoniou, Ioannis Greek representative in the Dooge Committee 
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Pattie, Geoffrey Minister of State at the Department of Trade and Industry 
 Minister for Information Technology 
Perrin de Brichambaut, Marc Chief of Staff to Roland Dumas 
Pfimlin, Pierre President of the European Parliament 
Phillips, Hayden Assistant Under-Secretary of State at HO 
Poos, Jacques Foreign Minister of Luxembourg 
Plumb, Henry Conservative MEP for the Cotswolds, leader EDG 
Powell, Charles Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Thatcher (1984-91) 
Renwick, Robin FCO Assistant Under-Secretary of State (responsible for 
 European integration, successor to David Hannay) (1984-7) 
Rifkind, Malcolm FCO Minister of state for Europe, 
 UK representative in the Dooge Committee  
Ripa di Meana, Carlo The European Commission’s representative in the Dooge 
 Committee (January to March 1985) 
Ruggiero, Rentato Secretary General at the Italian Foreign Ministry 
Ruhfus, Jürgen  German representative in the Dooge Committee, 
 Staatssekretär, i.e. holding the rank of a permanent 
 secretary in the German Foreign Ministry 
Santer, Jacques Prime Minister of Luxembourg (1984-95) 
Schäuble, Wolfgang Federal Minister and Head of German Federal Chancellery 
Schilling, Wolf-Dietrich Head of department no. 200: European integration and 
 EPC, Council of Europe, non-governmental European 
 organisations, WEU 
Schlüter, Poul Prime Minister of Denmark (1982-93) 
Schmidt, Helmut Chancellor of Germany (1974-82) 
Schoeller, Franz Joachim German ambassador to France 
Schreckenberger, Waldemar Federal Minister and Head of German Federal Chancellery 
Shepherd, John Counsellor and Head of Chancery UKRep (1982-4),  
 Head of European Community Department (External) FCO 
 (1985-7) 
Simonet, Henri Belgian Foreign Minister (1977-80) 
Simpson, Julie Official in Her Majesty’s Treasury  
Soames, Christopher European Commissioner (1973-7) 
Spaak, Paul-Henri Prime Minister of Belgium (1938-9, 1946-9),  
 Chairman of Spaak Committee (1955-6) 
Spearing, Nigel Labour MP for Newham South 
Spinelli, Altiero European Commissioner (1970-6), MEP (1979-86), 
 prominent federalist campaigner 
Stabreit, Immo Head of department no. 21: Foreign Ministry, federal 
 ministry for economic cooperation at the German Federal 
 Chancellery 
Stoltenberg, Gerhard German Finance Minister (1982-9) 
Taylor, Edward Conservative MP for Southend East 
Teltschik, Horst Head of department “Foreign and inter-German relations, 
 development politics and external security” at the German  
 Chancellery and personal advisor to Kohl  
Thatcher, Margaret Prime Minister of the UK (1979-90) 
Thomas, Derek Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Europe and  
 Political Director at FCO  
Thorn, Gaston President of the European Commission (1981-5) 
Tickell, Crispin Chef de Cabinet to the President of the European 
 Commission, Roy Jenkins (1977-81) 
 Deputy Under-Secretary of State (1983-4) 
 Permanent Secretary Official Development Assistance 
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Tindemans, Leonard Belgian Foreign Minister (1981-9) 
Trumpf, Jürgen Head of Department no. 40 then from 8 July 1985 head of 
 department no. 41: sub-departments of department no. 4: 
 Foreign economic policy, development and European 
 economic integration at German Foreign Ministry 
Tugendhat, Christopher European Commissioner (1977-85), 
 vice president of European Commission (1981-5) 
Ungerer, Werner Head of department no. 4: Foreign economic policy, 
 development and European economic integration  
 at German Foreign Ministry (1984-5) 
 German permanent representative to the EC (1985-9) 
Varfis, Gregori Greek representative in the Dooge Committee, then 
 European Commissioner 
Van Eekelen, Willem Netherlands representative in the Dooge Committee 
Védrine, Hubert Foreign policy advisor to François Mitterrand 
Vidal, Jean Head of department: Economic affairs and finances at 
 French Foreign Ministry 
Viot, Jacques French ambassador to the UK 
Vogel, Hans-Jochen Chairman of German Social Democratic Party 
Von Braunmühl, Georg Edler Head of department no. 2: Political department  
 at German Foreign Ministry 
Von Wechmar, Baron Rüdiger German ambassador to the UK 
Walker, Peter Secretary of State for Energy 
Wall, Stephen FCO Assistant Head European Community Department 
 (internal) (1983-5), head European Community Department 
 (internal) (1985-8) 
Wicks, Nigel Principal Private Secretary to Margaret Thatcher (1985-8) 
Williamson, David Head of the European Secretariat at the Cabinet Office 
 (1983-7), deputy representative of the UK government to 
 the IGC, UK representative to the Adonnino Committee 
Young, David Ivor Minister without portfolio (1984-5),  
 Secretary of State for Employment (1985-7)  
Younger, Viscount George Secretary of State for Scotland 
 
Where there are no translations in “who’s who”, all translations are mine. Titles were omitted, 
except in the case of hereditary titles.1043  
 
1043 Sources: Who’s Who 1995: An Annual Biographical Dictionary, 147 edition (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1995); Colin Mackie, ‘British Diplomats Directory’, accessed 9 November 2016, 
http://www.gulabin.com/britishdiplomatsdirectory/pdf/britishdiplomatsdirectory.pdf; British Diplomatic Oral 
History Programme, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge University, 
https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/bdohp/; Historical Archives of the European Union, Oral 
History, European University Institute, https://archives.eui.eu/en/oral_history; Pautsch et al., Akten Zur 
Auswärtigen Politik Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1985, 2016, 2:1893 ff.; ‘Who’s Who in France: 
Biographies Des Meilleurs Talents Français’, accessed 11 September 2019, https://www.whoswho.fr/. 
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Appendix 2: Systematic catalogue of search terms 
In order to understand how my search of sources differed from traditional archival 
research one has to understand the change that archives have made in moving away from an 
analogue catalogue towards a digital one. At the National Archive, my main source for 
primary evidence, this shift happened gradually over the past couple of years but with the 
sorting and declassification of the 1970s files out of the way the shift to a reference database 
is now complete and the printing of paper catalogues has been discontinued. In many ways 
one can liken this shift from manual to digital catalogue to no longer producing table of 
contents but more elaborate and searchable indexes. The linearity of the catalogue, with its 
easily understandable overview, has made way for an interactive and searchable database.  
In my research I combined the approach of a manual – or linear – catalogue search 
with a systematic search through databases, which harnessed the power of digital technology 
for my research. It helped me enormously to attend one of the courses that the National 
Archives offer on their different archiving, cataloguing and referencing systems, which of 
course differ depending on the time frame and department one is researching. It also helped 
me for my own research to begin by looking at the traditional book of referencing and look up 
European policy making in the 1979s and then transfer what I had learned on structures of 
departments, subject headings, descriptions and chronologies into the digital world. Equally, 
for the digital world it has helped me enormously to learn how databases are structured and 
used.  
In order to understand my list of search terms below, one has to understand that the 
database responds to codes that make up the search formulas. Moreover, one can filter for 
departments, dates and keywords. The rules for the formulas are as follows: 
1. Terms in inverted commas are searched as one term, rather than separate words 
2. AND connects words or terms and searches for both of them 
3. OR excludes either one or the other of the terms but searches for both of them 
4. Parentheses create levels of search terms that separate codes 
5. Asterisks search for everything, i.e. allow for different endings or spellings of a word 
6. NOT excludes the term mentioned afterwards 
My aim was to develop a set of search formulas that harnessed the strengths of the 
computing powers of the new National Archives catalogue, without losing the benefit of 
overview that the traditional approach (i.e. working through the linear paper-based catalogue) 
offers. I have only done this systematic catalogue search for the UK National Archives 
because that’s where the lion share of my resources came from, whereas other archives have 
other systems, patchier records and I have spent less time researching there.  
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My approach was developed and refined for the purposes of my research through a lot 
of experimenting. I wanted to make sure that nothing significant was excluded and that the 
search terms as well as the formulas that I was developing were suitable for my research. At 
the beginning ,the formula for the search terms were built from the indexed terms in the 
catalogue of the National Archives database. To this end I first conducted a broad research 
that would roughly correspond to an index subject in the traditional paper-based catalogue. 
The searches I launched were the following: 
List 
no. 
KEY WORDS FORMULAS Dept. DATE 
RANGE 
# of 
results 
Analysed for 
1 “European policy” PREM 
19* 
1983-6 87 content 
2 “European community” FCO 1985 725 Key words and 
relevant files 
3 “European Community” AND 
(Brussels OR Milan OR Stresa 
OR Luxembourg OR 
“Intergovernmental 
Conference”) 
FCO 1984-6 149 Key words and 
relevant files 
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The result of these searches gave me the rough equivalent of a list of indexed file 
numbers in the old catalogue, which when printed and sorted by reference number 
corresponded with the paper-based catalogue. I systematically worked through these printouts 
and looked at all the PREM files in detail, i.e. the individual papers in the file reference. I also 
worked through all the FCO file headings identified and all the content of the FCO files on 
the 1985 IGC. The result was a broad overview of the run of policy and a set of key words 
that described aspects or elements of the topic under consideration: 
1. Single European Act 
2. Market or Internal Market 
3. Political cooperation or PoCo 
4. Intergovernmental Conference or IGC (not the Irish one though) 
5. European Parliament (more as a subject than an actor) 
6. European Union (as an aspiration) 
7. Qualified majority voting or majority voting 
8. Variable geometry (the term diplomats used for what the press and parts of the 
literature called “two-speed Europe”) 
9. Luxembourg Compromise (in the files sometimes referred to as “invoking a national 
interest”) 
10. Value added Tax or what in the negotiations was called “monetary amendments [of 
the Treaty of Rome]” 
11. White Paper (of the European commission) on the Single Market 
Once the key terms were set, I defined the key departments for my research. In the 
1980s European policy making happened mainly in the FCO, in Cabinet – in its function to 
coordinate the workings of government – and the Prime Minister’s office, especially when 
Thatcher had to prepare for the European Council. The most important departments for this 
research and their file references are: 
1. Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) 
2. Cabinet (CAB) 
3. Foreign and Commonwealth office (FCO) 
4. Treasury (T) 
The records of the Cabinet Office were analysed separately by reading systematically 
all minutes of the full Cabinet in CAB128 and the relevant Cabinet committees. The 
committees were identified with the list of ministerial and official committees (CAB177/30 to 
31). I consulted CAB130, 133, 134, 148, 165. For an overview of the relevant ministerial and 
official Cabinet committees and an explanation how they relate to my research see chapter 
1.1.1. Moreover, I conducted a systematic search through the records of the European 
Secretariat at the Cabinet Office (CAB193).  
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Log of systematic search of UK National Archives catalogue 
List 
no. 
KEY WORDS FORMULAS DEPARTMENTS DATE 
RANGE 
# of 
results 
1 (“Intergovernmental Conference” OR IGC) 
AND Europ* 
PREM, FCO, T  1985 63 
 (“Intergovernmental Conference” OR IGC) 
AND Europ* 
All depts 1984-6 87 
 (“Intergovernmental Conference” OR IGC) 
AND Europ* 
All depts 1984 0 
 (“Intergovernmental Conference” OR IGC) 
AND Europ* 
All depts 
(included in print) 
1986 15 
 (“Intergovernmental Conference” OR IGC) 
AND Europ* 
All other depts for 
1985 (only CAB) 
1985 9 
2 Milan AND Europ* PREM, FCO, T 
(and all depts) 
1985 9 
 Stresa AND Europ* All depts. 1984-5 1 
3 Brussels AND “European Council” PREM, FCO, T 
(and all depts) 
1985 11 
4 Luxembourg AND “European Council” PREM, FCO, T 
(and all depts) 
1985 15 
5 (Dooge OR Spaak OR “Ad Hoc Committee 
on Institutional affairs”) AND Europ* 
PREM, FCO, T 
(and all depts) 
1984-5 62 
6 “single European act” All depts 1984-5 0 
7 “single European act” PREM, FCO, T 
(and all depts) 
1984-6 21 
8 “Internal Market” PREM, FCO, T 1984-5 30 
 “Internal Market” All depts 1984-5 38 
 "WHITE PAPER" AND "INTERNAL 
MARKET" 
All depts 1984-5 4 
9 "European Political Cooperation" OR 
POCO 
PREM, FCO, T 1984-5 259 
10 ("European Political Cooperation" OR 
POCO) AND (treaty OR procedure OR 
Dooge) 
PREM, FCO, T 
(and all depts) 
1984-6 15 
11 “treaty amendments” PREM, FCO, T 
(and all depts) 
1984-6 8 
12 ("European Union" AND "treaty") NOT 
NATO 
PREM, FCO, T 1984-6 24 
13 (*VOTING* OR "Decision taking") AND 
EUROP* 
All depts 1984-6 9 
14 “variable geometry” All depts 1984-6 1 
15 "Luxembourg Compromise" OR veto  All depts 1984-6 13 
 "Luxembourg Compromise" OR veto OR 
"national interest" 
All depts 1984-6 13 
16 ((VAT OR "value added tax") OR 
"monetary amendments") AND Europ* 
AND treaty 
All depts 1984-6 4 
 ((VAT OR "value added tax") OR 
"monetary amendments") AND Europ*  
All depts 1984-6 26 
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 ((VAT OR "value added tax") OR 
"monetary amendments") AND Europ* 
NOT treaty 
All depts 1984-6 22 
 “European Parliament” All depts 1984-6 187 
17 "powers of the European Parliament" All depts 1984-6 7 
18 "European Parliament" AND (powers OR 
revenue OR treaty* OR "value added tax" 
OR "monetary amendments" OR 
"Luxembourg Compromise" OR veto OR 
"White Paper" OR Dooge OR "single 
european act" OR "european council" OR 
"Internal Market" OR "decision*" OR 
"Intergovernmental Conference" OR Dooge 
OR "european Political Cooperation") 
All depts 1984-6 23 
19 "European Community" AND (powers OR 
revenue OR treaty* OR "value added tax" 
OR "monetary amendments" OR 
"Luxembourg Compromise" OR veto OR 
"White Paper" OR Dooge OR "single 
european act" OR "european council" OR 
"Internal Market" OR "decision*" OR 
"Intergovernmental Conference" OR Dooge 
OR "european Political Cooperation") 
T 1984-6 20 
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Appendix 3: Overview of the most important meetings 
 
Dates Place Level Principal subject of discussion 
(within scope of research) 
25-6 June 1984 Fontainebleau Heads of 
government 
Resolution of British Budget 
Question 
28 September 1984 
to 27-8 February 
1985 
Brussels Personal 
representatives 
of heads of 
government 
Ad Hoc Committee on 
Institutional Affairs 
“Dooge Committee” 
3-4 December 1984 Dublin Heads of 
government 
Interim report of the Dooge 
Committee  
29-30 March 1985 Brussels Heads of 
government 
Dooge Committee report 
submitted but not discussed 
3 May 1985 Bonn Heads of 
government 
Thatcher and Mitterrand briefly 
meet on the margins of an 
economic summit 
18 May 1985 Chequers Heads of 
government 
Thatcher and Kohl discuss 
European integration 
21 May 1985 Paris Foreign 
ministers 
Geoffrey Howe gives Roland 
Dumas the PoCo paper on a 
confidential basis 
8-9 June 1985 Stresa Foreign 
ministers 
Preparation for Milan European 
Council 
28-9 June 1985 Milan Heads of 
government 
Discussion of final report of the 
Dooge Committee; British PoCo 
paper; German-French “Treaty of 
European Union”; IGC called 
9 September to 1 
December 1985 
Brussels Foreign 
ministers 
IGC 
18 November 1985 London Anglo-French 
consultations 
(president, 
Prime 
Minister, and 
ministers) 
Part of regular bilateral 
consultations. Brief meeting 
between Thatcher and Mitterrand 
on the sidelines 
27 November 1985 London Anglo-
German 
consultations 
(Chancellor, 
Prime 
Minister, and 
ministers) 
Part of regular bilateral 
consultations. Brief meeting 
between Thatcher and Kohl on the 
sidelines 
30 November – 1 
December 1985 
Brussels Foreign 
ministers 
“conclave” to prepare the 
Luxembourg European Council 
2-3 December 1985 Luxembourg Heads of 
government 
SEA agreed 
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Appendix 4: Organogram of the key personalities charged with 
European policy making in the FCO (1984-5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(excluding the British ambassadors to Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain 
for reasons of research scope) Adapted from Hennessy, Whitehall, 399, 530 
 
Many thanks to Colin Mackie for his generous assistance and explanations  
Sources: Who’s Who 1995: An Annual Biographical Dictionary, 147th edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1995); Colin Mackie, ‘British Diplomats Directory’, accessed 25 February 2020, 
http://www.gulabin.com/britishdiplomatsdirectory/pdf/britishdiplomatsdirectory.pdf. 
  
Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs 
Sir Geoffrey Howe 
Principal Private Secretary 
Leonard Appleyard 
Assistant Private Secretary 
Roger Bone (1982-4) 
Colin Budd (1984-7) 
Peter Ricketts 
Minister of State for Europe 
Malcolm Rifkind 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (PUS) 
Sir Antony Acland 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Economic 
and Consular Affairs (DUS) 
Rodric Braithwaite 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Europe and 
Political Director (DUS) 
Derek Thomas 
Assistant Under-Secretary of 
State for  
European Integration (AUS) 
(responsible for EC excl. PoCo) 
David Hannay (1979-84) 
Robin Renwick (1984-7) 
Assistant Under-Secretary of 
State for  
Western Europe (AUS) 
(responsible for PoCo) 
Michael Jenkins (1983-5) 
Richard Samuel (1985) 
David Ratford (1986-90) 
UK Ambassador 
to France 
Sir John Fretwell 
UK permanent 
representative to 
the EC 
Sir Michael 
Butler (1979-85) 
David Hannay 
(1985-90) 
UK Ambassador 
to Italy 
Lord Bridges 
UK 
Ambassador to 
Germany 
Sir Julian 
Bullard 
European Community 
(Internal) 
Patrick Fairweather (1983-5) 
Stephen Wall (1985-8) 
 
European Community 
(External) 
John Shepherd 
Special advisor on Europe 
Adam Fergusson 
UK Ambassador 
to Luxembourg 
Oliver Miles 
Western European, Southern 
European, Eastern European 
and Soviet Departments 
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